Governing the Firm: Workers' Control in Theory and Practice

Portada
Cambridge University Press, 2003 M02 17 - 323 páginas
Most large firms are controlled by shareholders, who choose the board of directors and can replace the firms management. In rare instances, however, control over the firm rests with the workforce. Many explanations for the rarity of workers' control have been offered, but there have been few attempts to assess these hypotheses in a systematic way. This book draws upon economic theory, statistical evidence, and case studies to frame an explanation. The fundamental idea is that labor is inalienable, while capital can be freely transferred from one person to another. This implies that worker controlled firms typically face financing problems, encounter collective choice dilemmas, and have difficulty creating markets for control positions within the firm. Together these factors can account for much of what is known about the incidence, behavior, and design of worker- controlled firms. A policy proposal to encourage employee buyouts is developed in the concluding chapter. Gregory L. Dow is Professor and Chair of the Department of Economics at Simon Fraser University, British Columbia, Canada. He previously taught at the University of Alberta and Yale University, and has served as a visiting professor at the University of New South Wales, the Erasmus Institute for Philosophy and Economics, and the Swedish Collegium for Advanced Studies in the Social Sciences. Professor Dow is Associate Editor on the Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization and has published numerous articles on labor-managed firms and other topics in economic theory in leading journals such as the American Economic Review and the Journal of Political Economy.
 

Contenido

Introduction
1
12 The Control Dimension
4
13 Looking for Clues
8
14 A Projected Synthesis
12
15 The Plan of the Book
18
Normative Perspectives
23
22 Equality
24
23 Democracy
27
Views from Economic Theory I
165
Incentives and Information
166
Bargaining and Investment
168
84 Can Asset Specificity Explain the Rarity of Workers Control?
172
85 Work Incentives without Risk Aversion
173
86 Work Incentives with Risk Aversion
178
87 Can Work Incentives Explain the Rarity of Workers Control?
179
Views from Economic Theory II
185

24 Property
32
25 Dignity
34
26 Community
38
27 The Author Shows His Cards
41
Workers Control in Action I
45
32 The Plywood Cooperatives
50
33 The Mondragon Cooperatives
57
Workers Control in Action II
67
42 Employee Stock Ownership Plans
76
43 Codetermination
83
Conceptual Foundations
92
52 The Nature of Authority
98
53 The Locus of Control
101
54 Why Firms Cannot Be Owned
107
55 Asset Ownership
110
56 Residual Claims
114
Explanatory Strategies
117
62 The Replication Principle
119
63 Transaction Costs
121
64 Optimal Contracting
126
65 Adverse Selection
129
66 Repeated Games
132
67 Historical Explanations
135
68 Cultural Explanations
138
69 The Strategy to be Pursued
140
A Question of Objectives
142
72 The Illyrian Firm
143
73 Membership Markets and Labor Markets
148
74 Membership Markets and Stock Markets
152
75 Imperfect Membership Markets
156
76 What does the Evidence Say?
161
77 Some Lessons
163
92 Debt Financing
186
93 Equity Financing
188
94 Can Capital Constraints Explain the Rarity of Workers Control?
189
95 Portfolio Diversification
193
96 Can Portfolio Diversification Explain the Rarity of Workers Control?
197
97 Collective Choice
200
98 Can Collective Choice Explain the Rarity of Workers Control?
204
Transitions and Clusters
207
103 Worker Takeovers
212
104 Degeneration
221
105 Investor Takeovers
224
106 Survival Rates
226
107 Business Cycles
228
108 Clusters
230
Toward a Synthesis
234
112 Credible Commitment toward Labor
240
113 Credible Commitment toward Capital
245
114 The Composition of Control Groups
249
115 The Commodification of Control Rights
251
116 Intellectual History and Current Debates
253
117 Is Workers Control a Unitary Phenomenon?
256
Getting There from Here
260
122 A Modest Proposal
262
123 Reassuring Shareholders
273
124 Governing Firms
276
125 Trading Jobs
279
126 Sample Calculations
282
127 The Long and Winding Road
287
References
291
Index
313
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