 | William James - 1890 - 718 páginas
...feelings which is aware of itself as past and future : and we are reduced to the alternative of believing that the mind, or Ego, is something different from any series of feelings, or possibilities of them, or of accepting the paradox that something which ex fiypothe•i is but a series of feelings, can be... | |
 | D. B. McLachlan - 1892 - 254 páginas
...feelings which is aware of itself as past and future: and we are reduced to the alternative of believing that the Mind, or Ego, is something different from any series of feelings, or possibilities of them, or of accepting the paradox that something which ex hypothesi is but a series of feelings, can be aware... | |
 | Henry Clay Sheldon - 1894 - 460 páginas
...feelings which is aware of itself as past and future ; and we are reduced to the alternative of believing that the mind, or ego, is something different from any series of feelings, or possibilities of them, or of accepting the parodox that something which ex hypothesi is but a series of feelings can be aware... | |
 | Literary and Philosophical Society of Liverpool - 1897 - 360 páginas
...states the case thus — " We are reduced (by the phenomena of memory) to the alternative of believing that the Mind or Ego is something different from any series of feelings, or possibilities of them, or of accepting the paradox that something which is, ex hypothesi, but a series of feelings, can be... | |
 | Paul Janet, Gabriel Séailles - 1902 - 402 páginas
...feelings which is aware of itself as past and future ; and we are reduced to the alternative of believing that the Mind, or Ego, is something different from any series of feelings, or of possibilities of them, or of accepting the paradox, that something which, ex hi/pothesi, is but... | |
 | Richard Burdon Haldane Haldane (Viscount) - 1903 - 344 páginas
...feelings which is aware of itself as past and future ; and we are reduced to the alternative of believing that the Mind or Ego is something different from any series of feelings, or possibilities of them, or of accepting the paradox that something which, ex hypot/tesi, is but a series of feelings, can be... | |
 | James Orr - 1903 - 268 páginas
...position more hopeless than ever. As he himself put it, " we are reduced to the alternative of believing that the mind or ego is something different from any series of feelings or possibility of them, or of accepting the paradox that something which ex hypothesi is but a series... | |
 | John Clark Murray - 1904 - 538 páginas
...feelings which is aware of itself as past and future ; and we are reduced to the alternative of believing that the Mind, or Ego, is something different from any series of feelings, or possibilities of them, or of accepting the paradox that something which ex hypothesi is but a series of feelings can be aware... | |
 | Granville Stanley Hall, Edward Bradford Titchener, Karl M. Dallenbach, Madison Bentley, Edwin Garrigues Boring, Margaret Floy Washburn - 1904 - 622 páginas
...feelings which is aware of itself as past and future; and we are reduced to the alternative of believing that the mind, or ego, is something different from any series of feelings; or possibilities of them, or of accepting the paradox that something, which ex hypothesi is but a series of feelings, can be... | |
 | Lonna Dennis Arnett - 1904 - 136 páginas
...feelings which is aware of itself as past and future; and we are reduced to the alternative of believing that the mind, or ego, is something different from any series of feelings; or possibilities of them, or of accepting the paradox that something, which ex hypothesi is but a series of feelings, can be... | |
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If, therefore, we speak of the Mind as a series of feelings, we are obliged to complete the statement by calling it a series of feelings which is aware of itself as past and future : and we are reduced to the alternative of believing that the Mind, or... 
