is for us. If the Italians should make an attempt of the kind mentioned now, they would lose all sympathy among the German people. Their act would be looked upon as the act of an enemy, although all Liberal parties of our country acknowledge the right of Italy to Venice-but no further. Perdition will come upon those who now attempt an attack in our rear.'

I then explained to him that which I had stated formerly, in controversy with Harro Harring, through Mazzini's Pensiero ed Azione': that the people of the Duchies themselves had for three years (1848-51) carried on the struggle against Denmark; that Schleswig, like Holstein, had of her own free will sent her representatives to the Constituent Assembly of Germany in 1848-49; and that this was eminently our national cause.

Garibaldi listened attentively. Without further opposition, he gave up the idea of an attack. He even said:-'On the day when German Democracy, when the German nation, unfurls the banner of independence, I will be one of yours in the Schleswig-Holstein cause, and take part on the side of Germany.'

Those only who remember the then state of feeling in this country, can imagine what the result of Garibaldi's projected initiative might have been. The English Cabinet was ready to side with Denmark. So Mr. Gladstone has stated as recently as 1878.3 The intention was to fight Germany, in alliance with France. The Queen, it is true, was strongly opposed to any support being given to Denmark, even as she had been opposed to any support being given to the Slaveholders' rebellion in America, and as she was afterwards opposed to the French view in 1870-71. I have learnt, since, that years ago Prince Alfred (the Duke of Edinburgh) one morning received a letter of eight pages from his mother, impressing upon him not to allow himself to be influenced in the Danish sense.

In the same interview with Garibaldi, as well as some days later in London, French, Polish, Mexican, and North American affairs were touched upon. He showed himself deeply interested in the prospects of Poland. Learning that I was in personal relations with Mr. Cwierczakiewicz, the diplomatic representative of the Secret National Government of Warsaw, he eagerly put many ques

* Defending himself against the Pall Mall Gazette, which had said that, among the party of Mr. Gladstone, distaste for national greatness had grown into a permanent sentiment and a matter of principle, Mr. Gladstone replied:-'I simply ask at what date it was that the Liberal Administration of this country adopted the "permanent sentiment" and the "matter of principle" which have been their ruin?

Not when, in 1863, they invited France to join in an ULTIMATUM TO THE GERMAN POWERS, and to defend Denmark, with us, against the intrigues which Germany was carrying on under the plea of the Duke of Augustenburg's title to the Duchies; and when they were told by Louis Napoleon in reply that that might be a great British interest, but that it had no significance for France.' (Nineteenth Century, of September 1878.)-Napoleon's refusal is to be accounted for by the previous refusal of the English Government to join him in a projected intervention in Polish affairs, which he was supposed to have intended beginning in Rhenish quarters.

tions. For the American Union he expressed the best wishes. He gave it as his opinion that troubles would yet arise for French dominion in Mexico, even though the Empire of Maximilian were established in every part of the country.

On this subject, Ledru-Rollin, Mazzini, and myself had addressed President Lincoln in a Memoir, drawn up by me, showing that the ulterior object of Napoleon's enterprise was the dismemberment of the Union. The Memoir pointed out the help which the popular parties of Europe, of France before all, could afford to the American Republic. President Lincoln, to whom the letter was handed by a United States General, received it favourably. He reserved his final decision for the time of crisis; but before that arrived, the hand of the assassin struck him down. With the special proposals of the Memoir, Garibaldi, to whom I communicated them at Brooke House, fully agreed. He said if the moment for action came, he was ready once more to start an expedition against French dominion in Rome.

In France, a number of officers were known to Ledru-Rollin to be as dissatisfied with the Mexican war as many of the private soldiers and the population were. Had this condition of the public mind been properly used, Napoleon might have fallen through a movement from within. How different would have been the course of contemporary history! As it was, Mentana-Garibaldi's next enterprise was unsuccessfully fought after the Empire of Maximilian had collapsed and the French troops been withdrawn from Mexico.

For the sympathy evinced towards his struggling Commonwealth, President Juarez sent me an official letter of thanks after the death of the Archduke Maximilian. I prize it highly as a remembrance of that truly honest and excellent man whose character shone forth splendidly from the crowd of self-seeking adventurers, so common, unfortunately, among the ephemeral Presidents or Dictators of Central and South American Republics.

In the conversation on English statesmen, Garibaldi, before coming to London, seemed to entertain curiously hopeful ideas as to what he might expect in the way of active help in the future. I was sorry I had to express a contrary view, which he afterwards had reason, more than enough, to acknowledge as having been but too true. To England as a nation he showed himself sincerely, nay lovingly, attached. The maintenance of the Union he, like Mazzini, held to be as necessary for real freedom, as for the ultimate good of Ireland herself.

His words on Germany to me, as recorded at the time in the journals, were:- Pray, tell your compatriots that I wish to show my sympathy with the great German nation in as open and large a manner as possible. Upon your nation, whose solid qualities are a guarantee for the future, the political fate of Europe will finally depend!

He pressed me to stay over night. I had, however, to be back in London the same day, and took leave of him; fully satisfied with the result of the interview.

III.

THE SECRET HISTORY OF 1859-60.

THE inner or secret history of the Italian events of 1859-62 is not yet fully written. Seeing that the part, borne by the several leaders is still so much misunderstood, the following facts may help to bring about a correcter appreciation.

Immediately after the conclusion of the Peace of Villafranca, Mazzini had projected an attack to be made, through the Papal States, upon the Neapolitan kingdom. The war of 1859 he had strongly disapproved. In an interview I had with him, end of December, 1858, in presence of Aurelio Saffi, one of the ex-triumvirs of the Roman Republic, he proved himself fully informed of Louis Napoleon's intention of drawing the sword against Austria-an intention only afterwards declared, to the surprise of Europe, by the famous speech on New Year's Day, 1859. The very details which Mazzini gave to me-namely, that Lombardy only would be aimed at, and that peace would be concluded at once, if Austria yielded after a defeat-turned out to be strangely correct. I found him repeatedly in possession of similar early information; for instance, in 1866.

Of the coming Franco-Italian war he said, in December, 1858, that Garibaldi had conditionally accepted Cavour's offer to range the revolutionary elements under the Sardinian banner.' 'I myself,' he continued, have been asked by the Working Men's Union at Genoa whether this policy was to be adopted. I replied at once: "No! " ' He thought there was reason to fear that a compact dangerous to European security was being formed then between Louis Napoleon and the Czar. Together with Saffi, Campanella, Quadrio, Crispi (subsequently Speaker of the Italian House of Deputies, and Minister), Alberto Mario, Rosolino Pilo, Filippo de Boni, Vitale de Tivoli, C. Venturi, and others, he, on February 28, 1859, issued a protest against the coming war; recommending abstention to his party.

After Villafranca, Mazzini changed his tactics. He then sought to enlarge the area of action. His parole was: Al Centro, al Centro, mirando al Sud!' (To Central Italy-in the direction of the South!') Very much to the astonishment of several of his friends, he addressed a public letter to the King; proposing, for the sake of Italy, to make common cause. He himself, he said, would be ready to go back into exile afterwards, there to die with the Republican principles of his youth intact. When he wrote this, he was staying in seclusion at Florence. On his return to London, he showed to me the official proof of his having entered into relations with Ricasoli.

It has become known since that an offer to revolutionise the South,' which he declared to be easy,' was at the same time made secretly by Mazzini to the King. Victor Emmanuel was only to give his tacit approval, and to convey to Garibaldi a message to this effect, either direct, or through Ricasoli or Farini. In case Austria, however, intervened, the King was openly to support the rising in the Two Sicilies. As this offer had no result, Mazzini approached Garibaldi for the purpose of immediate action.

Victor Emmanuel-this is Mazzini's own statement to me—was to be left now wholly out of the affair, lest Cavour, and through him Louis Napoleon, should get wind of the plan. Garibaldi, as General of the Volunteers, was to suddenly give the order for starting towards the Centre and the South. At Naples, and more so even in Sicily, preparations for a rising had in the meantime been made. Garibaldi accepted. But though he promised to keep silence, Garibaldi thought he might as well inform the King, whose own interest was involved in the expedition, and with whom he was on the best personal terms. The King told Cavour. Cavour informed Napoleon. A thundering despatch from the Tuileries was the result. Garibaldi, on the point of issuing the order for the forward march, received a counter-order from the King, and had to give up the expedition. On November 26, 1859, he resigned his command. Nothing was done.

The Party of Action were wild with rage. An attempt has been made to charge Garibaldi with faithlessness, or worse, for having broached the matter to the King. The fact is, he acted from a mistaken feeling of confidence; being, no doubt, unaware of the previous secret offer made to Victor Emmanuel by Mazzini himself. However, the upshot of all these moves and counter-moves was, that Mazzini now made independent preparations for a rising in Sicily, into which Garibaldi, in the beginning, was not initiated.

Napoleon's decisive protest against the expedition planned in autumn, 1859, was, of course, dictated by due regard for large schemes of his own. He had never intended founding Italian Unity. On the contrary, his idea was merely to procure, at the expense of Austria, a slight aggrandisement to Piedmont which in future was to be a serviceable ally for him, whilst France was to obtain a territorial increase of her own at the expense of Piedmont. In Tuscany, Jerome Napoleon, who shortly before the war had married Victor Emmanuel's daughter; in the Neapolitan Kingdom, Prince Murat were to be introduced as rulers. The whole country was to be grouped into a Confederation under the honorary presidency of the Pope. The French Emperor was to be practically the Lord Paramount of Italy through his military occupation of the Papal States. In slightly altered form, it was the policy of Napoleon I.

Now, the steadiness with which Napoleon III. worked towards his aim, may be seen from a much-forgotten programme drawn up as early as January, 1852, a few weeks after his state-stroke of December 2. The programme found its way into a very influential

German paper, through its Paris correspondent, who received frequent and early communications from the Elysée. He wrote thus :

If I am correctly informed, and I have every reason to believe so, Louis Napoleon intends, even as at home, so also abroad, to introduce an active policy, instead of the merely negative one, as it was until now. For such a bold and active policy-Louis Napoleon thinks-Lord Palmerston alone would be a ready ally. The President proposes to urge the solution of the Eastern Question, and in doing so, to be on the side of England. He then will claim England's assistance in Italy, where, in alliance with Piedmont, he means to intervene against Austria. The Republic (France) is to be aggrandised by Savoy and Nice; Sardinia to be indemnified by Parma, Piacenza, Guastalla, Modena, and Lucca. For the carrying out of this plan, as against Austria's opposition, no war will be shrunk from (soll ... kein Krieg gescheut werden), whilst England will have to take care that the Italian war does not degenerate into a European one.

Here we have the Russian war of 1853-56-the Anglo-French alliance the Italian war-the alliance of Louis Napoleon with Piedmont the aggrandisement of France through Savoy and Nicethe increase of territory for Sardinia-the neutrality of Englandand the localisation' of the war of 1859, foreshadowed word for word! And all in the order in which it happened. It was in the 'Kölnische Zeitung' that this memorable programme was published more than thirty years ago. Only those who think that politics grow of themselves in some mysterious way, independently of the planning of individuals, will be taken by surprise when reading the above.

After 1859, Napoleon continued his endeavour to establish French vassal states in Italy, although Tuscany had escaped from his grasp in the first hurricane of the national movement. At Naples, his emissaries were very active, trying to turn the hatred against Bourbon tyranny into the channels of Bonapartism. Italian patriots had, therefore, good reason to hasten their own preparations in that quarter. Mazzini understood this situation to perfection.

The Bonapartist danger was all the greater because Cavour by no means opposed the scheme of the introduction of Murat at Naples. At present, Cavour is often held to be the real founder of Italian Unity wrongly so. Almost more French than Italian; or, at least, more of a North-Italian than of a large-hearted Italian patriot, Cavour did not believe in the possibility of placing the Two Sicilies under the House of Savoy. Nay, he did not even wish it. In the South-he thought-people are either Bourbonist or Democratic; the middle sort necessary for a useful junction with Piedmont would be wanting. Altogether the South seemed to him a strange, heterogeneous element. Hence he did not care much whether French

agents were busy in that quarter.

Here we come now to the mighty event of 1860-the overthrow of the Bourbon rule. Those who assert, as was done even in a London obituary notice, that Garibaldi was, to a great extent, a puppet worked from Turin,' do not know the simplest facts of the case.