Imágenes de páginas
PDF
EPUB

under the yoke,' and were dismissed, with only one | in order that this might serve as a curb to restrain suit of clothes for each. Gulussa, to satiate his vengeance for the ill treatment, which, as we before observed, he had met with, sent out against them a body of cavalry, whom, from their great weakness, they could neither escape nor resist. So that of 58,000 men, very few returned to Carthage.

The third Punic War.

and check their audacious conduct. For it was his opinion, that the Carthaginians were too weak to subdue the Romans; and at the same time too strong to be considered by them in a contemptible light. With regard to Cato, he thought that as his country. men had become haughty and insolent by success, and plunged headlong into profligacy of every kind; nothing could be more dangerous, than for them to have for a rival and an enemy, a city that till now had been powerful, but was become, even by its misfortunes, more wise and provident than ever; and not to remove the fears of the inhabitants entirely with regard to a foreign power; since they had, within their own walls, all the opportunities of inindulging themselves in excesses of every kind.

The third Punic War, which was A. M. 3855. less considerable than either of the A. Carth. 697. two former, with regard to the numA. Rom. 599. ber and greatness of the battles, and Ant. J. C. 149. its continuance, which was only four years, was still more remarkable with respect to the success and event of it, as it ended the total ruin and destruction of Carthage.

2

To lay aside, for one instant, the laws of equity, I leave the reader to determine which of these two great men reasoned most justly, according to the maxims of sound policy, and the true interests of a state. One undoubted circumstance is, that all the historians have observed that there was a sensible change in the conduct and government of the Romans, imlonger made its way into Rome with a timorous pace, and as it were by stealth, but appeared bare-faced, and seized, with astonishing rapidity, upon all orders of the republic: that the senators, plebeians, in a word, all conditions, abandoned themselves to luxury and voluptuousness without moderation or sense of decency which occasioned, as it must necessarily, the ruin of the state. The first Scipio, says Paterculus, speaking of the Romans, had laid the foundations of their future grandeur; and the last, by his conquests, opened a door to all manner of luxury and disso luteness. For, after Carthage, which obliged Rome to stand for ever on its guard, by disputing empire with that city, had been totally destroyed, the depravity of manners was no longer slow in its progress, but swelled at once into the utmost excess of corruption.

The inhabitants of this city, from their last defeat, knew what they had to fear from the Romans, who had uniformly displayed great ill will towards them, as often as they had addressed them upon their disputes with Masinissa. To prevent the consequences of it, the Carthaginians by a decree of the senate, impeached Asdrubal, general of the army, and Car-mediately after the ruin of Carthage. that vice no thalo, commander of the auxiliary forces, as guilty of high treason, for being the authors of the war against the king of Numidia. They then sent a deputation to Rome, to inquire what opinion that republic entertained of their late proceedings, and what was desired of them. The deputies were coldly answered, that it was the business of the senate and people of Carthage to know what satisfaction was due to the Romans. A second deputation bringing them no clearer answer, they fell into the greatest dejection; and being seized with the strongest terrors, from the recollection of their past sufferings, they fancied the enemy was already at their gates, and imagined to themselves all the dismal consequences of a long siege, and of a city taken sword in hand.

In the mean time, the senate debated at Rome on the measures it would be proper for them to take; and the disputes between Cato the elder and Scipio Nasica, who entertained totally different opinions on this subject, were renewed. The former, on his return from Africa, had declared, in the strongest terms, that he had found in Carthage, not as the Romans supposed it to be, exhausted of men or money, or in a weak and humble state; but, on the contrary, that it was crowded with vigorous young men, abounded with immense quantities of gold and silver, and prodigious magazines of arms and all war-stores; and was so haughty and confident on account of this force, that their hopes and ambition had no bounds. It is farther said, that, after he had ended his speech, he threw, out of the lappet of his robe, in the midst of the senate, some African figs; and, as the senators admired their beauty and size, Know, says he, that it is but three days since these figs were gathered. Such is the distance between the enemy and us.

Cato and Nasica had each of them their reasons for voting as they did. Nasica, observing that the people had risen to such a height of insolence, as led them into excesses of every kind; that their prosperity had swelled them with a pride which the senate itself was not able to check; and that their power was become so enormous, that they were able to draw the city, by force, into every mad design they might undertake; Nasica, I say, observing this, was desirous that they should continue in fear of Carthage,

Ils furent tous passés sous le joug: Sub jugum missi; a kind of gallows (made by two forked sticks, standing upright) was erected, and a spear laid across, under which vanquished enemies were obliged to pass. Festus.

Appian. p. 41, 42.

The foreign forces were commanded by leaders of their respective nations, who were all under the command of a Carthaginian officer, called by Appian, Boh@apxos. 4 Plut. in vitâ Cat. p. 352. Plut, ibid. in vitâ Cat.

Plin. l. xv. c. 18.

Be this as it may,' the senate resolved to declare war against the Carthaginians; and the reasons or pretences urged for it were, their having maintained ships contrary to the tenor of the treaty; their having sent an army out of their territories, against a prince who was in alliance with Rome, and whose son they had treated ill at the time that he was accompanied by a Roman ambassador.

A. M. 3856. A. Rom. 600.

An event, that chance occasioned to happen very fortunately, at the time that the senate of Rome was debating on the affair of Carthage, doubtless contributed very much to make them take that resolution. This was the arrival of deputies from Utica, who came to surrender up themselves, their effects, their lands, and their city, into the hands of the Romans. Nothing could have happened more seasonably. Utica was the second city of Africa, vastly rich, and had a port equally spacious and commodious; it stood within sixty furlongs of Carthage, so that it might serve as a place of arms in the attack of that city. The Romans now hesitated no longer, but formally proclaimed war. M. Manilius, and L. Marcius Censorinus, the two consuls, were desired to set out as soon as possible. They had se

Ubi Carthago, æmula imperii Romani ab stirpe interiit, fortuna sævire ac miscere omnia cœpit. Sallust. in bell. Catilin.

Ante Carthaginem deletam populus et senatus Romanus placidè modestèque inter se Remp. tractabant.-Metus hostilis in bonis artibus civitatem retinebat. Sed ubi formido illa mentibus decessit, ilicet ea, que secundæ res amant, lascivia atque superbia incessere. Idem in bello Jugurthino.

[ocr errors]

Potentiæ Romanorum prior Scipio viam aperuerat, luxuræ posterior aperuit. Quippe remoto Carthaginis metu, sublataque imperii æmula, non gradu, sed præcipiti cursu à virtute descitum, ad vitia transcursum. Vel. Paterc. 1. ii. c. 1. 'App. p. 42. App. p. 42.

10

cret orders from the senate, not to end the war but by the destruction of Carthage. The consuls immediately left Rome, and stopped at Lilybæum in Sicily. They had a considerable fleet, on board of which were 80,000 foot and about 4000 horse.

come; when, after having accompanied their dear children to the ship, they bid them a long last farewell, persuaded that they should never see them more: bathed them with their tears; embraced them with the utmost fondness; clasped them eagerly in their arms; could not be prevailed upon to part with them, till they were forced away, which was more grievous and afflicting than if their hearts had been torn out of their breasts. The hostages being arrived in Sicily, were carried from thence to Rome; and the consuls told the deputies, that when they should arrive at Utica, they would acquaint them with the orders of the republic.

The Carthaginians were not yet acquainted with the resolutions which had been taken at Rome. The answer brought back by their deputies, had only increased their fears, viz. It was the business of the Carthaginians to consider what satisfaction was due to them. This made them not know what course to take. At last they sent new deputies, whom they invested with full powers to act as they should see fitting; and even (what the former wars could never In such a situation of affairs, nothing can be more make them stoop to) to declare, that the Carthagini- grievous than a state of uncertainty, which, without ans gave up themselves, and all they possessed, to descending to particulars, gives occasion to the mind the will and pleasure of the Romans. This, accord- to image to itself every misery. As soon as it was ing to the import of the clause, se suaque eorum arbi-known that the fleet was arrived at Utica, the deputrio permittere, was submitting themselves, without ties repaired to the Roman camp; signifying that they reserve, to the power of the Romans, and acknow-were come in the name of their republic, in order to ledging themselves their vassals. Nevertheless, they receive their commands, which they were ready to did not expect any great success from this condescen- obey. The consul, after praising their good disposision, though so very mortifying; because, as the tion and compliance, commanded them to deliver up Uticans had been beforehand with them on that occa- to him, without fraud or delay, all their arms. This sion, this circumstance had deprived them of the merit they consented to, but besought him to reflect on the of a ready and voluntary submission. sad condition to which he was reducing them, at a time when Asdrubal, whose quarrel against them was owing to no other cause than their perfect submission to the orders of the Romans, was advanced almost to their gates, with an army of 20,000 men. The answer returned them was, that the Romans would set that matter right.

The deputies on their arrival at Rome, were informed that war had been proclaimed, and that the army was set out. The Romans had despatched a courier to Carthage, with the decree of the senate; and to inform that city, that the Roman fleet had sailed. The deputies had therefore no time for deliberation, but delivered up themselves, and all they This order was immediately put in execution." possessed, to the Romans. In consequence of this There arrived in the camp, a long train of waggons, behaviour, they were answered, that since they had loaded with all the preparations of war, taken out of at last taken a right step, the senate granted them Carthage; 200,000 complete sets of armour, a numtheir liberty, the enjoyment of their laws, and all their berless multitude of darts and javelins, with 2000 enterritories, and other possessions, whether public orgines for shooting darts and stones. Then followed private, provided that, within the space of thirty days, they should send as hostages, to Lilybæum, 300 young Carthaginians of the first distinction, and comply with the orders of the consuls. This last condition filled them with inexpressible anxiety; but the concern they were under would not allow them to make the least reply, or to demand an explanation; nor indeed would it have been to any purpose. They therefore set out for Carthage, and there gave an account of their em

bassy.

All the articles of the treaty were extremely severe with regard to the Carthaginians; but the silence of the Romans, with respect to the cities of which no notice was taken in the concessions which that people was willing to make, perplexed them exceedingly. But all they had to do was to obey. After the many former and recent losses which the Carthaginians had sustained, they were by no means in a condition to resist such an enemy, since they had not been able to oppose Masinissa. Troops, provisions, ships, allies, in a word, every thing was wanting, and hope and vigour more than all the rest.

They did not think it proper to wait till the thirty days, which had been allowed them, were expired, but immediately sent their hostages, in hopes of softening the enemy by the readiness of their obedience, though they dared not flatter themselves with the expectation of meeting with favour on this occasion. These hostages were the flower, and the only hopes, of the noblest families of Carthage. Never was any spectacle more moving; nothing was now heard but cries, nothing seen but tears, and all places echoed with groans and lamentations. But above all, the disconsolate mothers, bathed in tears, tore their dishevelled hair, beat their breasts, and, as if grief and despair had distracted them, they yelled in such a manner as might have moved the most savage breasts to compassion. But the scene was much more mournful, when the fatal moment of their separation was To the Romans.

'Polvb. excerpt. legat. p. 972.

Polyb. excerpt. legah p. 972.

the deputies of Carthage, accompanied by the most venerable senators and priests, who came purposely to try to move the Romans to compassion in this critical moment, when their sentence was going to be pronounced, and their fate would be irreversible. Censorinus, the consul, for it was he who had all along spoken, rose up for a moment at their coming, and expressed some kindness and affection for them; but suddenly resuming a grave and severe countenance: I cannot, says he, but commend the readiness with which you execute the orders of the senate. They have commanded me to tell you, that it is their absolute will and pleasure that you depart out of Carthage, which they have resolved to destroy; and that you remove into any other part of your dominions which you shall think proper, provided it be at the distance of eighty stadia" from the sea.

The instant the council pronounced this fulminating decree, nothing was heard among the Carthaginians but lamentable shrieks and howlings. Being now in a manner thunderstruck, they neither knew where they were, nor what they did; but rolled themselves in the dust, tearing their clothes, and unable to vent their grief any otherwise, than by broken sighs and deep groans. Being afterwards a little recovered, they lifted up their hands with the air of suppliants, one moment towards the gods, and the next towards the Romans, imploring their mercy and justice towards a people, who would soon be reduced to the extremes of despair. But as both the gods and men were deaf to their fervent prayers, they soon changed them into reproaches and imprecations; bidding the Romans call to mind, that there were such beings as avenging deities, whose severe eyes were for ever open on guilt and treachery. The Romans themselves could not refrain from tears at so moving a spectacle, but their resolution was fixed. The deputies could not even

[blocks in formation]

1

I now return to my subject. The consuls made no great haste to march against Carthage, not suspecting they had any thing to fear from that city, as it was now disarmed. The inhabitants took the opportunity of this delay to put themselves in a posture of defence, being all unanimously resolved not to quit the city. They appointed as general, without the walls, Asdrubal, who was at the head of 20,000 men, and to whom deputies were sent accordingly, to entreat him to forget, for his country's sake, the injustice which had been done him, from the dread they were under of the Romans. The command of the troops, within the walls, was given to another Asdrubal, grandson of Masinissa. They then applied themselves to the making arms with incredible expedition. The temples, the palaces, the open markets and squares, were all changed into so many arsenals, where men and women worked day and night. Every day were made 140 shields, 300 swords, 500 pikes or javelins, 1000 arrows, and a great number of engines to discharge them; and because they wanted materials to make ropes, the women cut off their hair and abundantly supplied their wants on this occasion.

Masinissa was very much disgusted at the Romans, because, after he had extremely weakened the Carthaginians, they came and reaped the fruits of his victory, without acquainting him in any manner with their design, which circumstance caused some coldness between them.

prevail so far, as to get the execution of this order sus-tration of state affairs, either in war or peace, without pended, till they should have an opportunity of pre- using fraud and deceit on some occasions. senting themselves again before the senate, to attempt, if possible, to get it revoked. They were forced to set out immediately, and carry the answer to Carthage. The people waited for their return with such an impatience and terror, as words could never express. It was scarce possible for them to break through the crowd that flocked round them, to hear the answer that was but too strongly painted in their face. When they were come into the senate, and had declared the barbarous orders of the Romans, a general shriek informed the people of their fate; and from that instant, nothing was seen and heard in every part of the city, but howling and despair, madness and fury. The reader will here give me leave to interrupt the course of the history for a moment, to reflect on the conduct of the Romans. It is a great pity that the fragment of Polybius, where an account is given of this deputation, should end exactly in the most interesting part of this narrative. I should set a much higher value on one short reflection of so judicious an author, than on the long harangues which Appian ascribes to the deputies and the consul. I can never believe, that so rational, judicious, and just a man as Polybius could have approved the proceedings of the Romans on the present occasion. We do not here discover, in my opinion, any of the characteristics which distinguished them anciently; that greatness of soul, that rectitude, that utter abhorrence of all mean artifices, frauds, and impostures, which, as is somewhere said, formed no part of the Roman disposition: Minime Romanis artibus. Why did not the Romans attack the Carthaginians by open force? Why should they declare expressly in a treaty (a most solemn and sacred thing) that they allowed them the full enjoyment of their liberties and laws; and understand, at the same time, certain private conditions, which proved the entire ruin of both? Why should they conceal, under the scandalous omission of the word city in this treaty, the perfidious design of destroying Carthage? as if, beneath the cover of such an equivocation, they might destroy it with justice. In short, why did the Romans not make their last declaration till after they had extorted from the Carthaginians, at different times, their hostages and arms; that is, till they had absolutely rendered them incapable of disobeying their most arbitrary commands? Is it not manifest, that Carthage, notwithstanding all its defeats and losses, though it was weakened and almost exhausted, was still a terror to the Romans, and that they were persuaded they were not able to conquer it by force of arms? It is very dangerous to be possessed of so much power, as to be able to commit injustice with impunity, and with a prospect of being a gainer by it. The experience of all ages shows, that states seldom scruple to commit injustice, when they think it will conduce to their advantage.

During this interval, the consuls were advancing towards the city, in order to besiege it. As they expected nothing less than a vigorous resistance, the incredible resolution and courage of the besieged filled them with the utmost astonishment. The Carthaginians were for ever making the boldest sallies, in order to repulse the besiegers, to burn their engines, and to harass their foragers. Censorinus attacked the city on one side, and Manilius on the other. Scipio, afterwards surnamed Africanus, served then as tribune in the army and distinguished himself above the rest of the officers, no less by his prudence than by his bravery. The consul, under whom he fought, committed many oversights, by having refused to follow his advice. This young officer extricated the troops from several dangers into which the imprudence of their leaders had plunged them. A renowned officer, Phamaas by name, who was general of the enemies' cavalry, and continually harassed the foragers, did not dare ever to keep the field, when it was Scipio's turn to support them, so capable was he of keeping his troops in good order, and posting himself to advantage. So great and universal a reputation excited some envy against him at first; but as he behaved, in all respects, with the utmost modesty and reserve, that envy was soon changed into admiration; so that when the senate sent deputies to the camp, to inquire into the state of the siege, the whole army gave him unanimously the highest commendation; the soldiers, as well as officers, nay, the very generals, with one voice extolled the merit of young Scipio: so necessary is it for a man to deaden, if I may be allowed the expression, the splendour of his rising glory, by a sweet and modest carriage; and not to excite jealousy, by haughty and self-sufficient behaviour, as this naturally awakens pride in others, and makes even virtue itself odious.

The noble character which Polybius gives of the Acleans, differs widely from what was practised here. That people, says he, far from using artifice and deceit towards their allies, in order to enlarge their power, did not think themselves allowed to employ them even against their enemies, considering only those victories as solid and glorious, which were obtained sword in hand, by dint of courage and bravery. He owns, in the same place, that there then remained among the Romans but very faint traces of the ancient generosity of their ancestors; About the same time Masinissa, and he thinks it incumbent on him (as he declares) finding his end approach, sent to to make this remark, in opposition to a maxim which desire a visit from Scipio, in order was grown very common in his time among persons that he might invest him with full in the administration of the government, who imagin-powers to dispose, as he should see proper, of his ed, that sincerity is inconsistent with good policy; kingdom and property, in behalf of his children. But, and that it is impossible to succeed in the adminis- on Scipio's arrival, he found that monarch dead.

Appian. p. 53, 54. 2 Polyb. I. xiii. p. 671, 672.

A. M. 3857. A. Rom. 601

[blocks in formation]

Masinissa had commanded them, with his dying breath, to follow implicitly the directions of Scipio, whom he appointed to be a kind of father and guardian to them. I shall give no farther account here of the family and prosperity of Masinissa, because that would interrupt too much the history of Carthage.

The high esteem which Phamaas had entertained for Scipio, induced him to forsake the Carthaginians, and go over to the Romans. Accordingly he joined them with above 2000 horse, and was afterwards of great service at the siege.

Calpurnius Piso the consul, and L. Mancinus, his lieutenant, arrived in Africa in the beginning of the spring. Nothing remarkable was transacted during this campaign. The Romans were even defeated on several occasions, and carried on the siege of Carthage but slowly. The besieged, on the contrary, had recovered their spirits. Their troops were considerably increased; they daily got new allies; and even sent an express as far as Macedonia, to the counterfeit Philip, who pretended to be the son of Perseus, and was then engaged in a war with the Romans, to exhort him to carry it on with vigour, and promising to furnish him with money and ships.

This occasioned some uneasiness at Rome. The people began to doubt the success of a war, which grew daily more uncertain, and was more important than had at first been imagined. As much as they were dissatisfied with the dilatoriness of the generals, and exclaimed against their conduct, so much did they unanimously agree in applauding young Scipio, and extolling his rare and uncommon virtues. He was come to Rome, in order to stand candidate for the edileship. The instant he appeared in the assembly, his name, his countenance, his reputation, a general persuasion that he was designed by the gods to end the third Punic war, as the first Scipio, his grandfather by adoption, had terminated the second; these several circumstances made a very strong impression on the people; and though it was contrary to law, and therefore opposed by the ancient men, instead of the edileship which he sued for, the people, disregarding for once the laws, conferred the consulship upon him, and assigned him Africa for his province, without casting lots for the provinces as usual, and as Drusus his colleague demanded. As soon as Scipio had completed his recruits, he set out for Sicily, and arrived soon after in Utica. He came very seasonably for Mancinus, Piso's lieutenant, who had rashly fixed himself in a post where he was surrounded by the enemy; and would have been cut to pieces that very morning, had not the new consul, who, on his arrival, heard of the danger he was in, re-embarked his troops in the night, and sailed with the utmost speed to his assistance.

A. M. 3858. A. Rom. 602.

[ocr errors]

Scipio's first care, after his arrival, was to revive discipline among the troops, which he found had been entirely neglected. There was not the least regularity, subordination, or obedience. Nothing was attended to but rapine, feasting, and diversions. He drove from the camp all useless persons, settled the quality of the provisions he would have brought in by the suttlers, and allowed of none but what were plain and fit for soldiers, studiously banishing all dainties and luxuries.

After he had made these regulations which cost him but little time and pains, because he himself first set the example, he was persuaded that those under him were soldiers, and thereupon he prepared to carry on the siege with vigour. Having ordered his troops to provide themselves with axes, levers, and scalingladders, he led them in the dead of the night, and without the least noise, to a district of the city, called Megara; when ordering them to give a sudden and general shout, he attacked it with great vigour. The

[merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][merged small][ocr errors][merged small][merged small]

enemy, who did not expect to be attacked in the night, were at first in the utmost terror; however, they defended themselves so courageously, that Scipio could not scale the walls. But perceiving a tower that was forsaken, and which stood without the city, very near the walls, he detached thither a party of intrepid and resolute soldiers, who, by the help of pontons," got from the tower on the walls, and from thence into Megara, the gates of which they broke down. Scipio entered it immediately after, and drove the enemies out of that post; who, terrified at this unexpected assault, and imagining that the whole city was taken, Aed into the citadel, whither they were followed by those forces that were encamped without the city, who abandoned their camp to the Romans, and thought it necessary for them to fly to a place of security.

Before I proceed further, it will be proper to give some account of the situation and dimensions of Carthage, which in the beginning of the war against the Romans, contained 700,000 inhabitants. It stood at the bottom of a gulf, surrounded by the sea, and in the form of a peninsula, whose neck, that is, the isthmus which joined it to the continent, was twenty-five stadia, or a league and a quarter in breadth. The peninsula was 360 stadia, or eighteen leagues round. On the west side there projected from it a long neck of land, half a stadium, or twelve fathoms broad; which, advancing into the sea, divided it from a morass, and was fenced on all sides with rocks and a single wall. On the south side, towards the continent where stood the citadel called Byrsa, the city was surrounded with a triple wall, thirty cubits high, exclusive of the parapets and towers, with which it was flanked all round at equal distances, each interval being fourscore fathoms. Every tower was four stories high, and the walls but two; they were arched, and in the lower part were stalls to hold 300 elephants with the fodder, and over these were stables for 4000 horses, and lofts for their food. There likewise was room enough to lodge 20,000 foot, and 4000 horse. All these were contained within the walls alone. In one place only the walls were weak and low; and that was a neglected angle, which began at the neck of land above mentioned, and extended as far as the harbours, which were on the west side. Of these there were two, which communicated with each other, but had only one entrance, seventy feet broad, shut up with chains. The first was appropriated for the merchants, and had several distinct habitations for the seamen. The second, or inner harbour, was for the ships of war, in the midst of which stood an island called Cothon, lined, as the harbour was, with large quays, in which were distinct receptacles for sheltering from the weather 220 ships; over these were magazines or storehouses, wherein was lodged whatever is necessary for arming and equipping fleets. The entrance into each of these receptacles was adorned with two marble pillars, of the Ionic order. So that both the harbour and the island represented on each side two magnificent galleries. In this island was the admiral's palace; and as it stood opposite to the mouth of the harbour, he could from thence discover whatever was doing at sea, though no one from thence could see what was transacting in the inward part of the harbour. The merchants,in like manner, had no prospect of the men of war; the two ports being separated by a double wall, each having its particular gate, that led to the city, without passing through the other harbour. So that Carthage may be divided into three parts: 10 the harbour, which was double, and called sometimes Cothon, from the little island of that name; the citadel, named Byrsa: the city properly so called, where the inhabitants dwelt, which lay round the citadel, and was called Megara.

[blocks in formation]

1

At day-break, Asdrubal perceiving the ignominious defeat of his troops, in order that he might be revenged on the Romans, and, at the same time, deprive the inhabitants of all hopes of accommodation and pardon, brought all the Roman prisoners he had taken upon the walls, in sight of the whole army. There he put them to the most exquisite torture; putting out their eyes, cutting off their noses, ears, and fingers; tearing their skin from their body with iron rakes or harrows, and then threw them headlong from the top of the battlements. So inhuman a treatment filled the Carthaginians with horror: however, he did not spare even them, but murdered many senators who had ventured to oppose his tyranny.

Scipio, finding himself absolute master of the isthmus, burnt the camp, which the enemy had deserted, and built a new one for his troops. It was of a square form, surrounded with large and deep intrenchments, and fenced with strong palisades. On the side which faced the Carthaginians, he built a wall twelve feet high, flanked at proper distances with towers and redoubts; and on the middle tower, he erected a very high wooden fort, from whence could be seen whatever was doing in the city. This wall was equal to the whole breadth of the isthmus, that is, twenty-five stadia. The enemy, who were within bow-shot of it, employed their utmost efforts to put a stop to this work but as the whole army were employed upon it day and night without intermission, it was finished in twentyfour days. Scipio reaped a double advantage from this work: First, his forces were lodged more safely and commodiously than before: Secondly, he cut off all provisions from the besieged, to whom none could now be brought but by sea; which was attended with many difficulties, both because the sea is frequently very tempestuous in that place, and because the Roman fleet kept a strict guard. This proved one of the chief causes of the famine which raged soon after in the city. Besides, Asdrubal distributed the corn that was brought, only among the 30,000 men who served under him, caring very little what became of the rest of the

inhabitants.

5

and obstinate, each exerting themselves to the utmost; the one to save their country, now reduced to the last extremity, and the other to complete their victory. During the fight, the Carthaginian brigantines running along under the large Roman ships, broke to pieces sometimes their sterns, and at other times their rudders and oars; and, when briskly attacked, retreated with surprising swiftness, and returned immediately to the charge. At last, after the two armies had fought with equal success till sun-set, the Carthaginians thought proper to retire; not that they believed themselves overcome, but in order to begin the fight again on the morrow. Part of their ships, not being able to run swiftly enough in the harbour, because the mouth of it was too narrow, took shelter under a very spacious terrace, which had been thrown up against the walls to unload goods, on the side of which a small rampart had been raised during this war, to prevent the enemy from possessing themselves of it. Here the fight was again renewed with more vigour than ever, and lasted till late at night. The Carthaginians suffered very much, and the few ships which got off, sailed for refuge to the city. Morning being come, Scipio attacked the terrace, and carried it, though with great difficulty; after which he made a lodgment there, and fortified himself on it, and built a brick wall close to those of the city, and of the same height. When it was finished, he commanded 4000 men to get on the top of it, and to discharge from it a perpetual shower of darts and arrows upon the enemy, which did great execution; because, as the two walls were of equal height, almost every dart took effect. Thus ended this campaign.

The seizure of this fort was followed by the surrender of almost all the strong holds of Africa; and contributed very much to the taking of Carthage itself, into which, from that time, it was almost impossible to bring any provisions.

8

A. M. 3859.

During the winter-quarters, Scipio endeavoured to overpower the enemy's troops without the city, who very much harassed the convoys that brought his provisions, and protected such as were sent to the besieged. For this purpose he attacked a neighbouring fort, called Nepheris, where they used to shelter themselves. In the last action, about 70,000 of the enemy, as well soldiers as peasants, who had been enlisted, were cut to pieces; and the fort was carried with great diffiTo distress them still more by the want of provi-culty, after sustaining a siege of two-and-twenty days. sions, Seipio attempted to stop up the mouth of the haven, by a mole, beginning at the above-mentioned neck of land, which was near the harbour. The besieged, at first looked upon this attempt as ridiculous, and accordingly they insulted the workmen: but, at last, seeing them make an astonishing progress every Early in the spring, Scipio attackday, they began to be afraid; and to take such mea-ed at one and the same time, the harsures as might, if possible, render the attempt unsuc-bour called Cothon, and the citadel. A. Rom. 603. cessful. Every one, to the women and children, fell to Having possessed himself of the wall work, but so privately, that all that Scipio could learn which surrounded this port, he threw himself into the from the prisoners, was, that they had heard a great great square of the city that was near it, from whence noise in the harbour, but did not know the occasion of was an ascent to the citadel, up three streets, on each it. At last, all things being ready, the Carthaginians side of which were houses, from the tops whereof a opened, on a sudden, a new outlet on the other side of shower of darts was discharged upon the Romans, the haven; and appeared at sea with a numerous fleet, who were obliged, before they could advance farther, to which they had just then built with the old materials force the houses they came first to, and post themselves found in their magazines. It is generally allowed, that in them, in order to dislodge from thence the enemy who had they attacked the Roman fleet directly, they must fought from the neighbouring houses. The combat infallibly have taken it; because, as no such attempt which was carried on from the tops, and in every part of was expected, and every man was elsewhere employed, the houses, continued six days, during which a dreadful the Carthaginians would have found it without rowers, slaughter was made. To clear the streets, and make soldiers, or officers. But the ruin of Carthage, says way for the troops, the Romans dragged aside, with the historian, was decreed. Having therefore only hooks, the bodies of such of the inhabitants as had offered a kind of insult or bravado to the Romans, been slain, or precipitated headlong from the houses; they returned into the harbour. and threw them into pits, the greatest part of them being still alive and panting. In this toil, which lasted six days and as many nights, the soldiers were relieved from time to time by fresh ones, without which they would have been quite spent. Scipio was the only person who did not take a wink of sleep all this time; leisure to take the least refreshment. giving orders in all places, and scarce allowing himself

Two days after, they brought forward their ships, with a resolution to fight in good earnest, and found the enemy ready for them. This battle was to determine the fate of both parties. The conflict was long

1

Appian. p. 72.

2 It was he who had first commanded without the city, but having caused the other Asdrubai, Masinissa's grandson, to be put to death, he got the command of the troops • Four miles and three quarters. • Ib. p. 75.

within the walis.

Appian. p. 73.
Appian. p. 74.

would last much longer, and occasion a great effusion There was every reason to believe," that the siege

[blocks in formation]
« AnteriorContinuar »