on the fourth, the enemy having, contrary to custom, pressed forward during the hours of darkness, occupied a hill that commanded the road. Encouraged by the indefatigable Xenophon, they gained, after a desperate effort, a still higher mountain, which enabled them to attack their pursuers with success. The barbarians fled, and the brave Greeks passed on without interruption, Tissaphernes and Ariæus shunning their encounter, and turning from the road as they approached.

These marches and manœuvres brought them to the point where a range of mountains strikes down to the river-bank, leaving no room for troops to pass between them and the stream, which was so deep that their pikes, with which they sounded, did not reach the bottom. It is very doubtful what mountains can here be meant; for a late intelligent traveller, Colonel Shiel, a military man too, assures us that the Zaco range, which is by Rennell and Kinneir supposed to be that in question, does not come within six miles of the river; and that the intervening space is by no means so narrow. The Buhtan ridge, mentioned by the colonel as about six miles farther north than that of Zaco, agrees better with the description of Xenophon; but then there is no mention whatever made of passing the Khabour, a stream fifty yards wide, knee-deep, and very rapid in the month of August, which must have been crossed to reach those hills.

Here, although a Rhodian proposed that the army should cross the Tigris on rafts of inflated skins, and pledged himself for success, the Grecian generals resolved to turn towards the north, and cross the Carduchian Mountains.

In order to avoid interruption from the enemy, they commenced their march at night, and, traversing the intervening plain, reached the foot of the hills by break of day. The natives who inhabited the villages fled to the high grounds, leaving abundance of provisions behind; but they afterward attacked the strangers from the heights, and both parties sustained some loss.

Next day, the supernumerary slaves and sumpter horses being abandoned, the Greeks prepared for the arduous march that was before them; and, in spite of storms and every other obstacle, they steadily pursued their way, guided by certain prisoners; but their progress being necessa rily slow, they had the mortification of occasionally losing,

by the missiles of the enemy, some brave men, whose bodies they could neither bury nor carry off. On the following morning, having sent a party of volunteers with a guide to occupy some cliffs that commanded a pass, over which lay their road, the rest of the army advanced, though exposed to great danger on account of the immense stones which the barbarians continually rolled down upon them from the precipices. At night, they took advantage of a dense mist to press forward; and, coming up with their rude assailants, they routed them; after which they passed the first mountain. Two others were won in like manner, with immense toil; and they were congratulating themselves on their success, when their active enemy commenced an attack in the rear, and cut off a detachment which had been left to guard a post. Attempts to treat with them were made in vain. They recovered some of the dead in exchange for the guides they had captured; found plenty of provisions in the villages as they passed along; but every day was a succession of struggles, attended with great fatigue and loss; for the Carduchians, who were skilful archers, had very long bows, which they drew by pressing them with their left foot, and the arrows pierced through the shields and corslets of the Greeks. On the fifth day's march it appears that they reached the plain of the River Centrites, which is by Kinneir supposed to be the Nicephorius of the Romans, and the Khabour of the present day. But it is clear that these two rivers are entirely different, and could not, by any construction, be represented as forming the boundary between Armenia and the country of the Carduchians, which last is barely penetrated by the Khabour. From this, indeed, it might be inferred that the followers of Xenophon entered the mountains at a point north of the Buhtan range, in which case the Centrites might be the Betlis chai, which rises among the lofty peaks northeast of Lake Van, and may therefore be fairly held as the southern boundary of Armenia. But, in fact, the description given by the author of the Anabasis, however graphic, is of too general a character, and contains too few recognisable points or names to be traced with accuracy, even were we better acquainted than we are with the geography of that part of the country. It is impossible, we conceive, to pronounce where the Greeks made their ascent, or even to identify the river which they

soon afterward crossed with so much boldness and skill in the face of a very determined enemy. There, however, we must take leave of Xenophon and his brave soldiers, who had yet much toil and danger to encounter before they could attain a sight of their native land. We have accompanied them to the confines of Armenia; and such of our readers as desire to learn their farther adventures, will find the narrative of their leader well illustrated by the labours of Rennell.

Seventy years after this celebrated achievement, the battle of Arbela or Gaugamela transferred the empire of Asia from Darius to Alexander the Great. The events which led to this revolution belong so entirely to another subject already handled in this work, that we shall not describe them here. On the death of the renowned conqueror, Babylonia and Mesopotamia, together with Syria, passed into the hands of the Seleucidæ, from whom they were in turn wrested by the Parthian dynasty of the Arsacidæ, about the year B.C. 164. In the possession of these last they remained, until the Mithradatic war led Lucullus in pursuit of Tigranes into Mesopotamia, when he took possession of Nisibis, B.C. 68. This was the first occasion on which a Roman army entered into that remote country.

In the year B.C. 64, Pompey reduced Syria to a Roman province, of which, nine years afterward, Marcus Licinius Crassus was made proconsul. Being an avaricious as well as an ambitious man, he regarded with an envious eye the power and supposed riches of the Parthians; and, in spite of the remonstrances of certain tribunes of the people, who represented them as faithful allies of the Roman nation, resolved to invade their country. Accordingly, having arrived at the seat of his government, where one of his first acts was to plunder the Temple of Jerusalem, he marched to the Euphrates, which he crossed by a bridge of boats; and, taking the Parthians at unawares, speedily overran Mesopotamia, then a part of their empire. But, instead of pursuing his success, by making himself master of Babylonia, and penetrating to Seleucia and Ctesiphon, he repassed the river in the beginning of autumn, leaving but 7000 foot and 1000 horse to secure his conquests.

This hasty retreat gave the natives time to recollect themselves; and Orodes their king, a warlike prince, immediately assembled a numerous army, while he sent am

bassadors to Crassus to inquire the reason of his unexpected aggression. This general, who had spent the winter in extorting money from the Syrians and shamelessly plundering the temples, but who, at the approach of spring, assembled his army in order to recommence the war, when the Parthian deputies, reminding him of the treaties which they had entered into with Sylla and Pompey, offered to forget the past, and to permit the garrison to retire unmolested out of Mesopotamia, upon the single condition of his ceasing from farther hostilities, haughtily replied that they should have his answer at Seleucia. The chief of the ambassadors, by name Vageses or Vahesis, smiling at this response, showed the Roman commander the palm of his hand, and exclaimed, "Sooner, Crassus, shall you see hair grow here, than be master of Seleucia;" and, without adding another word, retired.

Orodes immediately took the field, leading one half of his army in person to make a diversion on the side of Armenia, while the other half, under the celebrated Surenas, marched into Mesopotamia, and soon recovered most of the cities which the invader had captured in the preceding year.

This Surenas-an appellation which, we are told by St. Martin, was that of a great Parthian family, and not a title-was not only one of the most influential individuals about the court of his sovereign, but also a consummate general. The Romans who had the good fortune to escape from Mesopotamia brought fearful accounts of the number, strength, and power of the enemy. They assured their fellow-soldiers that not only were the Parthians perfectly well disciplined, but that, while their defensive armour was so excellent as to resist the heaviest darts, their weapons were so sharp and strong that the buckler proved no defence against them. Crassus, considering these reports as the exaggerations of fear, resisted all remonstrances, and, being re-enforced with 6000 troops by the King of Armenia, commenced his march, although that monarch, even while promising him farther assistance, advised him by all means to avoid the sandy deserts of the low country. Accordingly, with several legions, 4000 horse, and a great many auxiliaries, making in all about 40,000 men, he crossed the Euphrates at Zeugma, the present Kelaat e Roum. Pressed by the advice of his officers,

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he had consented to keep by the river-bank all the way to Seleucia, when Abgarus, king of Edessa, whom the Romans believed to be their friend, but who was in reality devoted to Surenas, unfortunately prevailed on him to alter his plan. The crafty barbarian represented the Parthians as already in utter dismay; and assured him that, in the war he was going to wage, feet and wings would be required to catch a flying enemy, rather than arms to fight a resolute one, and that he himself was prepared to lead them to certain victory. Conducted by this treacherous monarch, the legions entered first a green plain, divided by many rivulets, which afforded them easy and pleasant marching. But, as they advanced, the scene gradually changed; the roads grew worse; and they had to climb mountains and rocks, which brought them to a sandy waste where there was neither food nor water to be obtained. While beginning to suspect the honesty of their guides, a messenger from the sovereign of Armenia acquainted Crassus that the invasion of his own country by Orodes would prevent him from sending any farther aid; but he repeated his advice to avoid the barren plains, where his troops would perish with hunger, and take the mountainous road to Armenia, where he might join forces with him against the common enemy. Yet the Roman commander, with a degree of blindness that appears incomprehensible, still put faith in Abgarus, who led them some days across a burning desert, without hill or tree, or even a blade of grass, and not a drop of water to quench their increasing thirst.

To this condition were matters reduced when the scouts gave information that a numerous army of Parthians were at hand to attack them. Crassus immediately drew up his fainting and exhausted men, at first following the advice of the quæstor Cassius, who proposed an extended line, in order to occupy more ground, but instantly changed this arrangement, according to the suggestions of Abgarus, who, assuring them that the Parthians were but few in number, advised a compact disposition. So the troops were drawn up in a square, with a detachment of horse to support each cohort, twelve of which composed the front on every side. In this order they came to the banks of the Balissus, the present Belejick, where most of the This would lead to the belief that Crassus did not cross the Euphra