LET. I. ANS. TO let me once more beg the favour of a line from you, by which you will lay me under a particular obligation to be, what, with the rest of the world, I now am, Nov. 4. 1713. "Reverend Sir, "Your most obliged Servant, &c." THE ANSWER TO THE FIRST LETTER. " SIR, "Did men who publish controversial papers, accustom themselves to write with that candour and ingenuity with which you propose your difficulties, I am persuaded almost all disputes might be very amicably terminated, either by men's coming at last to agree in opinion, or at least finding reason to suffer each other friendly to differ. What "Your two objections are very ingenious, and urged with great strength and acuteness. Yet I am not without hopes of being able to give you satisfaction in both of them. To your first, therefore, I answer : Whatever may, without a contradiction, be absent from any one place at any one time, may also, without a contradiction, be absent from all places at all times. For, whatever is absolutely necessary at all, is absolutely necessary in every part of space, and in every point of duration. ever can at any time be conceived possible to be absent from any one part of space, may, for the same reason, (viz. the implying no contradiction in the nature of things,] be conceived possible to be absent from every other part of space at the same time, either by ceasing to be, or by supposing it never to have begun to be. Your instance about demonstrating a man to live 1000 years, is what (I think) led you into the mistake; and is a good instance to lead you out of it again. You may suppose a man shall live 1000 years, or God may reveal and promise he shall live 1000 years; and, upon that supposition, it shall not be possible for the man to be absent from all places in any part of that time. Very true; but why shall it not be possible? Only because it is contrary to the supposition, or to the promise of God; but not contrary to the absolute nature of things, which would be the case if the man existed necessarily, as every part of space does. In supposing you could demonstrate a man should live 1000 years, or one year, you make an impossible and contradictory supposition. For though you may know certainly, (by revelation, suppose,) that he will live so long, yet this is only the certainty of a thing true in fact, ANS. TO not in itself necessary: And demonstration is applicable to no- LET. I. thing but what is necessary in itself, necessary in all places and at all times equally. "To your second difficulty, I answer: What exists necessarily, not only must so exist alone, as to be independent of any thing else; but (being self-sufficient,) may also so exist alone as that every thing else may possibly (or without any contradiction in the nature of things) be supposed not to exist at all; and consequently, (since that which may possibly be supposed not to exist at all, is not necessarily existent,) no other thing can be necessarily existent. Whatever is necessarily existing, there is need of its existence in order to the supposal of the existence of any other thing; so that nothing can possibly be supposed to exist, without presupposing and including antecedently the existence of that which is necessary. For instance; the supposal of the existence of any thing whatever, includes necessarily a presupposition of the existence of space and time; and, if any thing could exist without space or time, it would follow that space and time were not necessarily-existing. Therefore, the supposing any thing possibly to exist alone, so as not necessarily to include the presupposal of some other thing, proves demonstrably that that other thing is not necessarily-existing; because, whatever has necessity of existence, cannot possibly, in any conception whatsoever, be supposed away. There cannot possibly be any notion of the existence of any thing, there cannot possibly be any notion of existence at all, but what shall necessarily pre-include the notion of that which has necessary existence: And consequently the two propositions which you judged independent are really necessarily connected. These sorts of things are indeed very difficult to express, and not easy to be conceived but by very attentive minds: But to such as can and will attend, nothing (I think) is more demonstrably convictive. "If any thing still sticks with you in this, or any other part of my books, I shall be very willing to be informed of it; who am, Nov. 10, 1713. "Sir, your assured Friend and Servant, "S. C." "P. S. Many readers, I observe, have misunderstood my second general proposition; as if the words [some one unchangeable and independent being] meant [one only-being,] whereas the true meaning, and all that the argument there requires, is, [some one at least.] That there can be but one, is the thing proved afterwards in the seventh proposition." THE SECOND LETTER. ANS. TO "REVEREND SIR, "I have often thought that the chief occasions of men's difLET. II. fering so much in their opinions, were, either their not understanding each other; or else, that instead of ingenuously searching after truth, they have made it their business to find out arguments for the proof of what they have once asserted. However, it is certain there may be other reasons for persons not agreeing in their opinions; and where it is so, I cannot but think, with you, that they will find reason to suffer each other to differ friendly; every man having a way of thinking, in some respects, peculiarly his own. "I am sorry, I must tell you, your answers to my objections are not satisfactory. The reasons why I think them not so are as follow: "You say; whatever is absolutely necessary at all, is absolutely necessary in every part of space, and in every point of duration.' Were this evident, it would certainly prove what you bring it for; viz. that whatever may, without a contradiction, be absent from one place at one time, may also be absent from all places at all times. But I do not conceive that the idea of ubiquity is contained in the idea of self-existence, or directly follows from it, any otherwise than as whatever exists must exist somewhere. You add ; whatever can at any time be conceived possibly to be absent from any one part of space, may, for the same reason [viz. the implying no contradiction in the nature of things] be conceived possibly to be absent from every other part of space at the same time. Now, I cannot see, that I can make these two suppositions for the same reason, or upon the same account. The reason why I conceive this being may be absent from one place, is, because it doth not contradict the former proof [drawn from the nature of things,] in which I proved only that it must necessarily exist. But the other supposition, viz. that I can conceive it possible to be absent from every part of space at one and the same time, directly contradicts the proof that it must exist somewhere; and so is an express contradiction. Unless it be said, that as, when we have proved the three angles of a triangle equal to two right ones, that relation of the equality ofits angles to two right ones will be wherever a triangle exists; so, when we have proved the necessary existence of a being, this being must exist everywhere. But there is a great difference between these two things; the one being the proof 11. of a certain relation, upon supposition of such a being's exist-LETTER ence with such particular properties; and consequently, wherever this being and these properties exist, this relation must exist too. But, from the proof of the necessary existence of a being, it is no evident consequence that it exists everywhere. My using the word demonstration, instead of proof, which leaves no room for doubt, was through negligence, for I never heard of strict demonstration of matter of fact. "In your answer to my second difficulty, you say; whatsoever is necessarily-existing, there is need of its existence, in order to the supposal of the existence of any other thing. All the consequences you draw from this proposition I see proved demonstrably; and consequently, that the two propositions I thought independent are closely connected. But how, or upon what account, is there need of the existence of whatever is necessarily-existing, in order to the existence of any other thing? Is it as there is need of space and duration, in order to the existence of any thing; or is it needful only as the cause of the existence of all other things? If the former be said, as your instance seems to intimate, I answer, space and duration are very abstruse in their natures, and, I think, cannot properly be called things, but are considered rather as affections which belong, and, in the order of our thoughts are antecedently necessary, to the existence of all things. And I can no more conceive how a necessarily-existing being can, on the same account or in the same manner as space and duration are, be needful in order to the existence of any other being, than I can conceive extension attributed to a thought; that idea no more belonging to a thing existing, than extension belongs to thought. But if the latter be said, that there is need of the existence of whatever is a necessary being, in order to the existence of any other thing; only as this necessary being must be the cause of the existence of all other things; I think this is plainly begging the question; for it supposes that there is no other being exists, but what is casual, and so not necessary. And on what other account, or in what other manner than one of these two, there can be need of the existence of a necessary being in order to the existence of any thing else, I cannot conceive. "Thus, sir, you see I entirely agree with you in all the consequences you have drawn from your suppositions; but cannot see the truth of the suppositions themselves. "I have aimed at nothing in my style but only to be intelligible; being sensible that it is very difficult (as you observe) to express one's self on these sorts of subjects, especially for one who is altogether unaccustomed to write upon them. "I have nothing at present more to add, but my sincerest thanks for your trouble in answering my letter, and for your ANS. TO professed readiness to be acquainted with any other difficulty LET. III. that I may meet with in any of your writings. I am willing to interpret this as somewhat like a promise of an answer to what I have now written, if there be any thing in it which de "Reverend Sir, "Your most obliged humble Servant.” THE ANSWER TO THE SECOND LETTER. "SIR, "It seems to me, that the reason why you do not apprehend ubiquity to be necessarily connected with self-existence, is, because, in the order of your ideas, you first conceive a being, (a finite being, suppose ;) and then conceive self-existence to be a property of that being; as the angles are properties of a triangle, when a triangle exists: Whereas, on the contrary, necessity of existence, not being a property consequent upon the supposi tion of the things existing, but antecedently the cause or ground of that existence; it is evident this necessity being not limited to any antecedent subject, as angles are to a triangle; but being itself original, absolute, and (in order of nature) antecedent to all existence, cannot but be everywhere, for the same reason that it is anywhere.* By applying this reasoning to the instance of space, you will find, that by consequence it belongs truly to that substance whereof space is a property,† as duration also is. What you say about a necessary being existing somewhere, supposes it to be finite; and being finite, supposes some cause which determined that such a certain quantity of that being should exist, neither more or less: And that cause must either be a voluntary cause, or else such a necessary cause, the quantity of whose power must be determined and limited by some other cause. But in original absolute necessity, antecedent (in order of nature) to the existence of any thing, nothing of all this can have place; but the necessity is necessarily everywhere alike. "Concerning the second difficulty, I answer, that which exists necessarily is needful to the existence of any other thing; not considered now as a cause, (for that indeed is begging the question) but as a sine qua non ; in the sense as space is necessary to every thing, and nothing can possibly be conceived to exist without thereby presupposing space: Which, therefore, I apprehend to * See the conclusion of the Answer to the Seventh Letter. |