Nested Games: Rational Choice in Comparative PoliticsUniversity of California Press, 1990 - 274 páginas Clearly written and easily understood by the nonspecialist, Nested Games provides a systematic, empirically accurate, and theoretically coherent account of apparently irrational political actions. |
Contenido
In Defense of the RationalChoice Approach | 18 |
Appendix to Chapter 2 | 48 |
Games with Variable Rules or the Politics of Institutional | 92 |
Why Do British Labour Party Activists Commit Political | 119 |
A RationalChoice Approach to Consociationalism | 159 |
The Cohesion of French Electoral Coalitions | 187 |
Appendix to Chapter 7 | 233 |
| 249 | |
| 269 | |
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Términos y frases comunes
activists ALLD argue argument assurance game behavior candidate Chapter chicken game choose coalition cohesion Communists competition conflict considered consociational constituency level contingent strategies correlated strategies defection dilemma game efficient institutions Egmont Pact election electoral system empirical equilibrium example explain Figure folk theorem four games French Fifth Republic game of chicken game theory games in multiple Graphic representation important increases indicates individual institutional design interaction issues iterated games Labour party leaders Left likelihood of cooperation majority marginal ment moderate multiple arenas mutual cooperation Nash equilibrium opponent outcome P₁ Pareto optimal Pareto set partners payoff matrix players political actors political elites possible preferences presented principal arena prisoners probability problem propositions 3.6 R₁ rational-choice approach reasons redistributive institutions represents reselection game rules S₁ seat second round Section situation social Socialists subgame suboptimal T₁ theoretical tion trade unions TRMES variable victory voters winning