shortsighted one; unionists forgive and forget the injuries inflicted on them by the masters much sooner than they do the individual desertions from their own ranks. It is much the same in a conquered country; the victorious invaders are more easily forgiven than the timeservers who change sides and go over to the ranks of the enemy. As a matter of common prudence, unionists ought never to strike against their fellow-workmen, however great the provocation might be; the full force of their energies ought to be reserved for conflicts in which principles are at stake rather than the actions of individual men. Trade-unions in the first place originated out of the repressive Acts of the Legislature which began as early as 1349 by the Statute of Labourers, 23 Edward III., under which men were consigned to prison for asking for a higher rate of wages. To this succeeded the 25th of Edward III., 1351, followed by the Acts of Richard II. 1388, and again in 1390; and the Act of Henry IV. 1406, and subsequently by the Statute of Apprentices, 5th of Elizabeth, cap. 4, by means of which the former Acts were extended so as to embrace and apply to all the handicrafts of the time. These went on accumulating up to 1720, a period of nearly 400 years. Combinations, in the modern sense of the term, were the inevitable and necessary outcome of those changes in industrial life which led to the growth of a capitalist class, men who were not craftsmen, as formerly, but manufacturers; they were fostered by the introduction of machinery, the consequent division of labour, the aggregation of large numbers of workpeople in certain localities, and the inauguration of factory life. These were the more immediate causes of the develop

ment of trade-unions, and the

feeling in favour of them became intensified from the fact that the whole statutory law with reference to labour was in the interests of the masters and adverse to the men. Still there were some provisions which the craftsmen regarded as favourable to them, and they combined to resist the encroachments on their legal rightsrights invaded, be it understood, by the masters: this was the object of all the earlier associations. The masters then sought for, and obtained, further enactments, the intention of which was to suppress the right of association altogether, and to punish rigorously those who dared to join in them. Thus we find, in 1727, the 12th of George I. passed, and again in 1799 the 39th of George III. c. 81, by which all combinations then existing were suppressed; in the year following, 1800, the 40th of George III. was passed, by which all who infringed the statute of the preceding year were to be severely punished. Atrocious as these laws were, they could not repress the tendency to unite, nor did they have the effect of stamping out the unions. Men braved the most cruel penalties rather than submit to the tender mercies of the trading class, and hence we find that coincident with the passing of the latest edict, for intimidating workmen by legal coercion, there grew up the more distinct form of trade-unionism which in a modified shape we see

now.

From 1800 to 1824 the unions developed, and were extended enormously; the laws failed by reason of their stringency, for many employers declined to avail themselves of the terrible weapons placed within their reach, and those who did take advantage of them were seldom proud of their victories. That excesses were sometimes committed by the men, must be admitted; and who can wonder?

The marvel is that such a state of things did not produce a craftsmen's war, more disastrous in its destructiveness than the peasants' war of 1381, or the revolt of the weavers in 1756. The repeal of the combination laws in 1824, although slightly modified in 1825, was due entirely to the concentrated force of the unions as they had organised themselves under the very statutes which were intended to suppress them. The result of the removal of these repressive measures was, that the unions grew and expanded under the eye of the law, and they began to take that form which in later years has shown such vast power and resources. From 1825 to 1871 they were still outside the pale of the law, their funds and property being totally unprotected, so that any dishonest officer could rob the society with impunity, and snap his fingers at those whose hard earnings he had embezzled. The Act of 1871 removed the most crying evils, but it remained for the Acts of 1875, known as the Labour Laws, together with the Act of 1876, to complete their emancipation. It is necessary that so much of their history should be perfectly understood, in order to estimate their character.

The leading features of tradeunions are best seen in their acts. Their constitution is essentially democratic; as a member no man is greater or less than another. Each has an equal voice in all matters pertaining to the union. In all essential particulars they are constituted and governed on a basis exactly similar to that of a social club. Candidates for membership have to be proposed by one member and seconded by another; these have to speak from personal knowledge as to their fitness, abilities as workmen, their capabilities of earning the current wages of the district, their general character, and their desire to be initiated as

members of the union. On the night of election, all these matters have to be vouched for in open lodge; if any member has anything to allege against the candidate he is bound to state it openly. If no objections are raised he is admitted by the vote of the lodge, and is welcomed as a brother by the president in the name of the members. If, on the contrary, something is said to his prejudice he is asked by the president to give an explanation. A private member is at liberty to ask any further question; if the replies are considered satisfactory he leaves the lodge, as a matter of form, while the votes are being taken; after which he is readmitted, and led to the chairman, whose duty it is to read to him certain rules, having reference for the most part to his voluntary submission to the regulations of the society, his conduct as a member, and his be haviour in the lodge during business hours.

Should the replies of the candidates be regarded as evasive or dubious, his admission is sometimes delayed for a week, so that inquiries may be made; if on the second occasion there is still some opposition manifested towards him, the question is put to the vote, and he is admitted or rejected, as the case may be. No man, however, is blackballed in the dark; if he is refused as a member, he knows the reason, and has ample opportunity afforded to him of explaining anything that may be alleged against his candidature.

The question of apprenticeship is sometimes raised, but not often; in olden times legal apprenticeship was invariably insisted on as an indispensable condition of membership, but it is so no longer; in one or two societies an attempt is made to enforce it, but the rule is inoperative-practically dead, except on paper. The only absolute conditions of membership now are, that a

proaching to uniformity. Beyond this the unions do not It go. would be quite as true to say that the masters insist upon a uniform rate, as to say that the unions attempt to do so. In neither case would it be correct. All that we can safely say is, that wages gravitate towards a uniform standard by reason of the operation of two opposite forces; beyond this we are in the region of speculation. There is absolutely no uniform rate imposed in any trade; in the engineers, iron-founders, smiths, boiler-makers and iron ship-builders there are marked variations not only in the same towns, but even in particular shops. Still there is a tendency to uniformity of price for the same kind of work in all trades and professions, quite apart from the action of trade-unions; we see its operations and effects on all hands, whether there are or are not combinations among the workers; it might almost be said to be the result of a natural law. In Government offices copying is paid for at the rate of tenpence the hour; newspaper work is three-halfpence the line; professional fees of all kinds are similarly fixed, not so much by law as by custom. It is in the very nature of things that it should be so, for it applies to prices just as much as it does to wages and salaries.

(2) It is precisely the same with regard to working hours; in certain businesses the office hours are from ten to four, in others from nine to five, in others again from eight to six; in the mechanical and artisan trades they are from six A.M. to five P.M. And this regularity is most useful and convenient to all concerned. When the men sometimes ask for a reduction of working hours, without a corresponding curtailment of their wages, it is said they are demanding 'ten hours' pay for nine hours' work;' but the masters very often try to enforce a reduction, which means ten hours'

·

work for nine hours' pay.' Where is the difference? If the men are wrong, are not the masters equally so? This way of putting the question, however, is only an evasion of the real point at issue. From beginning to end it is purely a question of value; and here it is pertinent to ask, 'Who should fix the value, masters or men?' Labour, we are told, is a commodity, and as such is governed by the same laws as all other commodities. But in the sale of other commodities it is the seller, not the buyer, who fixes the price. If the owner of certain articles wishes to dispose of them, and an intending purchaser desires to buy but will not give the price asked, bargaining takes place; this is what Adam Smith terms the higgling of the market. But in all such cases the two parties occupy equal ground; there is no assumption of authority on either side, or if there is it is the seller who occupies the vantage ground, and not the buyer. If workmen seek to take the same position with regard to their labour, it is denounced as presumption on their part, and yet, be it remembered, they are the sellers of labour, which is their commodity. Still, the assumption on either side of the sole right of determining what shall be paid leads to dictation; this is the point to be avoided. And the day is dawning when masters and men will see that their disputes can best be settled by bargaining, that is by some method of conciliation, or if terms cannot be arranged by this means, then by resorting to an equitable system of arbitration.

The question as to overtime needs no lengthened remarks; systematic overtime is a curse to the men, and of doubtful benefit to the masters. Its evils were recognised by the Legislature when they prohibited the practice in factories and workshops, and they are not less baneful to men than they are to

women and children; in the one case they are prohibited by law, in the other the men are a law unto themselves. Occasional overtime is quite another matter, and few men will object to work extra hours in cases of emergency. Nor do the laws of the union forbid this; the only thing they do is to fix a higher rate for the time so worked than that paid for the ordinary working hours; the intention of such rules is to restrict overtime to occasions of actual and real emergency.

With reference to piecework, there is a great deal of misapprehension in the public mind; it is thought that the unions, as a rule, are opposed to it; this is a mistake. Something likeseventy-five per cent. of all the work of the country is done on the principle of piece-work, and that, too, under the rules and regulations of trade societies. In some trades, it is true, the men combine to resist its introduction; but, rightly or wrongly, their contention is that the practice is unsuited to the particular industry. This might be a matter of dispute, but in all instances each case must be taken on its own merits, and reasoned out by the full light of all the facts connected therewith.

What the unions do not do may be summarised thus: they do not interfere with individual work,

Society

curtail individual labour, pare all workmen down to a dead level of mediocrity, or demand that the same wages shall be paid to all alike, whether bungler or craftsman. In all matters relating to labour trade-unions are protective of the workman's interests; but they have other and not less important functions to perform-namely, they provide the necessary funds for succouring their members in sickness, maintaining them when out of work, compensating them in cases of injury, keeping them in old age, and burying them and their wives when dead. In these respects they are friendly societies and mutual assurance societies combined; and indeed they are much more, for they have one purpose above and beyond any of those, such, for example, as the weekly allowance to members when out of work through depression of trade or other causes.

The whole of those benefits are secured by a payment of one shilling per week, and we venture to affirm that in no other kind of association can anything be found equal to it or like it. By way of example, let us take four of the largest and best organised societies to see how it works. In these the contributions, benefits, constitution, and rules, are in all essential features similar throughout:

Strike

Work gration Pay