 | Henry Longueville Mansel - 1859 - 378 páginas
...Now, in the first place, the very conception of Consciousness, in whatever mode it may be manifested, necessarily implies distinction between one object...by being distinguished from that which it is not. W But distinction is necessarily limitation ; for, if one object is to be distinguished from another,... | |
 | Henry Longueville Mansel - 1859 - 376 páginas
...Now, in the first place, the very conception of Consciousness, in whatever mode it may be manifested, necessarily implies distinction between one object...is, by being distinguished from that which it is not (1). But distinction is necessarily limitation ; for, if one object is to be distinguished from another,... | |
 | 1859 - 806 páginas
...Now, in the first place, the very conception of Consciousness, in whatever mode it may be manifested, necessarily implies distinction between one object and another. To be conscious, we most be conscious of something ; and that something can only be known, as that which it is, by being... | |
 | Henry Longueville Mansel - 1860 - 389 páginas
...Now, in the first place, the very conception of Consciousness, in whatever mode it may be manifested, necessarily implies distinction between one object...by being distinguished from that which it is not. W But distinction is necessarily limitation; for, if one object is to be distinguished from another,... | |
 | John Young - 1860 - 368 páginas
...unsatisfactory in many respects, and is accompanied with statements not only not supported, but untenable. " To be conscious, we must be conscious of something,...is not. But distinction is necessarily limitation." (p. 70.) Why so? Do I limit something, when I say it is not nothing? In the sense of distinguishing,... | |
 | Henry Longueville Mansel - 1860 - 446 páginas
...is coexistence, there is not identity. Any special modification (if consciousness is discerned to be that which it is by being distinguished from that which it is not ; and in this manner consciousness is only possible on the condition of a relation, not merely between... | |
 | Henry Longueville Mansel - 1860 - 428 páginas
...coexist^ ence, there is not identity. Any special modification of consciousness is discerned to be that which it is by being distinguished from that which it is not ; and in this manner consciousness is only possible on the condition of a relation, not merely between... | |
 | Jesse Henry Jones - 1865 - 252 páginas
...Now, in the first place, the very conception of Consciousness, in whatever mode it may be manifested, necessarily implies distinction between one object...by being distinguished from that which it is not." In this statement Mr. Mansel unconsciously assumes as settled, the very question at issue ; for, the... | |
 | Jesse Henry Jones - 1865 - 236 páginas
...Now, in the first place, the very conception of Consciousness, in whatever' mode it may be manifested, necessarily implies distinction between one object...by being distinguished from that which it is not." In this statement Mr. Mansel unconsciously assumes as settled, the very question at issue ; for, the... | |
 | Herbert Spencer - 1865 - 528 páginas
...manifested, necessarily implies distinction. between \onc object and another. To be conscious, we niust be conscious of something ; and that something can...is not. But distinction is necessarily limitation ; forjl if one object is to be distinguished from another, it must possess some form of existence which... | |
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The very conception of consciousness, in whatever mode it may be manifested, necessarily implies distinction between one object and another. To be conscious, we must be conscious of something; and that something can only be known, as that which it is,... 
