either capacity of understanding, or external strength. For when there are external defects and obstacles, they would be no obstacles, were it not for the imperfection and limitations of understanding and strength.

Corol. If things for which men have a moral Inability, may properly be the matter of precept or command, then they may also of invitation and counsel. Commands and invitations come very much to the same thing; the difference is enly circumstantial: Commands are as much a manifestation of the Will of him that speaks, as invitations, and as much testimonies of expectation of compliance. The difference between them lies in nothing that touches the affair in hand. The main difference between command and invitation consists in the enforcement of the Will of him who commands or invites. In the latter it is his kindness, the goodness which his Will arises from: In the former it is his authority. But whatever be the ground of the Will of him that speaks, or the enforcement of what he says, yet, seeing neither his Will nor expectation is any more testified in the one case than the other; therefore a person's being known to be morally unable to do the thing to which he is directed by Invitation, is no more an evidence of insincerity in him that directs in manifesting either a Will, or expectation which he has not, than his being known to be morally unable to do what he is directed to by command. So that all this grand objection of Arminians against the Inability of fallen men to exert faith in Christ, or to perform other spiritual gospel duties, from the sincerity of God's counsels and invitations, must be without force.

SECTION V.

That Sincerity of Desires and Endeavors, which is supposed to excuse in the Nonperformance of Things in themselves good, particularly considered.

IT is what is much insisted on by many, that some men, though they are not able to perform spiritual duties, such as repentance of sin, love of God, a cordial acceptance of Christ as exhibited and offered in the gospel, &c. yet they may sincerely desire and endeavor these things; and therefore must be excused; it being unreasonable to blame them for the omission of those things, which they sincerely desire and endeavor to do, but cannot do.

Concerning this matter, the following things may be ob

served.

1. What is here supposed, is a great mistake and gross absurdity; even that men may sincerely choose and desire those spiritual duties of love, acceptance, choice, rejection, &c. consisting in the exercise of the Will itself, or in the disposi tion and inclination of the heart; and yet not be able to perform or exert them. This is absurd, because it is absurd to suppose that a man should directly, properly and sincerely incline to have an inclination, which at the same time is contrary to his inclination: For that is to suppose him not to be inclined to that, to which he is inclined. If a man, in the state and acts of his Will and inclination, does properly and directly fall in with those duties, he therein performs them: For the duties themselves consist in that very thing; they consist in the state and acts of the Will being so formed and directed. If the soul properly and sincerely falls in with a certain proposed act of Will or choice, the soul therein makes that choice its own. Even as when a moving body falls in with a proposed direction of its motion, that is the same thing as to move in that direction.

2. That which is called a desire and willingness for those inward duties, in such as do not perform them, has repect to these duties only indirectly and remotely, and is improperly represented as a willingness for them; not only because (as was observed before) it respects those good volitions only in a distant view, and with respect to future time; but also because evermore, not these things themselves, but something else, that is alien and foreign, is the object that terminates these volitions and desires.

A drunkard, who continues in his drunkenness, being under the power of a love, and violent appetite to strong drink, and without any love to virtue; but being also extremely covetous and close, and very much exercised and grieved at the diminution of his estate, and prospect of poverty, may in a sort desire the virtue of temperance; and though his present Will is to gratify his extravagant appetite, yet he may wish he had a heart to forbear future acts of intemperence, and forsake his excesses, through an unwillingness to part with his money: But still he goes on with his drunkenness; his wishes and endeavors are insufficient and ineffectual: Such a man has no proper, direct, sincere willingness to forsake this vice, and the vicious deeds which belong to it: For he acts voluntarily in continuing to drink to excess: His desire is very improperly called a willingness to be temperate; it is no true desire of that virtue; for it is not that virtue, that terminates his wishes; nor have they any direct respect to it. It is only the saving his money, and avoiding poverty, that terminates and exhausts the whole strength of his desire. The virtue of temperance is regarded only very indirectly and improperly, even as a necessary means of gratifying the vice of covetousness.

So a man of an exceeding corrupt and wicked heart, whe has no love to God and Jesus Christ, but, on the contrary, being very profanely and carnally inclined, has the greatest distaste of the things of religion, and enmity against them; yet being of a family, that from one generation to another, have most of them died, in youth, of an hereditary consumption; and so having little hope of living long; and having been in

structed in the necessity of a supreme love to Christ, and gratitude for his death and sufferings, in order to his salvation from eternal misery; if under these circumstances he should, through fear of eternal torments, wish he had such a disposition: But his profane and carnal heart remaining, he continues still in his habitual distaste of, and enmity to God and religion, and wholly without any exercise of that love and gratitude, (as doubtless the very devils themselves, notwithstanding all the devilishness of their temper, would wish for a holy heart, if by that means they could get out of hell :) In this case, there is no sincere willingness to love Christ and choose him as his chief good: These holy dispositions and exercises are not at all the direct object of the Will: they truly share no part of the inclination or desire of the soul; but all is terminated on deliverence from torment: And these graces and pious volitions, notwithstanding this forced consent, are looked upon as undesirable; as when a sick man desires a dose he greatly abhors, to save his life.....From these things it appears,

3. That this indirect willingness which has been spoken of, is not that exercise of the Will which the command requires; but is entirely a different one; being a volition of a different nature, and terminated altogether on different objects; wholly falling short of that virtue of Will, which the command has respect to.

4. This other volition, which has only some indirect concern with the duty required, cannot excuse for the want of that good will itself, which is commanded; being not the thing which answers and fulfils the command, and being wholly des titute of the virtue which the command seeks.

Further to illustrate this matter..... If a child has a most excellent father, that has ever treated him with fatherly kindness and tenderness, and has every way, in the highest degree merited his love and dutiful regard, being withal very wealthy; but the son is of so vile a disposition, that he inveterately hates his father; and yet, apprehending that his hatred of him is like to prove his ruin, by bringing him finally to poverty and abject circumstances, through his father's

disinheriting him, or otherwise; which is exceeding cross to his avarice and ambition; he therefore, wishes it were otherwise But yet, remaining under the invincible power of his vile and malignant disposition, he continues still in his settled hatred of his father. Now, if such a son's indirect willing. ness to have love and honor towards his father, at all acquits or excuses before God, for his failing of actually exercising these dispositions towards him, which God requires, it must be on one of these accounts. (1.) Either that it answers and fulfils the command. But this it does not by the supposition; because the thing commanded is love and honor to his wor thy parent. If the command be proper and just, as is sup posed, then it obliges to the thing commanded; and so noth ing else but that can answer the obligation. Or, (2.) It must be at least, because there is that virtue or goodness in his indirect willingness, that is equivalent to the virtue required; and so balances or countervails it, and makes up for the want of it. But that also is contrary to the supposition. The willing ness the son has merely from regard to money and honor, has no goodness in it, to countervail the want of the pious filial respect required.

Sincerity and reality, in that indirect willingness, which has been spoken of does not make it the better. That which is real and hearty is often called sincere; whether it bein virtue or vice. Some persons are sincerely bad; others are sincerely good; and others may be sincere and hearty in things, which are in their own nature indifferent; as a man may be sincerely desirous of eating when he is hungry. But a being sincere, hearty and in good earnest, is no virtue, unless it be in a thing that is virtuous. A man may be sincere and hearty in joining a crew of pirates, or a gang of robbers. When the devils cried out, and besought Christ not to tor ment them, it was no mere pretence; they were very hearty in their desires not to be tormented; but this did not make their Will or desires virtuous....And if men have sincere desires, which are in their kind and nature no better, it can be no excuse for the want of any required virtue.