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abolition of slavery, but I also look upon it as a question concerning Humanity. WOE TO THE WORLD IF THE NORTH DID NOT ISSUE AS VICTOR FROM THE STRUGGLE!'

To the Scotch friend mentioned, whose proclivities were for States' rights and the secession of the South, Garibaldi had, however, declared in unmistakable words that America should increase rather than decrease in power, so that it might act as a check and counterpoise to the aristocratic and tyrannic Powers of Europe; and that was one great reason why the leading Liberals of Europe were anxious to see the Union strengthened and consolidated.' Garibaldi also thought that the South had rebelled against a good Government, on the frivolous ground of being defeated in the election of President, and the well-justified fear that, under the new Administration, the institution of slavery would be interfered with; so that, on moral grounds, their attempt at secession was an iniquitous rebellion.'

Owing to the sudden diminution in the export of cotton from the Southern States since the commencement of the American War, Garibaldi took much interest, at that time, in a plan for promoting cotton culture in Italy. It was from Italy that the seeds first came, which served to give greater impulse to the produce of cotton in America. Col. G. Bruzzesi, who makes this statement from a book of Vincenzo Rossi, was the bearer of one of Garibaldi's communications to me on the political affairs of the United States. Bruzzesi also handed me a pamphlet of his own on Cotton Culture in Italy,' in which there is a letter addressed to him by Garibaldi, containing the following passages:- To the south of Italy, which you mention, you ought to add Sardinia. This island is worth a world for agricultural purposes, and especially for the cultivation of cotton, which I tried myself there.'

I do not know what has become of Bruzzesi's project. But in this, as in kindred matters, Garibaldi always proved himself a far-seeing friend of agricultural and industrial progress-a man of the plough and the spade, even as he was of the sword. The best traits of

ancient Romans and Teutons seemed to have blended in him.

After the victory of the American Republic, opinions differed, among its European sympathisers, as to whether it was advisable to bring Jefferson Davis, the prime mover of treason, to trial or not. Garibaldi, always open to generous impulses even at the risk of political security, said on this subject, in a letter to me, dated Caprera, November 24, 1865

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By signing the address to Johnson (the President of the United States) in favour of sparing the life of Davis, I expressed my opinion and my desire. I am sorry that on this point there is no agreement of views among us, as there was against him when the question of the emancipation of an unfortunate race was to be solved.'

IX.

THE FRENCH WAR AGAINST GERMANY (1870-71).

THEN came the time of the colossal struggle between France and Germany

In accordance with the old fighting tactics of France, a section of our country-Prussia-was to be singled out as the object of the attack. The remainder of Germany was to remain a disinterested spectator. Surely, we were told, it was not intended to harm anybody else but the Hohenzollern monarch! Therefore, the programme for the nonce was, in Napoleonic calculation: first, the armed neutrality of the South of Germany; secondly, the establishment of close relations between France and Austria, so as to get the military co-operation of the latter after the first successful thrust against Prussia; thirdly, a secret alliance with Denmark. The rest-so they thought in the Tuileries-would follow in course of time. A'Welfic Legion' was to give trouble to Prussia in Hanover. In Copenhagen, preparations had been made by agents in connection with the Government of Napoleon for forcing King Christian, by means of a popular demonstration before the royal castle, to declare war against Prussia. This latter fact had come to the knowledge of some, at least, in London. Herr von Beust, at Vienna, was known to harbour feelings of revenge against Prussia, and to wait only for the opportune moment to show them by deeds. So the French ambassador certainly stated afterwards.

A feeling of anxiety, of expectant disquiet, characterised the days immediately preceding the war. The tempest had not broken forth yet, but eyes were restlessly directed towards the cloud pregnant with the storm. Much uneasiness was felt as to the possible conduct of Italy. Victor Emmanuel was the father-in-law of Prince Jerome Napoleon. A French party,' moreover, existed distinctly among an influential group of Italian statesmen and generals. Was it not to be feared, under such circumstances, that Rome would be made the price of barter for an alliance against Germany?

This was held at Berlin to be a dangerous possibility. Men of the most divergent views in home politics united, therefore, for the object of bringing about a diversion within Italy itself, in order to counteract the apprehended co-operation with Napoleon. Only Garibaldi or Mazzini were able to do this.

The question was: how could these two leaders, or at least one of them, be induced to act?

The intermediary to whom the matter was entrusted, in the first instance, for the purpose of communicating it to me, was a wellknown German writer and old friend of mine, who, after Sedan, to our great regret turned away from the patriotic cause. He placed the affair entirely in my hands.

Shortly before, on July 16, I had issued an Appeal for the united

defence of Germany,' irrespective of party divisions in north or south. I had spoken in the same sense before the mass-meeting of the London Germans, in the large Gymnastic Hall. On that latter occasion, I had called upon French Democrats to rise against the aggressive policy of Napoleon, and not to allow themselves to be allured by the talk about the so-called "natural frontier"; for if that were to be the parole, why, the natural configuration of the Vosges mountains, the German speech of the people there, and its older history and connection with us, would, all of them, indicate the necessity of recovering for us'... I could not finish the sentence, so powerfully did the thousands assembled break in with their stormy applause which shook the Hall.

The Appeal sent to Germany contained passages reflecting in the strongest and most uncompromising language upon the authors of the royal Prussian policy of 1866. Yet it was copied even in the Berlin papers, for instance, in the Volks-Zeitung,' without let and hindrance-it being deeply felt then that a grave national danger had to be met, for which every kind of moral help was welcome.

The Berlin proposal, as entrusted to me, contained the offer of arms and pecuniary means for the leaders of the Italian Party of Action. But the difficult question remained, as to which of the two eminent leaders should first be approached; for since Mentana a new cloud had arisen between the several sections of Italian patriots. In that attack upon Rome, Garibaldians, Victor Emmanuelists, and Mazzinians had not acted in unison. A Committee sitting in Rome itself was said not to have responded to the preconcerted signal for a rising within the gates of the city. Thus a campaign which had by no means been without some prospect of hope, was defeated more easily than might have been expected.

Either Mazzini or Garibaldi, I thought, had to be approached in the German interest. Whichever of the two lent a willing hand, was to be left full freedom to bring about the co-operation of the Democratic forces in Italy. After a rapid reflection, as demanded by the urgency of the situation, I resolved upon asking Mazzini.

He had been with me not long ago, shortly before his secret departure for Italy. In my communication, which was conveyed to him with every due precaution-as he was then apparently engaged upon a movement against the Government of the King-I urged upon him in a friendly way, for the sake of the cause, to enter without delay into relations with Garibaldi; the military leadership of the latter being absolutely required for the achievement of any

success.

My idea was that an attack should be made-if possible, under the combined political and military direction of Mazzini and Garibaldi -upon the French troops in the Roman territory; the Government at Florence to be left entirely out of the affair. Louis Napoleon had

Einig zur Abwehr des Fremdjochs! By Karl Blind.

to fear from such an attack that either the Democratic Party would get possession of Rome, or that Victor Emmanuel would be driven forward by the force of circumstances. In either case, matters in Italy were complicated, and Germany would not have had to apprehend an attack from the flank by the French party' in Italy. Before me is Mazzini's answer, dated August 1, 1870

Dear Friend,

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The question is not, to attack the French in Rome-they are on the point of going by themselves-but to prevent the alliance of which the abandonment of Rome is the pledge. This alliance between the King and the Emperor is a decided fact. I TAKE THE MATTER UPON ME, if I am aided; but this cannot be done by localising the question, but by overthrowing the government of the Monarchy.

us.

We desire German Unity as we desire Italian Unity; and we hate the Empire. We want Rome AND NIZZA. Aid us, and reckon upon But if help is to be useful to us, it must come with lightning rapidity. . . . [Here a number of details are given as to how the further communications are to be kept up, together with names and addresses.]

It may be that I shall be compelled to change my place of sojourn; but D will always know where I am.

With all my heart

Your friend

JOSEPH MAZZINI.

In the meanwhile, the battles of Wörth and Forbach were fought with unexpected rapidity and the fullest success on the German side. Mazzini soon afterwards was made a captive by the government of Victor Emmanuel, which treated him, however, with a respectful regard and high esteem such as enlightened public opinion felt towards the aged, indefatigable champion and promoter of the idea of national unity. When he came back to London, Mazzini most warmly expressed his thanks to me for the great proof of confidence which Germany had given to him.'

It may not be amiss to mention here that Mazzini, on principle, has always resisted the French claim of virtual hegemony in Europe as put forth not only by the Imperialist, but, down to recent times, also by the revolutionary and republican, party of France. Already in 1832 he wrote:

All minds are turned towards France; all look upon France as the country from which the destinies of every European nation depend. Such a concentration is highly dangerous; it is a sign of slavery rooted still in the public mind by force of custom. France, by the favour of circumstances, by her compact political unity, by a social spirit more diffused there than anywhere else, and by an intelligent insight which has risen to a high degree, has no doubt constituted herself the most powerful centre of activity and of European civilisation; but it is not the exclusive centre-not the

only one. The Europe of freemen does not any longer acknowledge an absolute dictatorship either of princes or of nations. The lever which is to bring down the antiquated political structure, has its fulcrum wherever there is a people ready to rise. . . . It is time we should emancipate ourselves.

Similar and much stronger utterances frequently fell from Mazzini. His own sad experience of 1849 only made his convictions in this respect deeper and more energetic. Almost the first words he spoke to me in the earliest interview I had with him, were to the same effect. Hence his co-operation in the matter above mentioned could be fully relied upon, had circumstances allowed of his coming forward with an active hand.

In the meantime, whilst Mazzini was a prisoner at Gaëta, the Government of Victor Emmanuel, thanks to the German victories, was able at last to obtain possession of the natural capital of the country. What a satire upon the French party' among the Italian generals and statesmen !

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Much to the surprise of many of his best fellow-workers who were enthusiastically in favour of Germany-for instance, of Alberto Mario Garibaldi, after Sedan, suddenly went over to France; for which he received the well-known thanks. German patriots naturally regretted the resolve of the Italian Liberator. Prince Bismarck, however, could scarcely complain. Had not he himself, in 1866, taught Garibaldi to step upon territory of the German Confederation? In that campaign, the Red Shirts were opposed by German Tyrolese volunteers, by students from the University of Vienna, as well as by Austrian troops. The Italian-speaking section of the Tyrolese did, however, not rise in favour of their would-be liberators,' even though Austria was attacked in the front and in the rear, as well as threatened on her Hungarian flank. In the end, Garibaldi's campaign came to nothing.

In 1870, truth to say, he went to France without being called there. Many of those connected with the Government of National Defence did not even wish for his appearance." There was, no doubt, a trait of generous grandeur in his forgetting that in 1849 the Roman Republic had been overthrown by the French Republic; that Nizza had been annexed to France in 1860, which made Garibaldi himself a subject of Napoleon III.; and that at Mentana the chassepots of De Failly had done wonders.' At the same time I think I am only stating the true facts of the case when I say that Garibaldi's resolution to offer his sword to France was connected with two important considerations very little known in public.

First of all, he had been urged by a group of the Party of Action (compare the above letter of Mazzini) to get possession of Nizza, which would not have been a difficult undertaking then; and to

8 See Vita di Giuseppe Garibaldi; narrata da Jessie W. Mario, vol. ii. See the book of his adjutant Bordone: Garibaldi et l'Armée des Vosges. 1871.

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