2d Argument fbows, That the fole Duty of Man with respect to having any Opinions whatfoever, lies in Free-Thinking. 3d Argument fhows there is no remedy for the great Evil of Superftition, but thinking 4th Argument is taken from the infinite namber 5th Argument is taken from the Establishment of a Society in England, for propagating 6th Argument is taken from the Defign of the 7th Argument is taken from the Conduct of the First Inftance of their Gonduct is their Divi- fions about the Nature and Attributes of God. 47. About Scriptures, and the Au- thority of Scriptures. 52. And about the Second Inftance of their Conduct is their owning the Doctrines of the Church to be contra- dictory to one another and to Reafon. 76 Third Inftance, their Acknowledgment of Abu- Fourth Inftance, their profiffing they will not 82 Fifth Inftance, their charging the most rational Sixth Inftance, their rendring the Canon of Eighth Inftante, their publishing the Argu- ibid. Ninth Inftance, their publifbing the only an- 92 Objections to Free-Thinking answer'd. ift Objection, That Men have not a sufficient Capacity to think freely about any Specu- 2d Objection, That Free-Thinking will pro 3d Objection, That by Free-Thinking Men may poffibly become Atheifts, answer'd. 104 4th Objection, That Priefts are fet apart to think freely for the Laity, and are to be ΙΟΙ 5th Objection, That it is neceffary to the III 6th 6th Objection, That Free-Thinkers are irra (1.) That Free-Thinkers must have most Un- A (3) A LETTER ΤΟ ***** Esquire. SIR, POLOGYS for felf-evident Truths can never have any effect on thofe who have fo little Senfe as to deny them. They are the Foundation of all Reasoning, and the only juft Bottom on which Men can proceed in convincing one another of the Truth: and by confequence whoever is capable of denying them, is not in a condition to be inform'd. Mere igno-. rant Men, or Men deftitute of thofe Principles of Knowledg, may perhaps be capable of Information: Their Ignorance does not exclude them from affenting to a felf-evident Truth when they first hear it, nor from admitting any Confequences deducible from it. But Men who deny what is felf A 2 evident, evident, are not only deftitute of the Principles of Knowledg, but muft in virtue of fuch their Denial have Principles inconsistent with the Principles of Knowledg, and confiftent with the greatest Abfurditys. And under that dif temper'd State of Mind, it remains only for them to take up with fome disorder'd Fancys of their own; or, which is much more common, with the Dictates of artificial defigning Men or crack-brain'd Enthufiafts: for as none else prefume to be Guides to others in Matters of Speculation, fo none who think they ought to be guided in thofe Matters make choice of any but fuch for their Guides. And if they ever depart from the Sentiments. they have once imbib'd, and from being obftinate in one Set of Opinions become obftinate in another; their Change muft ftill be founded on the fame Motives, and their Opinions be as abfurd as at firft. For as Truth will never ferve the Purposes of Knaves, fo it will never fuit the Understandings of Fools; and the latter will ever be as well pleas'd in being deceiv'd, as the former in deceiving. It is therefore without the leaft hopes of doing any good, but purely to comply with your Request, that I fend you this Apology for Free-Thinking; which, as it is one of thofe Subjects too evident to be made plainer, and, which ought to be admitted on the first Propofal, fo all that can be faid in its behalf must be built on Topicks lefs evident than the thing it self, SECT, |