Governing the Firm: Workers' Control in Theory and PracticeCambridge University Press, 2003 M02 17 - 323 páginas Most large firms are controlled by shareholders, who choose the board of directors and can replace the firms management. In rare instances, however, control over the firm rests with the workforce. Many explanations for the rarity of workers' control have been offered, but there have been few attempts to assess these hypotheses in a systematic way. This book draws upon economic theory, statistical evidence, and case studies to frame an explanation. The fundamental idea is that labor is inalienable, while capital can be freely transferred from one person to another. This implies that worker controlled firms typically face financing problems, encounter collective choice dilemmas, and have difficulty creating markets for control positions within the firm. Together these factors can account for much of what is known about the incidence, behavior, and design of worker- controlled firms. A policy proposal to encourage employee buyouts is developed in the concluding chapter. Gregory L. Dow is Professor and Chair of the Department of Economics at Simon Fraser University, British Columbia, Canada. He previously taught at the University of Alberta and Yale University, and has served as a visiting professor at the University of New South Wales, the Erasmus Institute for Philosophy and Economics, and the Swedish Collegium for Advanced Studies in the Social Sciences. Professor Dow is Associate Editor on the Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization and has published numerous articles on labor-managed firms and other topics in economic theory in leading journals such as the American Economic Review and the Journal of Political Economy. |
Contenido
Introduction | 1 |
12 The Control Dimension | 4 |
13 Looking for Clues | 8 |
14 A Projected Synthesis | 12 |
15 The Plan of the Book | 18 |
Normative Perspectives | 23 |
22 Equality | 24 |
23 Democracy | 27 |
Views from Economic Theory I | 165 |
Incentives and Information | 166 |
Bargaining and Investment | 168 |
84 Can Asset Specificity Explain the Rarity of Workers Control? | 172 |
85 Work Incentives without Risk Aversion | 173 |
86 Work Incentives with Risk Aversion | 178 |
87 Can Work Incentives Explain the Rarity of Workers Control? | 179 |
Views from Economic Theory II | 185 |
24 Property | 32 |
25 Dignity | 34 |
26 Community | 38 |
27 The Author Shows His Cards | 41 |
Workers Control in Action I | 45 |
32 The Plywood Cooperatives | 50 |
33 The Mondragon Cooperatives | 57 |
Workers Control in Action II | 67 |
42 Employee Stock Ownership Plans | 76 |
43 Codetermination | 83 |
Conceptual Foundations | 92 |
52 The Nature of Authority | 98 |
53 The Locus of Control | 101 |
54 Why Firms Cannot Be Owned | 107 |
55 Asset Ownership | 110 |
56 Residual Claims | 114 |
Explanatory Strategies | 117 |
62 The Replication Principle | 119 |
63 Transaction Costs | 121 |
64 Optimal Contracting | 126 |
65 Adverse Selection | 129 |
66 Repeated Games | 132 |
67 Historical Explanations | 135 |
68 Cultural Explanations | 138 |
69 The Strategy to be Pursued | 140 |
A Question of Objectives | 142 |
72 The Illyrian Firm | 143 |
73 Membership Markets and Labor Markets | 148 |
74 Membership Markets and Stock Markets | 152 |
75 Imperfect Membership Markets | 156 |
76 What does the Evidence Say? | 161 |
77 Some Lessons | 163 |
92 Debt Financing | 186 |
93 Equity Financing | 188 |
94 Can Capital Constraints Explain the Rarity of Workers Control? | 189 |
95 Portfolio Diversification | 193 |
96 Can Portfolio Diversification Explain the Rarity of Workers Control? | 197 |
97 Collective Choice | 200 |
98 Can Collective Choice Explain the Rarity of Workers Control? | 204 |
Transitions and Clusters | 207 |
103 Worker Takeovers | 212 |
104 Degeneration | 221 |
105 Investor Takeovers | 224 |
106 Survival Rates | 226 |
107 Business Cycles | 228 |
108 Clusters | 230 |
Toward a Synthesis | 234 |
112 Credible Commitment toward Labor | 240 |
113 Credible Commitment toward Capital | 245 |
114 The Composition of Control Groups | 249 |
115 The Commodification of Control Rights | 251 |
116 Intellectual History and Current Debates | 253 |
117 Is Workers Control a Unitary Phenomenon? | 256 |
Getting There from Here | 260 |
122 A Modest Proposal | 262 |
123 Reassuring Shareholders | 273 |
124 Governing Firms | 276 |
125 Trading Jobs | 279 |
126 Sample Calculations | 282 |
127 The Long and Winding Road | 287 |
References | 291 |
313 | |
Otras ediciones - Ver todas
Governing the Firm: Workers' Control in Theory and Practice Gregory K. Dow Sin vista previa disponible - 2003 |
Términos y frases comunes
adverse selection agents argue asymmetries authority bargaining behavior Ben-Ner Blasi Bo Gustafsson board of directors capital suppliers capitalist firms Chapter codetermination contracts control group control rights conventional firms coops corporations costs decisions democracy democratic dividends efficiency employee buyouts equilibrium ESOP Estrin example financing firm's free-rider problems Gintis governance structure Hansmann Holmstrom horizon problem Illyrian incentives income individual individual capital industries informational asymmetries input investment investors involves Jones Journal of Economic KMFs and LMFs labor market labor share labor suppliers labor trust labor-managed firm leasing Lega managers Market Socialism maximization membership markets Mondragon monitoring moral hazard organization organizational output owner percent Pérotin physical assets plywood cooperatives problem productivity profit Putterman quasi-rents repeated game residual claims risk risk aversion Robert Rowthorn role Section shareholders social strategy supply Svejnar takeover theory tion voting rights wage wealth worker cooperatives worker-controlled firms workforce
Referencias a este libro
Employee Participation, Firm Performance and Survival Virginie Perotin,Virginie Aida Pérotin,Andrew Robinson Sin vista previa disponible - 2004 |
Allokation der Eigentumsrechte an Unternehmensberatungen: Eine ökonomische ... Katrin Schröder Vista previa limitada - 2006 |