Appearance and Reality: A Metaphysical EssayAllen & Unwin, 1920 - 628 páginas |
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Términos y frases comunes
Absol Absolute abstraction actual adjective admit æsthetic ance appearance aspects assert attempt become body causation certainly Chapter character conclusion connection consists contradiction course deny desire difference distinction diversity doctrine doubt duration elements error essence essential existence experience external F. H. BRADLEY fact fall false feeling felt finite further hand harmony hence idea ideal iden identity Identity of Indiscernibles implies impossible inconsistent intellect J. S. Mill knowledge less mean merely metaphysics mind monad moral nature not-self object once pain pass perceive perception perfection perhaps personal identity pheno phenomena pleasure positive possess possible predicate present primary qualities principle problem psychical psychology qualities question reality regard relation result secondary qualities seems seen sense sentience side Solipsism somehow soul space stand suppose surely taken temporal thing Thing-in-itself thought tion transcend true truth unity urge whole wholly
Pasajes populares
Página 346 - My external sensations are no less private to myself than are my thoughts or my feelings. In either case my experience falls within my own circle, a circle closed on the outside; and, with all its elements alike, every sphere is opaque to the others which surround it. ... In brief, regarded as an existence which appears in a soul, the whole world for each is peculiar and private to that soul.
Página 443 - If the red slayer think he slays, Or if the slain think he is slain, They know not well the subtle ways I keep, and pass, and turn again. Far or forgot to me is near; Shadow and sunlight are the same; The vanished gods to me appear; And one to me are shame and fame. They reckon ill who leave me out; When me they fly, I am the wings; I am the doubter and the doubt, And I the hymn the Brahmin sings.
Página 527 - The superpersonal, in other words, is either openly or tacitly regarded as impossible. Personality is taken as the highest possible way of experience, and naturally, if so, the Absolute cannot be super-personal. This conclusion, with the assumption on which it rests, may be summarily rejected. It has been, indeed, refuted beforehand by previous discussions. If the term "personal" is to bear anything like its ordinary sense, assuredly the Absolute is not merely personal.
Página 144 - Feeling, thought, and volition (any groups under which we class psychical phenomena) are all the material of existence, and there is no other material actual or even possible.
Página 136 - Hence to think is to judge, and to judge is to criticise, and to criticise is to use a criterion of reality. And surely to doubt this would be mere blindness or confused self-deception. But, if so, it is clear that, in rejecting the inconsistent as appearance, we are applying a positive knowledge of the ultimate nature of things. Ultimate reality is such that it does not contradict itself; here is an absolute criterion.
Página 515 - Reality is one. It must be single, because plurality, taken as real, contradicts itself. Plurality implies relations, and through its relations, it unwillingly asserts always a superior unity.
Página 483 - We can find no province of the world so low but the Absolute inhabits it. Nowhere is there even a single fact so fragmentary and so poor that to the universe it does not matter. There is truth in every idea however false, there is reality in every existence however slight ; and, where we can point to reality or truth, there is the one undivided life of the Absolute.
Página 443 - C'est tout mon sang, ce poison noir ! Je suis le sinistre miroir Où la mégère se regarde. Je suis la plaie et le couteau ! Je suis le soufflet et la joue ! Je suis les membres et la roue, Et la victime et le bourreau...
Página 210 - The Absolute is timeless, but it possesses time as an isolated aspect, an aspect which, in ceasing to be isolated, loses its special character.
Página 142 - Co-existence in feeling is hence an instance and a proof not of self-sufficiency, but of dependence, and beside this it would add a further difficulty. If the nature of our reals is the diversity found at a stage below relations, how are we to dispose of the mass of relational appearance ? For that exists, and existing it must somehow qualify the world, a world the reality of which is discovered only at a level other than its own. Such a position would seem not easy to justify. Thus a mode of togetherness...