 | Richard Travers Smith - 1886 - 272 páginas
...feelings which is aware of itself as past and future : and we are reduced to the alternative of believing that the mind or ego is something different from any series of feelings or possibilities of them or of accepting the paradox that something which ex hypothesi is but a series of feelings, can be aware... | |
 | Edward John Hamilton - 1886 - 708 páginas
...feelings which is aware of itself as past and future; and weaare reduced to the alternative of believing that the mind, or ego, is something different from any series of feelings or possibilities of them, or of accepting the paradox that something which, ex hypothesi, is but a series of feelings can be... | |
 | Alfred Williams Momerie - 1886 - 128 páginas
...feelings which is aware of itself as past and future, we are reduced to the alternative of believing that the mind or ego is something different from any series of feelings, or of accepting the paradox that something, which is ex hypothesi but a series of feelings, can be aware... | |
 | Friedrich Max Müller - 1887 - 362 páginas
...feelings which is aware of itself as past and future : and we are reduced to the alternative of believing that the Mind, or Ego, is something different from any series of feelings, and possibilities of them, or of accepting the paradox, that something which ex hypothesi is but a... | |
 | Friedrich Max Müller - 1887 - 738 páginas
...feelings which is aware of itself as past and future : and we are reduced to the alternative of believing that the Mind, or Ego, is something different from any series of feelings, and possibilities of them, or of accepting the paradox, that something which « hypothesi is but a... | |
 | David Jayne Hill - 1888 - 456 páginas
...feelings which is aware of itself as past and future ; and we are reduced to the alternative of believing that the mind, or Ego, is something different from any series of feelings, or possibilities of them ; or of accepting the paradox, that something which is ex hypofhesi hut a series of feelings, can be... | |
 | 1888 - 916 páginas
...which, like the first, may be expressed in the words of J. 8. Mill, viz., "the alternative of believing that the Mind or Ego is something different from any series of feelings or possibilities of them." To admit this, of course, is to admit the necessity of distinguishing between Mind or Ego, meaning... | |
 | 1889 - 514 páginas
...feelings which is aware of itself as past and future: and we are reduced to the alternative of believing that the Mind, or Ego, is something different from any series of feelings, and possibilities of them, or of accepting the paradox, that something which ex hypothesi is but a... | |
 | William James - 1890 - 716 páginas
...feelings which is aware of Itself as past and future ; and we are reduced to the alternative of believing that the mind, or Ego, Is something different from any series of feelings, or possibilities of them, or of accepting the paradox that something which ex hypothen is but a series of feelings, can be aware... | |
 | Michael Maher - 1890 - 612 páginas
...impossible to it.12 On the other hand, Mill is again wrong in representing his opponents as teaching that " the mind or Ego is something different from any series of feelings or possibilities of them," if by " different " is meant that the Ego is something separate, standing out of all relation to its... | |
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If, therefore, we speak of the Mind as a series of feelings, we are obliged to complete the statement by calling it a series of feelings which is aware of itself as past and future : and we are reduced to the alternative of believing that the Mind, or... 
