 | Hector Macpherson - 1907 - 354 páginas
...feelings which is aware of itself as past and future ; and we are reduced to the alternative of believing that the mind or ego is something different from any series of feelings or possibilities of them, or of accepting the paradox that something which ex hypothesi is but a series of feelings can be aware... | |
 | Frederick Converse Beach, George Edwin Rines - 1911 - 978 páginas
...mind from without" ; on the other hand he recognizes "the paradox, that something which, ex hyfothcsi, is but a series of feelings, can be aware of itself...sense ; *our own desires can do much to shape those circumstances.11 As Economist, Mill attempted to follow the general plan of Adam Smith and give the... | |
 | Frank Challice Constable - 1911 - 362 páginas
...like the first, may be expressed in the words of JS Mill, viz., " the alternative of believing that mind or ego is something different from any series of feelings or possibilities of them." To admit this, of course, is to admit the necessity of distinguishing between mind or ego, meaning... | |
 | Frederick Converse Beach, George Edwin Rines - 1912 - 884 páginas
...mind from without" ; on the other hand he recognizes "the paradox, that something which, ex hypothesi, is but a series of feelings, can be aware of itself...determining character, he is careful to insist that this rs not "necessity" in the ordinary sense ; "our own desires can do much to shape those circumstances."... | |
 | Frank Thilly - 1914 - 1358 páginas
...feelings which is aware of itself as past and future; and we are reduced to the alternative of believing that the mind, or ego, is something different from any series of feelings, or possibilities of them, or of accepting the paradox that something which ex hypothesi is but a series of feelings, can be aware... | |
 | Clay MacCauley - 1914 - 866 páginas
...has admitted tbat, in giving this definition, — " We are reduced to the alternative of believing that the mind, or ego is something different from any series of feelings, or possibilities of them, or of accepting the paradox that somethmg which ex hypotkesi is but a series of feelings can be aware... | |
 | Colin McAlpin - 1915 - 452 páginas
...feelings which is aware of itself as past and future, we are reduced to the alternative of believing that the mind, or ego, is something different from any series of feelings, or of accepting the paradox that something which is, ex hypothesi, but a series of feelings, can be aware... | |
 | Colin McAlpin - 1915 - 460 páginas
...feelings which is aware of itself as past and future, we are reduced to the alternative of believing that the mind, or ego, is something different from any series of feelings, or of accepting the paradox that something which is, ex hypothesi, but a series of feelings, can be aware... | |
 | James Ward - 1919 - 510 páginas
...still remains the alternative, expressed in the words of JS Mill, viz. " the alternative of believing that the Mind or Ego is something different from any series of feelings or possibilities of them." To admit this, of course, is to admit the necessity of distinguishing between Mind or Ego, meaning... | |
 | Hans Ruin - 1921 - 324 páginas
...würde darin bestehen, dass eine Reihe, die aus einzelnen zusammengekoppel1 P. 248: ». . . that thc Mind, or Ego, is something different from any series of feelings, or possibilities of them, or of accepting the paradox, that something which ex hypothesi is but a series of feelings, can be... | |
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If, therefore, we speak of the Mind as a series of feelings, we are obliged to complete the statement by calling it a series of feelings which is aware of itself as past and future : and we are reduced to the alternative of believing that the Mind, or... 
