CHAPTER XII.

SUCCESSION AND DISTRIBUTION.

[* § 480. The right of succession next considered.

§ 481. This must be, as to personalty, by the ler domicilii.

§ 481 a. The same law decides the persons entitled.

§ 481 b-482 a. The foreign jurists concur in this view.

483. By the common law, succession to immovables is determined by lex rei sitæ.

§ 483 a -483 d. The foreign jurists generally concur in this view.

§ 484. The persons who are to take realty ascertained by lex rei sitæ.

§ 484 a. The foreign jurists concur in this view.

§ 485-489. The combination of real and personal estate in the same will often present embarrassing questions.

§ 489 a. Other difficult questions arise in regard to charges on real estate, portions of which are situate in different states.

§ 489 b.

Questions of embarrassment also arise as to remedies against heirs.

489 c. Nice questions often arise between heirs and devisees.

§ 490. The construction of a will referred to the law of the place where made.

§ 491. The law of the actual domicil of testator at death fixes the construction of the will.

§ 491 a. Successions governed by the law of the domicil of the intestate.

§ 491 b. The construction of wills determined by law of domicil.

§ 491 c. Whether a person dies intestate must be referred to the law of his domicil at death.

§ 491 d. Questions of legitimacy as affecting the construction of wills.

§ 480. HAVING considered the operation of foreign law, in regard to testaments of movable property, and of immovable property, we next proceed to the right of succession in cases of intestacy, or, as the phrase is, of succession ab intestato. And, here, the preceding discussions have left little more to be done, than to state the general principles applicable to each species of property.

§ 481. First, in relation to movable property. The universal doctrine, now recognized by the common law, although formerly much contested, is, that the succession to personal property is governed exclusively by the law of the actual domicil of the intestate at the time of his death. It is of no consequence, what is the

1 Suarez v. Mayor, &c., of New York, 2 Sandf. Ch. R. 173. Many of the authorities, to sustain this point, have been already cited, ante, § 380 to 385, § 465 to 474. But some others may be here referred to. Pipon v. Pipon, Ambler, R. 25; Thorne v. Watkins, 2 Ves. R. 35; 1 Chitty on Comm. and Manuf. 661; Sill v. Worswick, 1 H. Black. 690, 691; Bruce v. Bruce, 2 Bos. & Pull. 229, note; Hunter v. Potts, 4 T. R. 182; Potter v. Brown, 5 East, R. 130; Doe d. Birth

country of the birth of the intestate, or of his former domicil, or what is the actual situs of the personal property at the time of his death; it devolves upon those, who are entitled to take it, as heirs or distributees, according to the law of his actual domicil at the time of his death.1 Hence, if a Frenchman dies intestate in America, all his personal property, whether it be in America, or in France, is distributable according to the statute of distribution of the state where he then resided, notwithstanding it may differ essentially from the distribution prescribed by the law of France.

§ 481 a. So, the like rule prevails in the ascertainment of the person who is entitled to take as heir or distributee. The law of the domicil, therefore, is to decide, whether primogeniture gives a right of preference, or an exclusive right to the succession, and whether a person is legitimate, or not, to take the succession. So, whether persons are to take per capita, or per stirpes; and the nature and extent of the right of presentation. Thus, for example, in England, and in some of the American States, there is no right of representation beyond that of brothers' and sisters' children, as to the right of distribution, in cases of intestacy of immovable property. If, therefore, a man should die, leaving a brother and whistle v. Vardill, 5 Barn. & Cresw. 438, 450 to 455 ; S. C. 9 Bligh, R. 32 to 88; 2 Clark & Finnell. R. 571; Ennis v. Smith, 14 How. 400; Lawrence v. Kitteridge, 21 Conn. 577; Holcomb v. Phelps, 16 Conn. 127; Yates v. Thomson, 3 Clark & Finnell. R. 554; Robertson on Succession, ch. 6, p. 104 to 117; Id. ch. 8, p. 118 to 201; Thornton v. Curling, 8 Sim. R. 310; Price v. Dewhurst, 8 Sim. R. 279, 299; Moore v. Budd, 4 Hagg. Eccles. R. 346, 352; 4 Burge, Comm. on Col. and For. Law, Pt. 2, ch. 4, § 5, p. 156 to 170; ante, § 362, 367, 378. For a long time the law of Scotland was unsettled on this point; but it now coincides with that of England. Robertson on Succession, ubi supra; 4 Burge, Comm. ubi supra; Stairs, Instit. B. 3, tit. 8, § 35; Ersk. Instit. B. 3, tit. 9, § 4; Livermore, Dissert. 162, 163; Olivier v. Townes, 14 Martin, R. 99; Shultz v. Pulver, 3 Paige, R. 182; De Sobry v. De Laistre, 2 Harr. & Johns. R. 193, 224, 228; Holmes v. Remsen, 4 Johns. Ch. R. 460; S. C. 20 Johns. R. 229; Savatier, 3 Johns. Ch. R. 190; Erskine, Inst. B. 3, tit. 2, § 40, 41; Id. B. 3, tit. 9, § 4; 2 Kames, Equity, B. 3, ch. 8, § 3, 4, p. 333, 345; 1 Boullenois, Observ. 20, p. 358; 2 Boullenois, 54; Id. 57; Fergusson on Marr. and Div. 346, 361; Vattel, B. 2, § 85, 103, 110, 111; Hertii, Opera, De Collis. Leg. § 4, n. 26, p. 135, edit. 1737; Id. p. 192, edit. 1716; Huberus, De Confi. Leg. Lib. 1, tit. 3, § 15; Henry on Foreign Law, p. 13, 14, 15; Id. p. 46, 196; J. Voet, ad Pand. Lib. 38, tit. 17, § 34, p. 596; Harvey v. Richards, 1 Mason, R. 418; 2 Froland, Mém. 1294; 2 Dwarris on Statut. 649; Price v. Dewhurst, 3 M. & Craig, 76, 82; Preston v. Melville, 8 Clark & Finnell. 1, 12.

1 Ibid.

De Couche v.

sister, and the grandchildren of a deceased brother, the latter would not take anything in virtue of a representation of the deceased brother.1

§ 481 b. This same doctrine is maintained with equal broadness by foreign jurists. It is founded in a great measure upon the doctrine, that movables have no situs, and accompany the person of the owner; so that in fictione juris they are always deemed to be in the place of his domicil. Mobilia sequuntur personam, et ejus ossibus adhærent.2 Thus Rodenburg, referring to the effect of a change of domicil on succession, takes the very distinction between movable property and immovable property, founded upon its nature and character. Jus rebus succedendi immobilibus, semper a loco rei sitæ metiendum, huc non pertinet; succedendi mobilibus pertinet; quod ea certo loco non circumscripta, comitentur personam a domicilio ejus accipientia leges.3 Boullenois fully

1 4 Burge, Comm. on Col. and For. Law, Pt. 2, ch. 4, § 5, p. 156 to 160. As in cases of movable property, the law of the domicil is thus held to regulate the succession and distribution thereof; the question may often become important, what is the actual domicil. As to this, see ante, § 44 to 50. Upon this subject many difficult questions may arise. See, for example, De Bonneval v. De Bonneval, 1 Curteis, R. 856; Attor. Gen. v. Dunn, 6 Mees. & Welsb. R. 511. But the rule itself may require some modification, where the law of the domicil of the intestate is intended to take away the rights of persons, who might otherwise succeed to movable property in another country, by a sort of hostile perversity. Thus, it has been said, that, under the Berlin and Milan decrees passed by Napoleon, Englishmen were rendered incapable of succeeding to the personal estates of intestates dying in Italy. Such a law might require England to disallow the operation of the general rule, as to personal property of the same intestate situate in England. See Koster v. Sapte, 1 Curteis, Eccl. R. 691; ante, § 472, note. Suppose a person should die in transitu from his acquired domicil, the question might then arise, whether the law of his native domicil, or of his acquired domicil, or of his intended domicil, was to govern. It seems clear, that a domicil, whether native or acquired, is not lost by a mere abandonment. It is not defeated animo merely; but animo et facto, and necessarily remains until a subsequent domicil is acquired, at least unless the party dies in transitu to his intended domicil. This last qualification of the doctrine, though stated by a learned judge, may be exactly the point of a doubt, whether it varies the rule. Munroe v. Douglass, 5 Madd. R. 379. See also 2 Boullenois, Appx. p. 59, 60; Jennison v. Hapgood, 10 Pick. R. 77, 99.

2 See ante, § 362, 377, 378; 4 Burge, Comm. on Col. and For. Law, Pt. 2, ch. 4, § 5, p. 157; Fœlix, Conflit des Lois, Revue Etrang. et Franç. Tom. 7, 1840, § 32, p. 221, 222.

Rodenburg, de Div. Stat. tit. 2, Pt. 2, ch. 2, § 1; 2 Boullenois, Appx. p. 59; 2 Boullenois, ch. 2, p. 54.

concurs in this opinion.1 Burgundus holds the same opinion.2 Perhaps it might, with quite as much accuracy, be said, that the doctrine is founded in a great public policy, observed, ex comitate, by all nations, from a sense of its general convenience and utility, and its tendency to avoid endless embarrassments and conflicts, where personal property has often changed places; which is the view entertained by John Voet.3

§ 482. Paul Voet has put the principle in a compendious manner. Idem ne inferendum de statutis, quæ spectant successiones ab intestato? Respondeo, quod ita; rem enim afficiunt, non personam, ut legibus loci, ubi bona sita sunt, vel esse intelliguntur, regi debeant. Immobilia statutis loci, ubi sita; mobilia loci statutis, ubi testator habuit domicilium. And again: Verum an, quod de immobilibus dictum, idem de mobilibus stutuendum erit? Respondeo, quod non. Quia illorum bonorum nomine nemo censetur semet loci legibus subjecisse. Ut quæ res certum locum non habent, quia facile de loco in locum transferuntur; adeoque secundum loci statuta regulantur, ubi domicilium habuit defunctus.5

§ 482 a. Sandius, in speaking of successions, takes the like distinction between movables and immovables. Aliud judicium est de mobilibus, quæ ex conditione personarum legem accipiunt, nec loco continere dicuntur, sed personam sequuntur, et ab ea dependent; et ideo omnia ubicunque mobilia legibus domicilii subjiciuntur.6 Strykius affirms the same doctrine; as do Gaill, and Christinæus, and John Voet. The latter says: Cæterum occasione variantium in successionem intestatam statutorum, generaliter observandum est, bona defuncti immobilia, et quæ juris interpretatione pro talibus habentur, deferri secundum leges loci, in quo sita 1 2 Boullenois, Observ. 33, p. 57, 63, 64.

• Burgundus, Tract. 2, n. 20, 21; Id. Tract. 1, n. 26.

J. Voet, ad Pand. Lib. 38, tit. 17, n. 34, Tom. 2, p. 596; post, § 482 a, note. 4 P. Voet, § 4, ch. 3, n. 10, p. 135, edit. 1716; Id. p. 153, edit. 1661; ante, § 475.

'P. Voet, De Stat. § 9, ch. 1, n. 8, p. 255, edit. 1715; Id. p. 309, edit. 1661. See also to the same point, John Voet ad Pand. Tom. 1, Lib. 1, tit. 4, Ps. 2, n. 11, p. 44; ante, § 362, n. 3.

Sand. Decis. Frisic. Lib. 4, tit. 8, Defin. 7, p. 194.

Strykius, de Success. Diss. 1, ch. 4, n. 3; Gaill, Pract. Observ. Lib. 2, Observ. 124, n. 18, p. 552; Christin. Decis. Cur. Belg. Vol. 2, Decis. 3, n. 2, 3, p. 4; J. Voet, ad Pand. Lib. 38, tit. 17, De Success. ab Intestato, n. 34, Tom. 2, p. 596; Fœlix, Conflit des Lois, Revue Etrang. et Franç. Tom. 7, 1840, § 37, p. 307 to 311; 4 Burg. Comm. on Col. and For. Law, Pt. 2, ch. 4, § 5, p. 156 to 158.

sunt; adeo, ut tot censeri debeant diversa patrimonia, ac tot hæreditates, quot locis, diverso jure utentibus, immobilia existunt. Mobilia vero ex lege domicilii ipsius defuncti, vel quia semper domino præsentia esse finguntur, aut (ut exposui,) ex comitate, passim usu.1 Bynkershoek is equally positive. Omnino igitur interest scire non tam, ubi quis decessit, quam ubi decedens domicilium habuit; nam si hoc sciamus, secundum leges domicilii hæ-. reditas intestati defertur, sive major, sive minor decesserit quod ad mobilia nempe, et quæ pro mobilibus habentur.2

§ 483. Secondly, in relation to immovable property. And here a very different principle prevails at the common law. The descent and heirship of real estate are exclusively governed by the law of the country, within which it is actually situate. No person can take, except those, who are recognized as legitimate heirs by the laws of that country; and they take in the proportions, and the order, which those laws prescribe.. This is the indisputable doctrine of the common law.3

§ 483 a. Foreign jurists are not, indeed, universally agreed, even as to this point, although certainly they differ less than in most other cases. It may truly, be said, that the generality of them, (having a great weight of authority,) unequivocally admit, that the descent and distribution of real estate are, and ought to be, governed by the lex rei sita. On this head it might seem al1 J. Voet, Comm. ad Pand. Lib. 38, tit. 17, n. 34, Tom. 2, p. 596.

2 Bynkers. Quest. Privat. Jur. Lib. 1, ch. 16, p. 179, 180.

3

4 Burge, Comm. on Col. and For. Law, Pt. 2, ch. 4, § 5, p. 151, 152; Doe d. Birthwhistle v. Vardill, 5 Barn. & Cres. p. 451, 452; S. C. 6 Bligh, R. 479, note; 9 Bligh, R. 32 to 88; 1 Rob. R. (House of Lords) p. 627; ante, § 364 to 366, § 426 to 429; post, § 483 a, note; S. P. Bunbury v. Bunbury, 1 Jurist, (English,) 1839, p. 104.

The authorities to this point also have been already cited, ante, § 424 to 448. See Doe dem. Birthwhistle v. Vardill, 5 Barn. & Cres. 438; United States v. Crosby, 7 Cranch, R. 115; Kerr v. Moon, 9 Wheaton, R. 556, 570; McCormick v. Sullivant, 10 Wheaton, R. 192; Dunbar v. Dunbar, 5 Louis. Ann. R. 159; Darby v. Mayer, 10 Wheaton, R. 469; Hosford v. Nichols, 1 Paige, R. 220; Cutter v. Davenport, 1 Pick. R. 81; Wills v. Cowper, 2 Hamm. R. 124; 1 Hertii, Opera, De Collis. Leg. § 4, n. 26, p. 135; 1 Boullenois, 25, 223, &c.; 1 Froland, Mém. 60, 61, 65; P. Voet, De Stat. § 4, ch. 2, n. 6, p. 123; J. Voet, ad Pand. Lib. 1, tit. 4, Pt. 2, § 3, p. 39; Ersk. Inst. B. 3, tit. 2, § 40, 41, p. 515; D'Aguesseau, Œuvres, Tom. 4, p. 637; Huberus, Lib. 1, tit. 3, § 15; 2 Dwarris on Statut. p. 649; Rodenburg, Pt. 2, tit. 2, ch. 2; 2 Boullenois, Appx. p. 59, 63; 2 Boullenois, 54, 57, 383; 2 Froland, Mém. ch. 7, p. 1288; Fœlix, Conflit des Lois, Revue Etrang. et Franç. Tom. 7, 1840, § 37, p. 307 to 312; 4 Burge, Comm. on