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out breaking at the same time with all Peloponnesus,) | crates; but as the generals seemed inclined to decree but only agreed to succour each other mutually, in it to Alcibiades, on account of his illustrious birth; case they should be attacked, either in their own per- Socrates, who only sought for opportunities to inflame son or in that of their allies. Their real design was, him with a desire of true glory, contributed more than to set those two states, which were very powerful by any other person, by the noble eulogium he made on sea, at variance; and after each should have exhaust his courage, to cause the crown and complete suit of ed the other by a tedious war, to triumph over the armour (which was the prize of valour) to be adjudgweakest for at that time there were but three states ed to Alcibiades. in Greece who possessed powerful fleets; and these were Athens, Corinth, and Corcyra. They also had a design on Italy and Sicily, which their taking the island of Corcyra would very much promote.

On this plan they concluded an alliance with the Corcyreans, and accordingly sent them ten galleys, but with an order for them not to engage the Corinthians, unless they should first invade the island of Corcyra, or some other place belonging to their allies; this precaution was used, in order that the articles of the truce might not be infringed.

But it was very difficult to obey these orders. A battle was fought between the Corcyreans and the Corinthians, near the island of Sybota, opposite to Corcyra: it was one of the most considerable, with regard to the number of ships, that was ever fought between the Greeks. The advantage was nearly equal on both sides. About the end of the battle, as night was drawing on, twenty Athenian galleys came up. The Corcyreans, with this reinforcement, sailed next day by day-break towards the port of Sybota, whither the Corinthians had retired, to see if they would venture a second engagement. However, the latter contented themselves with sailing out in order of battle, without fighting. Both parties erected a trophy in the island of Sybota, each ascribing the victory to themselves.

From this war arose another, which occasioned an open rup ture between the Athenians and Corinthians, and afterwards the war of Peloponnesus. Potidæa, a city of Macedonia, was a colony belonging to the Corinthians, who sent magistrates thither annually; but it was dependent at that time on Athens, and paid tribute to it. The Athenians fearing this city would revolt, and prevail with the rest of the Thracian allies to join them, commanded the inhabitants to demolish their walls on the side next Pallene; to deliver hostages to them as sureties for their fidelity; and to send back the magistrates which Corinth had given them. Demands of so unjust a nature only hastened the revolt. The Potidæans declared against the Athenians,2 and several neighbouring cities followed their example. Both Athens and Corinth took up arms and sent forces thither. The two armies engaged near Potidæa, and that of the Athenians had the advantage. Alcibiades, who was then very young, and Socrates his master, signalized themselves on this occasion. It is something very singular, to see a philosopher put on his coat of mail; as well as to consider his behaviour and conduct in a battle. There was not a soldier in the whole army who so resolutely supported all the toils and fatigues of the campaign as Socrates. Hunger, thirst, and cold, were enemies he had long accustomed himself to despise and subdue with ease. Thrace, the scene of this expedition, was a frozen region. Whilst the other soldiers, covered with thick clothes and warm furs, lay close in their tents, and scarce ever dared to stir out of them; Socrates used to come into the open air clad as usual, and barefooted. His gayety and wit were the life of the table; and induced others to put the glass round cheerfully, though he himself never drank wine to excess. When the armies engaged he performed his duty wonderfully well. Alcibiades having been thrown down and wounded, Socrates placed himself before him, defended him valiantly, and, in sight of the whole army, prevented him and his arms from being taken by the enemy. The prize of valour was justly due to So

1 Thucyd. I. i. p. 37-42. Diod. 1. xii. p. 93, 94.
* Plut. in Conviv. p. 219, 220. Plut. in Alcib, p. 194.

Notwithstanding the loss which the Corinthians had sustained in the battle, the inhabitants of Potidea did not change their conduct. The city was therefore besieged. The Corinthians, fearing to lose a place of so much importance, addressed their allies in the strongest terms; who all, in conjunction with them, sent a deputation to Lacedæmon, to complain of the Athenians, as having infringed the articles of peace. The Lacedæmonians admitted them to audience in one of their ordinary assemblies. The people of Ægina, though very much disgusted at the Athenians, did not send a deputation publicly thither, for fear of giving umbrage to a republic to which they were subject, but they acted in secret as strenuously as the rest. The people of Megara complained vehemently against the Athenians, that (contrary to the law of nations, and in prejudice to the treaty concluded between the Greeks) they had prohibited them by a public decree from access to their fairs and markets, and excluded them from all the ports dependent on them. By that decree, according to Plutarch, the Athenians declared an eternal and irreconcileable hatred against Megara; and ordained that all Megarians should be put to death that set foot in Athens: and that all the Athenian generals, when they took the usual oath, should swear expressly, that they would send a body of soldiers twice a year, to lay waste the territories of that hostile city.

The chief complaints were made by the Corinthian ambassador, who spoke with the utmost force and freedom. He represented to the Lacedæmonians, that as they themselves never swerved from the most inviolable integrity, either in public or private transactions, they for that very reason, were less inclined to suspect the probity of others; and that their own moderation prevented their discovering the ambition of their enemies: that instead of flying, with readiness and activity, to meet dangers and calamities, they never attempted to remedy them, till they were quite crushed by them: that by their indolence and supineness, they had given the Athenians an opportunity of attaining, by insensible degrees, their present height of grandeur and power: that it was quite different with regard to the Athenians: "that this active, vigilant, and indefatigable people, were never at rest themselves, nor would suffer any other nation to be so. Employed," says he, "wholly in their projects, and they form none but such as are great and bold, their deliberations are speedy, and their execution the same. One enterprise serves only as a step to a second. Whether they are successful or unfortunate, they turn every thing to their advantage; and never stop in their career, nor are discouraged. But you, who are opposed by such formidable enemies, are lulled asleep in a fatal tranquillity; and do not reflect that it is not sufficient for a man who desires to live at ease merely to forbear injuring others, he must also hinder any one from injuring him; and that justice consists, not only

Thucyd. 1. i. p. 43-59.

Plut. in Pericl. p. 168.

8 According to Plutarch, some persons pretended that Pericles had caused this decree to be enacted, to revenge the private injury done to Aspasia, from whose house the people of Megara had carried off two courtezans; and he cites some verses of Aristophanes, who, in a comedy entitled the Acharnanians, reproaches Pericles with this action. But Thucydides, a contemporary author, who was very well acquainted with all the transactions of Athens, does not say a word of this affair; and he is much more worthy of belief than a poet who was a professed slanderer and satirist,

in forbearing to commit evil ourselves, but in avenging that done to us by others. Shall I be so free as to say it? Your integrity is of too antique a cast for the present state of affairs. It is necessary for men in politics, as well as in all other things, to conform always to times and circumstances. When a people are at peace they may follow their ancient maxims; but when they are involved in a variety of difficulties, they must try new expedients, and set every engine at work to extricate themselves. It is by these arts that the Athenians have increased their power so much. Had you imitated their activity, they would not have dispossessed us of Corcyra, and would not now be laying siege to Potidea. Follow, at least on this occasion, their example, by succouring the Potidæans and the rest of your allies, as your duty obliges you; and do not force your friends and neighbours, by foreaking them, to have recourse, through despair, to other powers."

The Athenian ambassador, who was come to Sparta upon other affairs, and was in the assembly, did not think it advisable to let this speech go unanswered. He put the Lacedæmonians in mind, of the still recent services that the republic, by which he was sent, had done to all Greece, which (he said) merited some regard; and that therefore it ought not to be envied, much less should endeavours be used to lessen its power: that the Athenians could not be charged with having usurped an empire over Greece; since it was merely at the entreaty of their allies, and in some measure with the consent of Sparta, that they had been forced to take the abandoned helm: that those who murmured, did it without grounds; and only from the aversion which mankind in general have to dependence and subjection, though of the gentlest and most equitable kind: that he exhorted them to employ a sufficient time in deliberating, before they came to a resolution; and not involve themselves and all Greece in a war, which would necessarily be attended with the most fatal consequences: that gentle methods might be found for terminating the differences of the allies, without breaking at once into open violence. However, that the Athenians, in case of an invasion, were able to oppose force with force; and would prepare for a vigorous defence, after having invoked, against Sparta, the deities who take vengeance of those that forswear themselves, and violate the faith of treaties.

The ambassadors being withdrawn, and the affair debated, the majority were for war. But before the final resolution was passed, Archidamus, king of Sparta, setting himself above those prejudices which so strongly biassed the rest, and directing his views to futurity, made a speech in which he set forth the dreadful consequences of the war in which they were going to embark; showed the strength and resources of the Athenians; exhorted them first to try gentle methods, which they themselves had seemed to approve; but to make, in the mean time, the necessary preparations for carrying on so important an enterprise, and not to be under any apprehensions, that their moderation and delays would be branded with the name of cowardice, since their past actions secured them from any suspicion of that kind.

But, notwithstanding all these wise expostulations, a war was resolved. The people caused the allies to return into the assemly, and declared to them, that in their opinion the Athenians were the aggressors; but that it would be expedient first to assemble all who were in the alliance, in order that peace or war might be agreed upon unanimously. This decree of the Lacedæmonians was made in the fourteenth year of the truce; and was not owing so much to the complaint of the allies, as to the jealousy of the Athenian power, which had already subjected a considerable part of Greece.

Accordingly the allies were convened a second
They all gave their votes in their several

time.

1 Thucyd. l. i. p. 77—84, 93.

turns, from the greatest city to the least, and war
was resolved by general consent. However, as they
had not yet made any preparations, it was judged ad-
visable to begin them immediately; and while this
was doing, in order to gain time, and observe the ne-
cessary formalities, to send ambassadors to Athens,
to complain of the violation of the treaty.
The first who were sent thither, reviving an old
complaint, required of the Athenians to expel from
their city the descendants of those who had profaned
the temple of Minerva in the affair of Cylon.2 As
Pericles was of that family by the mother's side, the
view of the Lacedæmonians, in making this demand,
was, either to procure his banishment or lessen his
authority. However, it was not complied with. The
second ambassadors required, that the siege of Poti-
dæa should be raised, and the liberty of Egina re-
stored; and above all, that the decree against the
Megarians should be repealed; declaring, that other-
wise no accommodation could take place. In fine, a
third embassy came, who took no notice of any of
these particulars, but only said, that the Lacedæmo-
nians were for peace: but that this could never be,
except the Athenians should cease to infringe the li-
berties of Greece.

SECTION XIV.-TROUBLES EXCITED AGAINST PE-
RICLES. HE DETERMINES THE ATHENIANS TO EN-
GAGE IN WAR AGAINST THE LACEDEMONIANS.

PERICLES opposed all these demands with great vigour,3 and especially that relating to the Megarians. He had great influence at Athens, but at the same time had many enemies. Not daring to attack him at first in person, they cited his most intimate friends, and those for whom he had the greatest esteem, as Phidias, Aspasia, and Anaxagoras, before the people; and their design in this was, to sound how the people stood affected towards Pericles himself.

Phidias was accused of having embezzled considerable sums in the forming the statue of Minerva, which was his master-piece. The prosecution having been carried on with the usual forms, before the assembly of the people, not a single proof of Phidias's pretended embezzlement appeared: for that artist, from the time of his beginning that statue, had by Pericles's advice, contrived the workmanship of the gold in such a manner, that all of it might be taken off and weighed; which accordingly Pericles bid the informers do in presence of all the spectators. But Phidias had witnesses against him, the truth of whose evidence he could neither dispute nor silence; these were the fame and beauty of his works, the ever-existing causes of the envy which attacked him. The circumstance which they could least forgive in him was, his having represented to the life (in the battle of the Amazons, engraved on the shield of the goddess) his own person, and that of Pericles 4 and, by an imperceptible art, he had so blended and incorporated these figures with the whole work, that it was impossible to erase them, without disfiguring and taking to pieces the whole statue. Phidias was therefore dragged to prison, where he came to his end, either by the common course of nature or by poison. Other authors say, that he was only banished, and that after his exile he made the famous statue of Jupiter at Olympia. It is not possible to excuse, in any manner, the ingratitude of the Athenians, in thus making a prison or death the reward of a master-piece of art; nor their excessive rigour in punishing, as a capital crime, an action that

100 years before. Those who followed him, being besieged in it, and reduced to extreme famine, fled for shelter were taken out by force and cut to pieces. Those who to the temple of Minerva, from whence they afterwards advised this murder were declared guilty of impiety and sacrilege, and as such banished. However, they were recalled some time after.

This Cylon had seized on the citadel of Athens above

Plut, in Pericl. p. 168, 169.
Aristot, in tractat. de mund. p. 613

appears innocent in itself; or which, to make the worst of it, was a vanity very pardonable in an artist. Aspasia, a native of Miletus in Asia, had settled in Athens, where she had become very famous, not so much for the charms of her person, as for her vivacity and the solidity of her wit, and her great knowledge. All the illustrious men in the city thought it an honour to frequent her house. Socrates himself used to visit her constantly; and was not ashamed to pass for her pupil, and to own that he had learned rhetoric from her. Pericles declared also that he was indebted to Aspasia for his eloquence, which so greatly distinguished him in Athens; and that it was from her conversation he had imbibed the principles of the art of policy, for she was exceedingly well versed in the maxims of government. Their intimacy was owing to still stronger motives. Pericles did not love his wife; he resigned her very freely to another man, and supplied her place with Aspasia, whom he loved passionately, though her reputation was more than suspicious. Aspasia was accused of impiety and a dissolute conduct; and it was with the utmost difficulty that Pericles saved her, by his entreaties, and by the compassion he raised in the judges, by shedding abundance of tears whilst her cause was pleading; a behaviour little consistent with the dignity of his character, and the rank of supreme head of the most powerful state of Greece.

A decree had passed, by which informations were ordered to be laid against all such persons as denied what was ascribed to the ministry of the gods ; or those philosophers and others who gave lessons on the more abstruse points of physics, and the motions of the heavens, topics which were considered injurious to the established religion. The scope and aim of this decree was, to make Pericles suspected with regard to these matters, because Anaxagoras had been his This philosopher taught, that one only Intelligence had modified the chaos, and disposed the universe in the beautiful order in which we now see it; which tended directly to depreciate the gods of the Pagan system. Pericles thinking it would be impossible for him to save his life, sent him out of the city to a place of safety.

master.

The enemies of Pericles seeing that the people approved and received with pleasure all these accusations, impeached that great man himself, and charged him with embezzling the public moneys during his administration. A decree was made, by which Pericles was obliged to give in immediately his accounts; was to be tried for peculation and rapine; and the cause to be adjudged by 1500 judges. Pericles had no real cause for fear, because in the administration of the public affairs his conduct had always been irreproachable, especially on the side of interest: he could not however but be under some apprehensions from the ill will of the people, when he considered their great levity and inconstancy. One day when Alcibiades (then very young) went to visit Pericles, he was told that he was not to be spoken with, because of some affairs of great consequence in which he was then engaged. Alcibiades inquiring what these mighty affairs were, was answered, that Pericles was preparing to give in his accounts. "He ought rather," says Alcibiades, "to think how he may avoid giving them in:" and indeed this is what Pericles at last resolved. To allay the storm, he made a resolution to oppose the inclination the people discovered for the Peloponnesian war no longer, preparations for which had been long carrying on, firmly persuaded that this would soon silence all complaints against him; that envy would yield to a more powerful motive; and that the

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citizens when in such imminent danger, would not fail of throwing themselves into his arms, and submit implicitly to his conduct, from his great power and exalted reputation.

This is what some historians have related ;3 and the comic poets in the lifetime, and under the eye, as it were, of Pericles, spread a report in public, to sully, if possible, his reputation and merit, which drew upon him the envy and enmity of many. Plutarch on this occasion makes a reflection which may be of great service, not only to those in the administration of public affairs, but to all sorts of persons, as well as of advantage in the ordinary intercourse of life. He thinks it strange, when actions are good in themselves, and as far as can be judged from external appearance, laudable in all respects, that men purely to discredit illustrious personages, should pretend to dive into their hearts; and from a spirit of the vilest and most abject malignity, should ascribe such views and intentions to them, as they probably never so much as imagined. He, on the contrary, wishes, when the motive is obscure, and the same action may be considered in different lights, that men would always view it in the most favourable, and incline to judge candidly of it. He applies this maxim to the reports which had been spread concerning Pericles, as the fomenter of the Peloponnesian war, merely for private and interested views; whereas, the whole tenor of his past conduct ought to have convinced every body, that it was wholly from reasons of state, and for the good of the public, that he at last acquiesced in an opinion, which he had hitherto thought it incumbent on him to oppose.

Whilst this affair was carrying on at Athens, the Lacedæmonians sent several embassies thither, one after another, to make the various demands above mentioned. At last the affair was debated in the assembly of the people, and it was resolved they should first deliberate upon all the articles, before they gave a positive answer. Opinions, as is usual in these cases, were divided; and some were for abolishing the decree enacted against Megara, which seemed the chief obstacle to a peace.

Pericles spoke on this occasion with a force of eloquence, which his view to the public welfare, and the honour of his country, rendered more vehement and triumphant than it had ever appeared before. He showed, in the first place, that the decree relating to Megara, on which the greatest stress was laid, was not of so little consequence as they imagined: that the demand made by the Lacedæmonians on that head was merely to sound the disposition of the Athenians, and to try whether it would be possible to encroach upon them by frightening them that should they recede on this occasion, it would betray fear and weakness: that the affair was of less importance than the giving up to the Lacedæmonians the empire which the Athenians had possessed during so many years, by their courage and resolution: that should the Athenians give way on this point, the Lacedæmonians would immediately prescribe new laws to them, as to a people seized with dread; whereas, if they made a vigourous resistance, their opponents would be obliged to treat them at least, on the foot of equals: that with regard to the present matters in dispute, arbiters might be chosen, in order to adjust them in an amicable way; but that it did not become the Lacedæmonians to command the Athenians with a magesterial air, to quit Potidea, to free Ægina, and revoke the decree relating to Megara: that such imperious behaviour was directly contrary to the treaty, which declared in express terms, That should any disputes arise among the allies, they should be decided by

Pacific methods, AND WITHOUT ANY PARTY'S BEIN

OBLIGED TO GIVE UP ANY PART OF WHAT THEY POS

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CHAPTER II.

SECTION I.-THE CARTHAGINIANS ARE DEFEATED
IN SICILY. THERON, TYRANT OF AGRIGENTUM.
REIGN OF GELON IN SYRACUSE, AND HIS TWO BRO-
THERS. LIBERTY IS RESTORED.

I. Gelon.

A. M. 3520.

WE have seen that Kerxes,' whose project tended to no less than the total extripation of the Ant. J. C. 484. Greeks, had prevailed with the Carthaginians to make war against the people of Sicily. They crossed over thither with an army of above 300,000 men, and a fleet of 2000 ships, and upwards of 3000 transports. Hamilcar, the ablest of the Carthaginian generals at that time, was charged with this expedition. However, the success was not answerable to these mighty preparations; the Carthaginians were entirely defeated by Gelon, who at that time had the chief authority in Syracuse.

SESSED: that the surest way to prevent a government from being eternally contesting about its possessions, TRANSACTIONS OF THE GREEKS IN SICILY AND ITALY. is to take up arms, and dispute its rights sword in hand : As the Peloponnesian war is a great event, of conthat the Athenians had just reason to believe they siderable duration, before I enter upon the history of would gain the cause this way; and to give them a it, it may be proper to relate, in a few words, the stronger idea of this truth, he set before them a most most considerable transactions which had happened brilliant description of the present state of Athens, giv-in Græcia Major, to the time we now speak of, ing a very particular account of its treasures, revenues, whether in Sicily or Italy. fleets, land as well as sea forces, and those of its allies; contrasting these several resources with the poverty of the Lacedæmonians, who (he said) had no money, which is the sinews of war, not to mention the poor condition of their navy, on which success in war most depended. And indeeed,' there were at that time in the public treasury, which the Athenians had brought from Delos to their city, 9600 talents, which amount to about 1,200,000l. sterling. The annual contributions of the allies amounted to 460 talents, that is, to near 1,400,000 French livres. In cases of necessity, the Athenians would find infinite resources in the ornaments of the temples, since those of the statue of Minerva alone amounted to fifty talents of gold, that is, 1,500,000 French livres, which might be taken from the statue without spoiling it, and be afterwards fixed on again in more auspicious times. With regard to the land forces, they amounted to very near 30,000 men, and the fleet consisted of 300 galleys. Above all, he advised them not to venture a battle in their own country against the Peloponnesians, whose This Gelon was born in a city of Sicily, situated troops were superior in number to theirs; not to re- on the southern coast between Agrigentum and Cagard the laying waste of their lands, as they might marina, called Gelas, whence perhaps he received his easily be restored to their former condition; but to name. He had signalized himself very much in the consider the loss of their men as highly important, be-wars, which Hippocrates, tyrant of Gela, carried on cause irretrievable; to make their whole policy consist in defending their city, and preserving the empire of the sea, which would certainly one day give them the superiority over their enemies. He laid down the plan for carrying on the war, not for a single campaign, but during the whole time it might last; and enumerated the evils they had to fear, if they deviated from that system. Pericles, after adding other considerations, taken from the character and internal government of the two republics; the one uncertain and fluctuating in its deliberations, and rendered still slower in the execution, from its being obliged to wait for the consent of its allies; the other speedy, determinate, independent, and mistress of its resolutions, which is no indifferent circumstance with regard to the success of enterprises; Peric es, I say, concluded his speech, and gave his opinion as follows: "We have no more to do but to dismiss the ambassadors, and to give them this answer: That we permit those of Megara to trade with Athens, upon condition that the Lacedæmonians do not prohibit either us, or our allies, to trade with them. With regard to the cities of Greece, we shall leave those free who were so at the time of our agreement, provided they shall do the same with regard to those dependent on them. We do not refuse to submit the decision of our differences to arbitration, and will not commit the first hostilities: however, in case of being attacked, we shall make a vigorous defence."

The ambassadors were answered as Pericles had dictated. They returned home, and never again to Athens; soon after which the Peloponnesian

war broke out.

1 Diod. 1. xii. p. 96, 97.

2

came

against the neighbouring powers, most of whom he subdued, and was very near taking Syracuse. After the death of Hippocrates, Gelon, upon pretence of defending the rights and succession of the tyrant's children, took up arms against his own citizens, and having overcome them in a battle, possessed himself of the government in his own name. Some time after he made himself master also of Syracuse, by the assistance of some exiles whom he had caused to return into it, and who had engaged the populace to open the gates of that city to him. He then gave Gela to Hiero his brother, and applied himself wholly in extending the limits of the territory of Syracuse, and soon rendered himself very powerful. We may form a judgment of this from the army which he offered the Grecian ambassadors,5 who came to desire his aid against the king of Persia; and by his demand of being appointed generalissimo of their forces, which however they refused. The fear he was in at that time, of being soon invaded by the Carthaginians, was the chief occasion of his not succouring the Greeks. He showed himself to be a crafty politi cian by his conduct; and when news was brought him of Xerxes's having crossed the Hellespont, he sent a trusty person with rich presents, and ordered him to wait the issue of the first battle, and in case Xerxes should be victorious, to pay homage to him in his name, otherwise to bring back the money. I now return to the Carthaginians.

They had landed in Sicily at the earnest solicitations of Terillus, formerly tyrant of Himera, but dethroned by Theron, another tyrant, who reigned at Agrigentum. The family of the latter was one of the most illustrious of all Greece, as he was descended in a direct line from Cadmus. He married into the family which at that time ruled at Syracuse,__and which consisted of four brothers, Gelon, Hiero, Polyzelus, and Thrasybulus. He married his daughter to the first, and himself married the daughter of the third.

[The Athenian revenues consisted of, 1. Contributions from the allies, which amounted to 600 talents in the days of Alcibiades. 2. Customs at the rate of 2 per cent, on imports and exports, which yielded 36 talents. 3. Confis- Hamilcar having landed at Panormus, began by cations of the property of individuals. 4. Rents and pro-laying siege to Himera. Gelon hasted with a great duce of mines and marble quarries. 5. Capitation tax on the Metoikoi or strangers permanently settled in the city. Xenophon estimates the whole at 1,000 talents, or 256,000l. sterling. Walpole's Memoirs on European Turkey, p. 435.J

Diod. 1. xi. p. 1, and 16-22.
Herod, 1. vii, c. 153-167.

He promised to furnish 200 ships and 30,000 men

except in Vespasian,5 he was the first whom the sovereignty made the better man. He made upwards of 10,000 foreigners, who had served under him, denizens. His views were, to people the capital, to increase the power of the state, to reward the services of these brave and faithful soldiers, and to attach them more strongly to Syracuse, from the sense of the advantageous settlement they had obtained in being incorporated with the citizens.

army to the succour of his father-in-law; when uni- | heard of, and of which Tacitus since found no example ting, they defeated the Carthaginians. This was perhaps the most complete victory ever gained. The battle was fought the same day with that of Thermopyla, the circumstances of which I have related in the history of the Carthaginians. One remarkable circumstance in the conditions of the peace,2 which Gelon prescribed to the conquered, was, that they should cease to sacrifice their children to the god Saturn; which shows, at the same time, the cruelty of the Carthaginians, and the piety of Gelon.

The spoils won on this occasion were of immense value. Gelon allotted the greatest part of them for the ornament of the temples in Syracuse. They also took an incredible number of prisoners. These he shared, with the utmost equity, with his allies, who employed them, after putting irons on their feet, in cultivating their lands, and in building magnificent edifices, as well for the ornament as the utility of the cities. Several of the citizens of Agrigentum had each 500 for his own share.

A. M. 3525. Ant. J. C. 479.

Gelon, after so glorious a victory. far from growing more proud and haughty, behaved with greater affability and humanity than ever towards the citizens and his allies. Being returned from the campaign, he convened the assembly of the Syracusans, who were ordered to come armed into it. However, he himself came unarmed thither: declared to the assembly every circumstance of his conduct, the uses to which he had applied the several sums with which he had been intrusted, and in what manner he had employed his authority; adding, that if they had any complaints to make against him, his person and life were at their disposal. All the people, struck with so unexpected a speech, and still more with the confidence he reposed in them, answered by acclamations of joy, praise, and gratitude; and immediately with one consent, invested him with the supreme authority, and the title of king. And to preserve to latest posterity the remembrance of Gelon's memorable action,3 who had come into the assembly, and put his life into the hands of the Syracusans, they erected a statue in honour of him, wherein he was represented in the ordinary habit of a citizen, ungirded, and unarmed. This statue met afterwards with a very singular fate, and worthy of the motives which had occasioned its being set up. Timoleon, about 130 years after, having restored the Syracusans to their liberty, thought it advisable, in order to erase all traces of tyrannical government, and at the same time to assist the wants of the people, to sell publicly by auction all the statues of those princes and tyrants who had governed it till that time. But first he brought them to a formal trial, as so many criminals; hearing the depositions and witnesses upon each of them. They all were condemned unanimously, the statue of Gelon only excepted, which found an eloquent advocate and defender in the warm and sincere gratitude which the citizens retained for that great man, whose virtue they revered as if he had been still alive.

The Syracusans had no cause to repent their having intrusted Gelon with unlimited power and authority. This made no addition to his known zeal for their interests, but only enabled him to do them more important services. For, by a change till then un

1 Herodotus says, that this battle was fought the same day with that of Salamis, which does not appear so probable. For the Greeks, informed of Gelon's successes, entreated him to succour them against Xerxes, which they ⚫ would not have done after the battle of Salamis, which exalted their courage so much, that after this battle they imagined themselves strong enough to resist their enemies, and to put an end to the war, to their own advantage, without the assistance of any other power.

2 Plut. in Apophth. p. 175.

3 Plut, in Timol. p. 247. Ælian. 1. xiii, c. 37. • Diod. I. xi. p. 55

He prided himself particularly upon his inviolable sincerity, truth, and fidelity, to his engagements; a quality very essential to a prince, the only one capable of gaining him the love and confidence of his subjects and of foreigners, and which therefore ought to be considered as the basis of all just policy and good government. Having occasion for money to carry on an expedition he meditated (this, very probably, was before he had triumphed over the Carthaginians,) he addressed the people in order to obtain a contribution from them but finding the Syracusans unwilling to be at that expense, he told them, that he asked nothing but a loan, and that he would engage to repay it as soon as the war should be over. The money was advanced, and repaid punctually at the promised time. How happy is that government where such justice and equity are exercised; and how mistaken are those ministers and princes, who violate them in the slightest degree!

One of the chief objects of his attention, in which his successor imitated him, was to make the cultivation of the lands be considered as an honorable employment. It is well known how fruitful Sicily was in corn; and the immense revenues which might be produced from so rich a soil when industriously cultivated. He animated the husbandman by his presence, and delighted in appearing sometimes at their head, in the same manner as on other occasions he had marched at the head of armies. His intention, says Plutarch, was not merely to make the country rich and fruitful, but also to exercise his subjects, to accustom and inure them to toils, and by that means to preserve them from a thousand disorders, which inevitably follow a soft and indolent life. There are few maxíms (in point of policy) on which the ancients have insisted more strongly, than on that relating to the cultivation of their lands; a manifest proof of their great wisdom, and the profound knowledge they had of what constitutes the strength and solid support of a state. Xenophon in a dialogue, entitled Hiero,8 the subject of which is government, shows the great advantage it would be to a state, were the king studious to reward those who excel in husbandry, and in whatever relates to the cultivation of lands. He says the same of war, of trade, and of all the arts; on which occasion, if honours were paid to all those who should distinguish themselves in them, it would give universal life and motion; would excite a noble and laudable emulation among the citizens, and give rise to a thousand inventions for the improvement and perfection of those arts.

It does not appear that Gelon had been educated in the same manner as the children of the rich among the Greeks, who were taught music and the art of playing on instruments with great care. Possibly this was a consequence of his mean birth, or rather was owing to the little value he set on those kind of exercises. One day at an entertainment, when according to the usual custom, a lyre was presented to each of the guests; when it was Gelon's turn, instead of touching the instrument as the rest had done, he caused his horse to be brought, mounted him with wonderful agility and grace, and showed that he had learned a nobler exercise than playing on the lyre.

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