 | Gilbert Sutton - 1868 - 356 páginas
...feelings which is aware of itself as past and future ; and we are reduced to the alternative of believing that the mind, or ego, is something different from any series of feelings or possibilities of them, or of accepting the paradox that something, which ex hypothesi is but a series of feelings, can be... | |
 | 1868 - 654 páginas
...sensations) which is aware of itself as past and .future ; and we are reduced to the alternative of believing that the mind, or ego, is something different from any series of feelings, or any possibilities of them, or of accepting the paradox that something which ex hypothesi is but a series... | |
 | 1868 - 662 páginas
...sensations) which is aware of itself as past and future; and we are reduced to the alternative of believing that the mind, or ego, is something different from any series of feelings, or any possibilities of them, or of accepting the paradox that something which ex hypothesi is but a.... | |
 | 1868 - 884 páginas
...feelings which is aware of itself as past and future ; and we are reduced to the alternative of believing that the mind or ego is something different from any series of feelings and possibilities of them, or of accepting the paradox that something which, ex hypotltesi, is but... | |
 | Henry Allon - 1868 - 728 páginas
...which ' cic hypothesi is but a series of feelings, can be aware of itself as ' a series.' That the mind is something different from any series of feelings or possibilities of them, has been and still is the all but universal conviction alike of mankind in general, and of the profoundtst... | |
 | James McCosh - 1869 - 82 páginas
...itself as past and future." He had acknowledged that this " reduces us to the alternative of believing that the Mind, or Ego, is something different from any series of feelings or possibilities of them, or of accepting the paradox that something which, ex hypothesi, is but a series of feelings, can be... | |
 | Noah Porter - 1869 - 752 páginas
...ferlings which ix aware of ITSELF as past and future ; and we arc reduced to the alternative of believing that the mind or Ego is something different from any series of feelings or possibilities of them, or of accepting the paradox that something which, ex hypoIJtcsi, is but a scries of feelings, can bo... | |
 | Joseph Haven - 1869 - 514 páginas
...feelings which is aware of itself as past and future ; and we are reduced to the alternati"e of believing that the mind or ego is something different from any series of feelings and possibilities of them, or of accepting the paradox that something which, ex hypothesi, is but a... | |
 | Charles B. B. M'Laren - 1870 - 130 páginas
...; and he puts the issue well when he says, J that " we are reduced to the alternative of believing that the Mind, or Ego, is something different from any series of feelings, or possibilities of them, or of accepting the paradox that something, which, ex hypothesi, is but a series of feelings, can be... | |
 | 1870 - 672 páginas
...feelings which is aware of itself as past and future ; and we are reduced to the alternative of believing that the mind or ego is something different from any series of feelings or possibilities of them, or of accepting the paradox, that something which ex Jiypothesi is but a series of feelings, can be... | |
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If, therefore, we speak of the Mind as a series of feelings, we are obliged to complete the statement by calling it a series of feelings which is aware of itself as past and future : and we are reduced to the alternative of believing that the Mind, or... 
