Separate and unequal: race relations in the AAF during World War IIDIANE Publishing, 2000 - 60 páginas |
Otras ediciones - Ver todas
Separate and Unequal: Race Relations in the AAF During World War II Alan M. Osur Sin vista previa disponible - 2004 |
Separate and Unequal: Race Relations in the Aaf During World War II Alan Osur Sin vista previa disponible - 2012 |
Separate and Unequal: Race Relations in the AAF During World War II Alan Osur Sin vista previa disponible - 2004 |
Términos y frases comunes
332d Fighter Group AAF commanders AAF leaders AAF plan AAF’s accept blacks African Americans Air Corps Air Service Air Staff Army Air Forces assigned Assistant Secretary attitude B.O. Davis Bamber Bridge base black community black flying units black officers black pilots black press black soldiers black troops black units cadets chain of command Civilian Aide club combat Department and AAF Department directives discrimination Eaker effort employment of blacks enlisted Fort Knox Freeman Field Godman Field Hastie Hunter Ira Eaker issue Judge Hastie’s leadership Lovett major McCloy Committee Miami Beach morale NAACP Negro Troop number of black organizations overseas Parrish personnel Pittsburgh Courier political pressure protest race relations racial policies racial problems recreational facilities reported result Secretary of War segregation Selfridge Field small numbers stationed Technical Training tion took Training Command training program treatment Truman Gibson Tuskegee Field utilization of African utilization of black white officers World War II
Pasajes populares
Página 6 - The Army is not a sociological laboratory; to be effective it must be organized and trained according to the principles which will insure success. Experiments to meet the wishes and demands of the champions of every race and creed for the solution of their problems are a danger to efficiency, discipline and morale, and would result in ultimate defeat.1 "The Army is not a sociological laboratory.
Página 37 - AAF, because some of its recent actions were "so objectionable and inexcusable that I have no alternative but to resign in protest and to give public expression to my views.
Página 6 - September 22, would be tantamount to solving a social problem which has perplexed the American people throughout the history of this nation. The Army cannot accomplish such a solution, and should not be charged with the undertaking.
Página 10 - negro pilots cannot be used in our present Air Corps units since this would result in having negro officers serving over white enlisted men," creating "an impossible social problem.
Página 6 - ... experiments within the Army in the solution of social problems are fraught with danger to efficiency, discipline, and morale."7 Winning the war was Marshall's obsession, and rightly so.
Página 47 - Furthermore, he realized that "90 percent of the trouble with Negro troops was the fault of the whites" and directed his staff officers "to give serious thought to handling this important problem.
Página 33 - I will not tolerate any mixing of the races and anyone who protests will be classed as an agitator, sought out, and dealt with accordingly.
Página 31 - I repeatedly gave instructions that I did not want a colored chauffeur.
Página 36 - Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson (left), Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy, and Assistant Secretary of War for Air Robert A. Lovett.
Página 20 - The AAF dogmatically pursued a system of segregation that was almost impossible to maintain. It even went so far as to violate War Department regulations in order to prevent the mixing of whites and blacks in officers