This last passage gives room for some reflections, which may very much contribute to the knowledge of the genius and character of the Persian government. In the first place, the king there spoken of, that is, Darius, was one of the most celebrated princes that ever reigned in Persia, and one of the most deserving of praise, on account of his wisdom and prudence: though he had his failings. It is to him, as well as to Cyrus, that the greatest part of those excellent laws are ascribed, which have ever since subsisted in that country, and have been the foundation and standard of their government. Now this prince, notwithstanding his extraordinary penetration and ability, thought he stood in need of advice; nor did he apprehend, that the joining a number of assistants to himself, for the determination of affairs, would be any discredit to his own understanding; by which proceeding he really showed a superiority of genius which is very uncommon, and implies a great fund of merit. For a prince of slender talents and a narrow capacity, is generally full of himself; and the less understanding he has, the more obstinate and untractable he generally is he thinks it want of respect to offer to discover any thing to him which he does not perceive; and is affronted, if you seem to doubt that he, who is supreme in power, is not the same in penetration and understanding. But Darius had a different way of thinking, and did nothing without counsel and advice: Illorum faciebat cuncta consilio.

Secondly, Darius, however absolute he was, and how jealous soever he might be of his prerogative, did not think he impaired or degraded it when he instituted that council; for the council did not at all interfere with the king's authority of ruling and commanding, which always resides in the person of the prince, but was confined entirely to that of reason, which consisted in communicating and imparting their knowledge and experience to the king. He was persuaded that the noblest character of sovereign power, when it is pure, and has neither degenerated from its origin, nor deviated from its end, is to govern by the laws;* to make them the rule of his will and desires; and to think nothing allowable for him which they prohibit. In the third place, this council, which every where accompanied the king (ex more regio semper ei aderant,) was a perpetual standing council, consisting of the greatest men and the best heads of the kingdom; who, under the direction of the sovereign, and always with a dependency upon him, were in a manner the source of public order, and the principle of all the wise regulations and transactions at home and abroad. To this council the king transferred from himself several weighty cares, with which he must otherwise have been overburdened; and by them he likewise executed whatever had been resolved on. It was by means of this standing council, that the great maxims of the state were preserved; the knowledge of its true interests perpetuated; affairs carried on with harmony and order; and innovations, errors, and oversights prevented. For in a public and general council things are discussed by unsuspected persons; all the ministers are mutual inspectors of one another; all their knowledge and experience in public matters are united together; and they all become equally capable of every part of the administration: because though, as to the executive part, they move only in one particular sphere of business, yet they are obliged to inform themselves in all affairs relating to the public, that they may be able to deliver their opinions in a judicious

manner.

The fourth and last reflection I have to make on this head is, that we find it mentioned in Scripture, that the persons of which this council consisted, were

Two things, which, as the Scripture informs us, were practised by the Persians, might very much contribute to instruct the king and his council in the methods of governing with wisdom and prudence. The first was, their having public registers, wherein all the prince's edicts and ordinances, all the privileges granted to the people, and all the favours conferred upon particular persons, were entered and recorded. The second was, the annals of the kingdom, in which all the events of former reigns, all resolutions taken, regulations established, and services done by any particular persons, were exactly and circumstantially entered. These annals were carefully preserved, and frequently perused both by the kings and the ministers, that they might acquaint themselves with times past; might have a clear idea of the state of the kingdom; avoid an arbitrary, unequal, uncertain conduct; maintain a uniformity in the conduct of affairs; and, in short, acquire such light from the perusal of these books, as should qualify them to govern the state with wisdom.

SECTION III.-THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE. To be king, and to be judge, is but one and the same thing. The throne is a tribunal, and the sovereign power is the highest authority for administering justice. God hath made you king over his people, (said the queen of Sheba to Solomon), to the end that you should judge them, and render justice and judgment unto them. God hath made every thing subject to princes, to put them into a condition of fearing none but him. His designs in making them independent, was to give them the more inviolable attachment to justice. That they might not excuse themselves on pretence of inability or want of power, he has delegated his whole power unto them; he has made them masters of all the means requisite for the restraining injustice and oppression, that iniquity should tremble in their presence, and be incapable of hurting any persons, whatsoever.

But what is that justice which God hath intrusted to the hands of kings, and whereof he hath made them depositaries? Why, it is nothing else but order; and order consists in observing a universal equity, and taking care that force do not usurp the place of law; that one man's property be not exposed to the violence of another; that the common ties of society be not broken; that artifice and fraud do not prevail over innocence and simplicity; that all things rest in peace under the protection of the laws; and the weakest among the people find sanctuary in the public authority.

We learn from Josephus, that the kings of Persia used to administer justice in their own persons. And it was to qualify them for the due discharge of this duty, that care was taken to have them instructed, from their tenderest youth, in the knowledge of the laws of their country; and that in their public schools, as we have already mentioned in the history of Cyrus, they were taught equity and justice, in the same manner as rhetoric and philosophy are taught in other places.

These are the great and essential duties of the regal dignity. Indeed it is reasonable, and absolutely necessary, that the prince be assisted in the execution of that august function, as he is in others; but to be assisted, is not to be deprived, or dispossessed. He continues judge, as long as he continues king. Though he communicates his authority, yet does he not resign or divide it. It is therefore absolutely necessary for him to bestow some time upon the study of equity and justice; not that he need enter into the whole detail of particular laws, but only acquaint himself with the

principal rules and maxims of the law of his country, that he may be capable of doing justice, and of passing sentence with precision, upon important points. For this reason, the kings of Persia never ascended the throne till they had been for some time under the care and instruction of the Magi, who were to teach them that science, whereof they were the only masters and professors, as well as of the religion of the country.

Now since to the sovereign alone is committed the right of administering justice, and that within his dominions there is no other power of administering it than what is delegated by him; how greatly does it behove him to take care into what hands he commits a part of so valuable a trust; to know whether those he places so near the throne, are worthy to partake of his prerogative; and industriously to keep all such at a distance from it, as he judges unworthy of that privilege! We find that in Persia their kings were extremely careful to have justice rendered with integrity and impartiality. One of their royal judges' (for so they called them) having suffered himself to be corrupted by a bribe, was condemned by Cambyses to be put to death without mercy, and to have his skin put upon the seat where he used to sit and give judgment, and where his son, who succeeded him in his office, was to sit, that the very place whence he gave judgment, should remind him continually of his duty. Their ordinary judges were taken out of the class of old men, into which none were admitted till the age of fifty years: so that a man could not exercise the office of a judge before that age, the Persians being of opinion, that too much maturity could not be required in an employment which decided upon the fortunes, reputations, and lives of their fellow-citizens. Amongst them, it was not lawful either for a private person to put any of his slaves to death, nor for the prince to inflict capital punishment upon any of his subjects for the first offence; because it might rather be considered as an effect of human weakness and frailty, than of a confirmed malignity of mind.

The Persians thought it reasonable to put the good as well as the evil, the merits of the offender, as well as his demerits, into the scales of justice; nor was it just, in their opinion, that one single crime should obliterate all the good actions a man had done during his life. Upon this principle it was that Darius had condemned a judge to death for some prevarication in his office, and afterwards calling to mind the important service he had rendered both to the state and the royal family, revoked the sentence at the very moment of its going to be executed, and acknowledged, that he had pronounced it with more precipitation than wisdom."

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But one important and essential rule which they observed in their judgments, was, in the first place, never to condemn any person without confronting him with his accuser to his face, and without giving him time, and all other means, necessary for defending himself against the articles laid to his charge: and, in the second place, if the person accused was found innocent, to inflict the very same punishment upon the accuser, as the other was to have suffered, had he been found guilty. Artaxerxes gave a fine example of the just rigour which ought to be exercised on such occasions. One of the king's favourites, ambitious of getting a place possessed by one of his best officers, endeavoured to make the king suspect the fidelity of that officer; and, to that end, sent informations to court full of calumnies against him, persuading himself that the king, from the great influence he had with his majesty, would believe the thing upon his bare word, without farther examination. For such is the general character of calumnia

1 Herod. 1. v. c. 25. 2 Xenoph. Cyrop. 1. i. p. 7. 3 Herod. 1. i. c. 137. 4 Ibid. I. vii. c. 194. Γνοὺς ὡς ταχύτερα αὐτὸς ἢ σοφώτερα ἐργασμένος εἴη, εἴλυσε. Diod. 1. xv. p. 333-336.

tors. They are afraid of evidence and light; they make it their business to bar up from the innocent all access to the prince, and thereby put it out of their power to vindicate themselves. The officer was imprisoned; but he desired of the king, before he was condemned, that his cause might be heard, and his accusers ordered to produce their evidence against him. The king did so, and as there was no proof but the letters which his enemy had written against him, he was cleared, and his innocence fully justified by the three commissioners that sat upon his trial; and all the king's indignation fell upon the perfidious accuser, who had thus attempted to abuse the favour and confidence of his royal master. The prince, who was well informed, and knew that one of the true signs of a wise government is to have the subjects stand more in fear of the laws than of informers, would have thought, that to act otherwise than he did, would have been a direct violation of the most common rules of natural equity and humanity; it would have been opening a door to envy, hatred, calumny, and revenge; it would have been exposing the honest simplicity of good and faithful subjects to the cruel malice of detestable informers, and arming the latter with the sword of public authority: in a word, it would have been divesting the throne of the most noble privilege belonging to it, namely, that of being a sanctuary for innocence and justice, against violence and calumny.

There is upon record a still more memorable example of firmness and love of justice, in another king of Persia, before Artaxerxes; in him, I mean, whom Scripture calls Ahasuerus, and who is thought to be the same as Darius, the son of Hystaspes, from whom Haman had, by his earnest solicitations, extorted that fatal edict, which was calculated to exterminate the whole race of the Jews throughout the Persian empire in one day. When God had, by the means of Esther, opened his eyes, he made haste to make amends for his fault, not only by revoking his edict, and inflicting an exemplary punishment upon the impostor who had deceived him; but, which is more, by a public acknowledgment of his error, which should be a pattern to all ages, and to all princes, and teach them, that far from debasing their dignity, or weakening their authority thereby, they procure to them both the more respect. After declaring, that it is but too common for calumniators to impose, by their misrepresentations and craftiness, on the goodness of their princes, whom their natural sincerity induces to judge favourably of others; he is not ashamed to acknowledge, that he had been so unhappy as to suffer himself to be prejudiced by such means against the Jews, who were his faithful subjects, and the children of the most high God, to whose goodness he and his ancestors were indebted for the throne.

The Persians were not only enemies of injustice, as we have now shown; but also abhorred lying, which always was deemed amongst them a mean and infamous vice.10 What they esteemed most pitiful, next to lying, was to live upon trust, or by borrowing. Such a kind of life seemed to them idle, ignominious, servile, and the more despicable, as it tends to make people liars.

SECTION IV.-THE CARE OF THE PROVINCES. It seems to be no difficult matter to maintain good order in the metropolis of a kingdom, where the conduct of the magistrates and judges is closely inspected; and the very sight of the throne capable of keeping the subjects in awe. The case is otherwise with respect to the provinces, where the distance from the sovereign, and the hopes of impunity, may occasion many misdemeanors on the part of the magistrates Non jam delatores, sed leges timenter. Plin. in Paneg. Traj. Princeps, qui delatores non castigat, irritet. Sueton. in vit. Domit. c. ix. Esth. iii. &c. 10 Herod. l. i. c. 139.

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The Persian empire was divided into 127 governments, the governors whereof were called satrapa. Over them were appointed three principal ministers, who inspected their conduct, to whom they gave an account of all the affairs of their several provinces, and who were afterwards to make their report of the same to the king. It was Darius the Mede, that is, Cyaxares, or rather Cyrus in the name of his uncle, who put the government of the empire into this excellent method. These satrapa were, by the very design of their office, each in his respective district, to have the same care and regard for the interests of the people, as for those of the prince: for it was a maxim with Cyrus, that no difference ought to be admitted between these two interests, which are necessarily linked together; since neither the people can be happy, unless the prince is powerful, and in a condition to defend them; nor the prince truly powerful, unless his people be happy.

These satrapa being the most considerable persons in the kingdom, Cyrus assigned them certain funds and revenues proportioned to their station and the importance of their employments. He was willing they should live nobly in their respective provinces, that they might gain the respect of the nobility and common people within their jurisdiction; and that for that reason their retinue, their equipage, and their table, should be answerable to their dignity, yet without exceeding the bounds of prudence and moderation. He himself was their model in this respect, as he desired they should be likewise to all persons of distinguished rank within the extent of their authority: so that the same order which reigned in the prince's court, might likewise proportionably be observed in the courts of the satrapæ, and in the noblemen's families. And to prevent, as far as possible, all abuses which might be made of so extensive an authority as that of the satrapa, the king reserved to himself alone the nomination of them, and chose that the governors of places, the commanders of the troops, and other such like officers, should depend immediately upon the prince himself; from whom alone they were to receive their instructions, in order that, if the satrapa were inclined to abuse their power, they might be sensible those officers were so many overseers and censors of their conduct. And, to make this correspondence, by letters, the more sure and expeditious, the king caused post-houses to be erected throughout all the empire, and appointed couriers, who travelled night and day, and made wonderful despatch. But I shall speak more particularly on this article at the end of the section, that I may not break in upon the matter in hand.

The care of the provinces, however, was not entirely left to the satrapa and governors: the king himself took cognizance of them in his own person, being persuaded, that the governing only by others, is but to govern by halves. An officer of the household was ordered to repeat these words to the king every morning, when he awakened him: Rise, Sir, and think of discharging the duties for which Oromasdes has placed you upon the throne. Oromasdes was the principal god, anciently worshipped by the Persians. A good prince, says Plutarch in relating this custom, has no occasion for an officer to give him this daily admonition: his own heart and the love he has for his people, are sufficient monitors.

The king of Persia thought himself obliged, according to the ancient custom established in that country, from time to time personally to visit all the provinces of his empire; being persuaded, as Pliny says

Authors differ about the number of governments or provinces. Xenoph. Cyrop. 1. v. iii. p. 229, 232. Plut. ad Princ. indoct. p. 780. Xenoph. in Econom, p. 828.

exquisite pleasure, a good prince can enjoy, is from time to time to let the people see their common father; to reconcile the dissensions and mutual animosities of rival cities; to calm commotions or seditions among the people, and that not so much by the seve rity of power, as by the authority of reason, to prevent injustice and oppression in magistrates; and cancel and reverse whatever has been decreed against law and equity; in a word, like a beneficent planet, to shed his salutary influences universally, or rather, like a kind of divinity, to be present every where, to see, to hear, and inspect every thing, without rejecting any man's petition or complaint.

When the king was not able to visit the provinces himself, he sent, in his stead, some of the great men of the kingdom, such as were the most eminent for wisdom and virtue. These persons were generally called the eyes and ears of the prince, because by their means he saw and was informed of every thing. When these, or any other of his great ministers, or the members of his council, were said to be the eyes and ears of the prince, it was at once an admonition to the king, that he had his ministers, as we have the organs of our senses, not that he should lie still and be idle, but act by their means; and to the ministers, that they ought not to act for themselves, but for the king their head, and for the advantage of the whole body politic.

The particular detail of affairs, which the king when he went his progress in person, or the commissioners appointed by him, entered into, is highly worthy of admiration, and shows how well they understood, in those days, wherein the wisdom and ability of governors consist. The attention of the king and his ministers was not employed upon great objects alone, as war, the revenue, justice and commerce; but matters of less importance, as the security and beauty of towns and cities, the convenient habitation of the inhabitants, the repairs of high roads, bridges, causeways, the keeping of woods and forests from being laid waste and destroyed, and, above all, the improvement of agriculture, and the encouraging and promoting all sorts of trades, even to the lowest and meanest of handicraft employments; every thing, in short, came within the sphere of their policy, and was thought to deserve their care and inspection. And, indeed, whatever belongs to the subjects, as well as the subjects themselves, is a part of the trust committed to the head of the commonwealth, and is entitled to his care, concern, and activity. His love for the commonweal is universal. It extends itself to all matters, and takes in every thing: it is the support of private persons, as well as of the public. Every province, every city, every family, has a place in his heart and affections. Every thing in the kingdom has a relation to, and concerns him; every thing challenges his attention and regard.

I have already said, that agriculture was one of the principal objects on which the Persians bestowed their care and attention. Indeed, one of the prince's first cares was, to make husbandry flourish; and those satrapæ, whose provinces were the best cultivated, had the most of his favour. And as there were offices erected for the regulation of the military part of the government; so were there likewise for the inspecting their rural labours and economy. For these two employments had a near relation; the business of the one being to guard the country, and the other to culti

4 Reconciliare æmulas civitates, tumentesque populos non imperio magis quàm ratione compescere, intercedere iniquitatibus magistratuum, infectumque reddere quicquid fieri non oportuerit; postremò velocissimi sideris more omnia invisere, omnia audiere, et undecumque invocatum, statim, velut numen, adesse et adsistere. Plin. in. Panegyr. Traj.

Is, cui curæ sunt universe, nullam non reip. partem tanquam sui nutrit. Senec. lib. de Clem. c. xiii. Xenoph. Econ. p. 827-830.

vate it. The prince protected both almost with the same degree of affection; because both concurred, and were equally necessary, for the public good. For if the lands cannot be cultivated without the aid and protection of armies for their defence and security; so neither can the soldiers, on the other hand, be fed and maintained without the labour of the husbandmen who cultivate the ground. It was with good reason, therefore, that the prince, since it was impossible for himself to see into every thing, caused an exact account to be given him, how every province and district was cultivated; that he might know, whether each country brought forth abundantly such fruits as it was capable of producing; that he descended so far into those particulars, as Xenophon remarks of Cyrus the younger, as to inform himself, whether the private gardens of his subjects were well kept, and yielded plenty of fruit; that he rewarded the superintendants and overseers, whose provinces or districts were the best cultivated, and punished the laziness and negligence of those idle persons, who suffered their grounds to lie barren or untilled. Such a care as this is by no means unworthy of a king, as it naturally tends to propagate riches and plenty throughout his kingdom, and to beget a spirit of industry amongst his subjects, which is the surest means of preventing that increase of drones and idle fellows, that are such a burden upon the public, and a dishonour to the state.

Xenophon, in the next passage to this I have now cited, puts into the mouth of Socrates, who is introduced as a speaker, a very noble encomium upon agriculture, which he represents as the employment of all others the most worthy of man, the most ancient and the most suitable to his nature; as the most common nurse of all ages and conditions of life; as the source of health, strength, plenty, riches, and a thousand sober delights and honest pleasures; as the mistress and school of sobriety, temperance, justice, religion; and, in a word, of all kinds of virtues both civil and military. After which he relates the fine saying of Lysander, the Lacedæmonian, who, as he was walking at Sardis with the younger Cyrus, hearing from that prince's own mouth, that he himself had planted several of the trees he was looking at, exclaimed, that the world had reason to extol the happiness of Cyrus, whose virtue was as eminent as his fortune, and who, in the midst of the greatest affluence, splendour, and magnificence, had yet preserved a taste so pure and so conformable to right reason. Cùm Cyrus respondisset,' Ego ista sum dimensus, mei sunt ordines, mea descriptio, multæ etiam istarum arborum meâ manu sunt satæ: tum Lysandrum, intuentem ejus purpuram et nitorem corporis, ornatumque Persicum multo auro multisque gemmis, dixisse: RECTE VERO TE, CYRE, BEATUM FERUNT, QUONIAM VIRTUTI TUE FORTUNA CONJUNCTA EST. How much it is to be wished, that our young nobility, who in the time of peace do not know how to employ themselves, had the like taste for planting and agriculture, which surely, after such an example as that of Cyrus, should be thought no dishonour to their quality; especially if they would consider, that for several ages it was the constant employment of the bravest and most warlike people in the world! The reader may easily perceive, that I mean the ancient Romans.

The Invention of Posts and Couriers. I promised to give some account in this place of the invention of posts and couriers. This invention is ascribed to Cyrus ; nor, indeed, can I find any mention of such an establishment before his time. As the Persian empire, after his last conquest, was of a vast

1 Xenoph. Econ. 830-833. 2 Cic. de Senect. num. 59. In the original Greek there is still a greater energy. Δικαίως μοι δοκεῖς, ὦ Κύρε, εὐδαίμων εἶναι· ἀγαθὸς γὰρ ἂν àvip evdaιpovεis. Thou art worthy, Cyrus, of that happiness thou art possessed of; because, with all thy affluence and prosperity, thou art also virtuous. • Xen. Cvrop. 1. viii. p. 232.

extent, and Cyrus required that all his governors of provinces, and his chief commanders of his troops, should write to him, and give an exact account of every thing that passed in their several districts and armies; in order to render that correspondence the more sure and expeditious, and to enable himself to receive speedy intelligence of all occurrences and affairs, and to send his orders thereupon with expedi tion, he caused post-houses to be built, and messengers to be appointed, in every province. Having computed how far a good horse, with a brisk rider, could go in a day without being spoiled, he had stables built in proportion, at equal distances from each other, and had them furnished with horses, and grooms to take care of them. At each of these places he likewise appointed a post-master, to receive the packets from the couriers as they arrived, and give them to others; and to take the horses that had performed their stage, and to find fresh ones. Thus the post went continually night and day, with extraordinary speed; nor did either rain or snow, heat or cold, or any inclemency of the season, interrupt its progress. Herodotus speaks of the same sort of couriers in the reign of Xerxes."

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These couriers were called in the Persian language, "Ayyapo. The superintendency of the posts became a considerable employment. Darius,' the last of the Persian kings, had it before he came to the crown. Xenophon takes notice that this establishment subsisted still in his time: which perfectly agrees with what is related in the Book of Esther, concerning the edict published by Ahasuerus in favour of the Jews; which edict was carried through that vast empire with a rapidity that would have been impossible, without these posts erected by Cyrus.

We are justly surprised to find, that this establishment of posts and couriers, first invented in the east by Cyrus, and continued so many ages afterwards by his successors, especially considering of what usefulness it was to the government, should never have been imitated in the west, particularly by people so expert in politics as the Greeks and the Romans.

It is more astonishing, that, where this invention was put in execution, it was not farther improved, and that the use of it was confined only to affairs of state without considering the many advantages the public might have reaped from it, by facilitating a mutual correspondence, as well as the business of merchants and tradesmen of all kinds; by forwarding the affairs of private persons; the despatch of journeys which required haste; the easy communication between families, cities, and provinces; and by the safety and conveniency of remitting money from one country to another. It is well known what difficulty people at a distance had then, and for many ages afterwards, to communicate any news, or to treat of any affairs together; being obliged either to send a servant on purpose, which could not be done without great charge and loss of time; or to wait for the departure of some other person, that was going into the province or country, whither they had letters to send; which method was liable to numberless disappointments, accidents, and delays.

At present we enjoy this general conveniency at a small expense; but we do not thoroughly consider the advantage of it; the want whereof would make us fully sensible of our happiness in this respect. France is indebted for it to the university of Paris, which I cannot forbear observing here: I hope the reader will excuse the digression. The university of Paris, being formerly the only one in the kingdom, and having