 | Noah Porter - 1871 - 108 páginas
...Ibidem. the absurdity of his position, by confessing that "we are reduced to the alternative of believing that the mind or ego is something different from any series of feelings, or possibilities of them, or of accepting the paradox, that something which, ex liypotlicsi, is but a series of feelings can... | |
 | 1885 - 900 páginas
...series which is aware of itself as past and present ; and we are reduced to the alternative of believing that the mind or ego is something different from any series of feelings or possibilities of them, or of accepting the paradox that something which, by hypothesis, is but a series of feelings, can be... | |
 | Noah Porter - 1872 - 112 páginas
...Ibidem. the absurdity of his position, by confessing that "we are reduced to the alternative of believing that the mind or ego is something different from any series of feelings, or possibilities of them, or of accepting the paradox, that something which, ex hypothesi, is but a series of feelings can be... | |
 | Henry Calderwood - 1872 - 356 páginas
...3d ed. p. 242. Which alternative is commonly accepted, there can be no doubt. But if it be admitted that 'the Mind or Ego is something different from any series of feelings,' how can the acknowledgment be described as a 'belief? In postulating a belief, we are guilty of the... | |
 | Noah Porter - 1873 - 730 páginas
...fcttingt which is aware nf ITSELF as past and future ; and we arc reduced to the alternative of believing that the mind or Ego is something different from any series of feelings or possibilities of them, or of accepting the paradox that pometl.ing wliich, ex tiyp'ifh'ti, is but a series of feelings, can... | |
 | Théodule Ribot - 1873 - 382 páginas
...feelings which is aware of itself as past and future ; and we are reduced to the alternative of believing that the mind, or ego, is something different from any series of feelings, or possibilities of them, or of accepting the paradox that something, which ex hypothesi is but a series of feelings, can be... | |
 | James Fitzjames Stephen - 1873 - 360 páginas
...feelings which is aware of itself as past and future, and we are reduced to the alternative of believing that the Mind or Ego is something different from any series of feeling or possibilities of them, or of accepting the paradox [I should have said of making the unmeaning... | |
 | Friedrich Ueberweg - 1874 - 580 páginas
...feeling." He concedes that in adhering to this definition " we are reduced to the alternative of bel ieving that the mind, or ego, is something different from any series of feelings or possibilities of them, or of accepting the paradox that something which, ex hyjwttiesi, is but a series of feelings can be... | |
 | Friedrich Ueberweg - 1874 - 580 páginas
...feeling." lie concedes that in adhering to this definition "we are reduced to the alternative of believing that the mind, or ego, is something different from any series of feelings or possibilities of them, or of accepting the paradox that something which, is but a series of feelings can be aware of itself... | |
 | Henry Calderwood - 1874 - 328 páginas
...3d ed. p. 242. Which alternative is commonly accepted, there can be no doubt. But if it be admitted that ' the Mind or Ego is something different from any series of feelings,' how can the acknowledgment be described as a 'belief? In postulating a belief, we are guilty of the... | |
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If, therefore, we speak of the Mind as a series of feelings, we are obliged to complete the statement by calling it a series of feelings which is aware of itself as past and future : and we are reduced to the alternative of believing that the Mind, or... 
