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according to his will, than not; because, if he had not rather, then it is not his will. It is a contradiction to say, he wills it, and yet does not choose it, or had not rather it should be so than not. But, if God had rather things should be according to his will than not, then, if a thing fall out otherwise than he' hath willed, he meets with a cross; because, on this supposition, he had rather it should have been otherwise, and therefore he would have been better pleased if the thing had been otherwise. It is contrary to what he chose, and therefore it is of necessity that he must be displeased. It is of necessity that every being should be pleased, when a thing is as he chooses, or had rather it should be. It is a contradiction to suppose otherwise. For it is the very notion of being pleas ed, to have things agreeable to one's pleasure. For the very same reason, every being is crossed, or it is unpleasing to him, when a thing is, that he chose, and had rather should not have been. For it is the very notion of a thing's being cross or unpleasing to any, that it is contrary to his pleasure.

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But if God can meet with crosses and things unpleasing to him, then he is not perfectly and unchangeably happy. For wherever there is any unpleasedness or unpleasantness, it must, of necessity, in a degree diminish the happiness of the subject. Where there is any cross to a being's choice, there is something contrary to happiness. Wherever there is any unpleasedness, there is something contrary to pleasure, and which consequently diminishes pleasure. It is impossible any thing should be plainer than this.

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16. The commands and prohibitions of God are only significations of our duty and of his nature. It is acknowl edged that sin is, in itself considered, infinitely contrary to God's nature, but it does not follow, but that it may be the pleasure of God to permit it, for the sake of the good that he will bring out of it. God can bring such good out of that, which in itself is contrary to his nature, and which, in itself considered, he abhors, as may be very agreeable to his nature, and when sin is spoken of as contrary to the will of

God, it is contrary, to his will, considered only as in itself. As man commits it, it is contrary to God's will; for men act in committing it with a view to that which is evil. But as God permits it, it is not contrary to God's will; for God in permitting it has respect to the great good that he will make it an occasion of. If God respected sin as man res pects it in committing it, it would be exceedingly contrary to his will but considered as God decrees to permit it, it is not contrary to God's will. To give an instance....The crucifying of Christ was a great sin; and as men committed it, it was exceedingly hateful and highly provoking to God. Yet upon many great considerations it was the will of God that it should be done. Will any body say that it was not the will of God that Christ should be crucified? Acts iv, 28. "For to do whatsoever thy hand and thy counsel determined before to be done.".

§ 17. Sin is an evil, yet the futurition of sin, or that sin should be future, is not an evil thing. Evil is an evil thing, and yet it may be a good thing that evil should be in the world. There is certainly a difference between the thing itself existing, and its being an evil thing that ever it came into existence. As, for instance, it might be an eyil thing to crucify Christ, but yet it was a good thing that the crucifying of Christ came to pass. As men's act, it was evil, but as God ordered it, it was good. Who will deny but that it may be so that evil's coming to pass may be an occasion of a greater good than that is an evil, and so of there being more good in the whole, than if that evil had not come to pass? And if so, then it is a good thing that that evil comes to pass. When we say the thing is an evil thing in itself, then we mean that it is evil, considering it only within its own bounds. But when we say that it is a good thing that ever it came to pass, then we consider the thing as a thing among events, or as one thing belonging to the series of events, and as related to the rest of the series. If a man should say that it was a good thing that ever it happened that Joseph's brethren sold him into Egypt, or that it was a good thing that ever it came to pass that

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Pope Leo X. sent out indulgencies for the commission of future sins, nobody would understand a man thus expressing 'himself, as justifying these acts.angelton Mann os

It implies no contradiction to suppose that an act may be an evil act, and yet that it is a good thing, that such an act should come to pass. A man may have been anbad man, and yet it may be a good thing that there has been such a man. This implies no contradiction; because it implies no Contradiction to suppose that there being such a man may be an occasion of there being more good in the whole, than there would have been otherwise. So it no more implies a "Contradiction to suppose that an action may be a bad action, and yet that it may be a good thing that there has been, such an' action. God's commands and calls, and counsels, da imply another thing, viz. that it is our duty to do these things; and though they may be bur duty, yet it may be certain beforehand that we shall not do them.en bas odros bus 22sq

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And if there be any difficulty in this, the same difficulty will attend the scheme of the Arminians; for they allow that God permits sif. Therefore, as he permits it, it cannot be contrary to his will. For if it were contrary to his will as he permits it, then it would be contrary to his will to permit it; for that is the same thing. But nobody will say that God permits sin, when it is against his will to permit it; for this would be to make him act involuntarily, or against his own will.

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51 18! The wrath of man shall praise thee, and the remainder of wrath shalt thou restrain." Psal. Ixxvit 10b If God restrain's sin when he pleases; and when he permits it, bermits it for the sake of some good that it will be an occa"sion of, and does actually restrain it in all other cases; it is evident that when he permits it, it is his will that it should come to pass for the sake of the good that it will be an occasion of. If he permits it for the sake of that good, then he does

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not permit it merely because he would infringe on the creature's liberty in restraining it as is further evident because 'docs' restrain it when that good is not in view. If it be his

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will to permit it to come to pass, for the sake of the good that its coming to pass will be an occasion of; then it is his will to permit it, that by its coming to pass he may obtain that good; and therefore, it must necessarily be his will that it should come to pass, that he may obtain that good. If he permits it, that, by its coming to pass, he may obtain a certain good, then his proximate end in permitting it, is that it may come to pass. And if he wills the means for the sake of the end, he therein wills the end. If God wills to permit a thing that it may come to pass, then he wills that it should come to pass. This is selfevident. But if he wills to permit it to come to pass, that by its coming to pass he may obtain some dend, then he wills to permit it that it should come to pass. For to with to permit a thing to come to pass, that by its com ing to pass good may be obtained, is exactly the same thing as to will to permit it to come to pass, t that it may come to pass, and so the end may be attained. To will to permit a ything to come to pass, that he may obtain some end by its coming to pass, and yet to be unwilling that it, should come. to pass, certainly implies a contradiction.

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If the foundation of that distinction that there is between one man and another, whereby one is a good man, and anothver a wicked man, be God's pleasure, and his causation; then God has absolutely elected the particular persons that are to be godly. For, by supposition, it is owing to his determination. Matth. xi. 25, 26, 27. "At that time, Jesus answered and said, I thank thee, O Father, Lord of heaven and carth, because thou hast hid these things from the wise and prudent, and hast revealed them unto babes. Even so, Father, for so it seemed good in thy sight. All things are delivered unto me - of my Father; and no man knoweth the Son, but the Father; neither knoweth any man the Father, save the Son, and he to whomsoever the Son will reveal him," on

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§ 19. It may be argued, from the infinite power and wisdom of God, that nothing can come to pass, but that it must ⚫be agreeable to the will and pleasure of God that it should come to pass. For, as was observed before, every being had

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rather things should be according to his will, than not. Therefore, if things be not according to his will, it must be for want of power. It cannot be for want of will, by supposition. It must therefore be for want of sufficiency. It must be either because he cannot have it so, or cannot have it so without some difficulty, or some inconvenience; or all may be expressed in a word, viz. that he wants sufficiency to have things as he wishes. But this cannot be the case of a being of infinite power and infinite wisdom. If he has infinite power and wisdom, he can order all things to be just as he wills: And he can order it with perfect and infinite ease, or without the least difficulty or inconveniency. Two things lie before him, both equally within his power, either to order the matter to be, or not to order it to be; and both of them are equally easy to him. One is as little trouble to him as the other; as to easiness or trouble, they are perfectly equal. It is as easy for him to order it, as not to order it. Therefore, his determination, whether it be ordering it, or not ordering it, must be a certain sign of his will in the case. If he does order it to be, this is a sign that his will is that it should be.. And if he does not order it to be, but suffers it not to be, that is as sure a sign that he wills that it should not be. So that, however the thing is, it is a sure sign that it is the will of God that it should be as it is.

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To this nothing can be objected, unless that it is not for want of will, nor want of power in God, that things be not as he would have them, but because the nature of the subject will not allow of it. But how can this be to the purpose, when the nature of the subject itself is of God, and is wholly within his power, is altogether the fruit of his mere will? And cantiot a God of infinite wisdom and infinite power cause the natures of things to be such, and order them so after they are caused, as to have things as he chooses, or without his will's being crossed, and things so coming to pass that he had rather have them otherwise? As, for instance, God foresaw who would comply with the terms of salvation, and who would not!" And he could have forborne to give being to such as he foresaw would not comply, if, upon some consideration, it was

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